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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a district court's final order denying a petition for post-
conviction relief in a capital case filed by Von Lester Taylor ("Mr. Taylor" or 
"Petitioner"). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(I). The 
district court entered its order denying the petition on August 17, 2009. (ROA 1211; 
Addendum B.) Mr. Taylor timely filed a notice of appeal from that order on September 
15, 2009. (ROA 1320; Utah R. App. P. 4(a).) 
ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue 
Whether the district court erred in holding that Claims 5, 9, 10? 12, 14, 19,21,24, 
25, and 27 are procedurally barred because they were not raised in Mr. Taylor's initial 
post-conviction petition. 
Standard of Review 
This Court must "review an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition 
for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's 
conclusions of law." Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, ^ 13 (quoting Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 
UT 42, f7, 94 P.3d 263 ("Gardner HF) (quoting Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7, % 43 
P.3d 467)). "When confronted with ineffective assistance of counsel claims," this Court 
"review[s] a lower court's purely factual findings for clear error, but review[s] the 
application of the law to the facts for correctness." Taylor, 2007 UT 12, f 13 (quoting 
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ^[58, 150 P.3d 480). 
Preservation 
This issue arises from the district court's ruling and is thus exemr! *•-
preservation at that level. 
C O N S riONAL P R O v i s iONS 5 STATUTES, AND RULES 
V \ K in 
Addendum A: 
Federal Rules of Evidence 606(b) 
i Halt Lode oi Admin, rroc. Kuli J.v i4-> 
I hljh (Vide Ann .'; "'R-"? vi-lll4 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202 
Utah v. ,;e \ 
Utah Code . k^ . $ 78B->-
 Av . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedi ire, R I ile 1(a) 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 23B 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(c) 
1 il.ih Ruii^ of \ 1iiimihil I'loeedure 8 
Utah Rules of Evidence 606(b) 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Taylor is in state custody at the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah. He is 
sentenced to death. 
The Course of Proceedings 
On November 5, 2007? Mr. Taylor filed a Petition for Relief under the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") in the district court ("Petition"). (ROA 1 -486.) 
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on February 15, 2008. (ROA 528-627.) Petitioner 
filed an opposition on May 13, 2008. (ROA 659-800.) On June 13, 2008, Respondent 
moved for permission to file a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion to 
dismiss. (ROA 823-30.) Petitioner opposed that motion on June 23, 2008. (ROA 831-
37.) Respondent filed a reply on that request on June 26, 2008 (ROA 838-48), and the 
district court on that same date allowed the supplemental memorandum by the State. 
(ROA 849-50.) On July 25, 2008, the State filed its supplemental memorandum. (ROA 
863-86.) Petitioner filed an opposition on August 27, 2008. (ROA 887-933.) On 
February 26, 2009, Respondent filed a reply. (ROA 974-1163.) The district court held 
oral argument on the motion to dismiss on July 14, 2009. (ROA 1330.) On August 17, 
2009, the district court granted the State's motion to dismiss in its Ruling and Order 
("Ruling"). (ROA 1211.) Mr. Taylor timely filed his notice of appeal on September 15, 
2009. (ROA 1320-22.) 
Dispc siti on in th e C' ci i iii I: Be I c:i • i v 
Mr.' I a}/ lor is appealing the district court's denial of his Petition as si iccessi/v e and 
procedurally barred. (ROA 1211.) 
Statement of Facts1 
( in I'll' ml- i I I I,,'|||HI j)ii, i fininliiio iln; ib\ searching for employment, Mr 
Taylor failed to return to the halfway house where he was sta> ing One w eek later J!\ !i 
Taylor and Edward Deli broke into the Tiede family cabin after seeing Rolf and Kaye 
Tiede leave their Summit County cabin with their family and luggage in tow. 
I lie folio \ \ ii lg da> ., after an o \ ernight s h o p p i n g li ip in ,Sall I a k e L i l \ , I he I i cde s 
returned t o the cab in . P a r t o f t h e f ami ly parked ;il Hie r a t e d III Www i ^ ! 
development and Kaye Tiede, together with her mother, Beth Potts, a woman m her 
mid /Us, and daughter Linae Tiede, age 20, drove two snowmobiles to the cabin, which 
w i Ion jlecl i i p p i ' o x t i o a k h ivi m n u l l ' , !iiiii> (IK oak on \\ ohet ('ainon road , P.oH I icde 
and his 16 year-old daughter Tricia Tiede drove to a i epair shop to pick up .idditional 
snowmobiles which were being repaired. 
Linae Tiede was the first to arrive at the cabin. When she opened the door at the 
l o p off ho si airs Mi I .i I u < on i l ion led In i y it In Ins \ linn In ,m in >i K •< • 1 \ J \ C 1 tede a n d M s 
Potts were upstairs, Kaye Tiede offered Mr. Taylor money. As she reached into 
jacket, Mr. Taylor shot her near her left shoulder. Based on the testimony at trial and the 
1
 The Statement of Facts is primarily derived from the Ruling, which described its 
summary of the facts as "[gjleaned from the record of court proceedings as found by the 
court and jury at the time." (ROA 1216.) The basis for the Statement of Facts is found 
in the ROA at 1\n 16 ?05 except as otherwise noted. 
4 
forensic evidence, it appears that Mr. Taylor's shot was responsible for a graze wound on 
Kaye Tiede's left arm, and not Gunshot Wound #2, as originally thought. {See Petition 
Exhibit 117.2) Ms. Potts was then shot several times, including at least once in the chest 
and in the head, either of which could have been the cause of her death. 
Linae Tiede witnessed the shootings of her mother and grandmother from several 
feet away. (RT3 509.) She unequivocally stated that Mr. Taylor carried a .38 caliber 
handgun and Edward Deli carried a .44 caliber weapon. (RT 499, 503.) Linae Tiede 
believed that each fired shots from their respective weapons. (RT 499, 503.) 
Extremely damaging to Mr. Taylor was the testimony of Dr. Sharon Schnittker of 
the Utah State Medical Examiner's Office, who performed the autopsies on Beth Potts and 
Kaye Tiede. (RT 700.) Dr. Schnittker testified that .38 caliber bullets were responsible 
for at least two of the bullet wounds, Gunshot Wound #2 to Beth Potts, and Gunshot 
Wound #2 to Kaye Tiede. (RT 704, 707.) Dr. Schnittker only recovered one bullet from 
the two autopsies, a .38 caliber slug that she tied to Gunshot Wound #2 to Kaye Tiede. 
(RT 707-08.) Moreover, Gunshot Wound #2 to Kaye Tiede was identified to be a fatal 
shot, having gone through from the shoulder, fracturing the second and third ribs, and 
passing through the upper lobe of the left lung, and into the aorta, through the right lung, 
and finally fracturing the fourth right rib before exiting. (RT 710.) 
2
 Because the clerk's office did not bates number every page of the Record on 
Appeal, Petitioner must frequently use alternative descriptions for reference. 
3 «£p>
 refers to the reporter's transcripts of the Capital Homicide Sentencing 
Phase lodged with the Utah Supreme Court in Utah v. Taylor, Case No. 910496. 
The projectil . . « - * • . , 
Laboratory indicate that with the possible exception of a bullet graze to Kaye Tiede's arm, 
and the non-fatal pellet shots fired by Mr. Taylor, all of the other injuries to Kaye Tiede 
i I I id lii P'olli. were ill I m:l caused In the , I \ caliber weapon carried by Mr. lien (See 
State's Trial Exs, 28 to 38 ) I he exhibits at t t: ial she v e d that fi \ - e Il I magni im III: i ill = ts 
were recovered either from the bodies of Kaye Tiede and Beth Potts, or the floor area 
under their bodies, while only two .38 caliber bullets were recovered. (Petition Exhibit 
85 ) One c f those 3 8 caliber lit illets was wrongfully assumed to have penetrated Ms. 
Tiede, and the other "was examined .HHL <» /thiol /v t scltuh < '".n.h.n inn? h m final In n 
the Smith and Wesson .38 caliber revolver." (Id.; emphasis added.) N o evidence 
definitively proved that the second bullet was fired from the .38 caliber handgun. (Id.) 
penalty phase trial and the expert reports make clear that 
five .44 caliber bullets passed throi igh the ' ictims (I "'e tition Exhibit 86 ) I he ai itopsj 
reports and the testimony of Dr. Schnittker unequivocally prove that the two women were 
only penetrated by five actual bullets, along with Kaye Tiede being wounded by some bird 
sin,»( ,tm I ii iiipiTlinal graze dloiit' lin mm " 1 h1 I <>*>9-' J2; Petition Exhibits 83&84.) As 
with the bullet that grazed Kaye Tiede, the bird shot from thr iK \\;\s nof (iil.il i \i I III1
 ( 
The Bullet Analysis compiled by Detective Joseph Offret on February 28, 1991, 
4
 I h e bird shot all came from the .38 caliber Smith and Wesson taken from Dennis 
Anderson's cabin. The .38 caliber bird shot was packed by a friend of Mr. Anderson's 
who was a gun expert and loaded most of his own ammunition. These cartridges were 
lightly packed for killing woodpeckers. According to Mr. Anderson, it "is easy to tell the 
difference between bird shot and regular bullets." (Petition Exhibit 114, at f6.) 
6 
reported the results of the examination of the eight bullets recovered from the Tiede Cabin 
and the one bullet recovered by the coroner. (Petition Exhibit 86.) Detective Offret 
conclusively determined that bullets # 1 (JB13), #2 (JB15), #5 (JB42), #6 (JB46)? and #7 
(JB48) were all fired through the bodies of either Kaye Tiede or Beth Potts. {Id.) Having 
made this determination, combined with the bird shot from the .38, there are no 
unaccounted for entrance wounds. Bullets 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7, were all AA caliber rounds. 
The coroner was incorrect when she assumed that the .38 she found in Kaye Tiede's 
clothing had passed through her body. 
There is no physical evidence tying Mr. Taylor to Beth Potts' shooting. While one 
of the wounds was thought to have been caused by a .38 caliber bullet (RT 704), no bullet 
was ever recovered that matched that wound. 
Mr. Taylor was assumed to have been responsible for killing Kaye Tiede because 
the .38 caliber bullet found in the clothing of Kaye Tiede was in the general proximity of 
Gunshot Wound #2's exit. Dr. Schnittker has since admitted that she cannot be certain 
that the .3 8 caliber bullet she recovered actually caused the injuries of Gunshot Wound #2 
to Kaye Tiede, as was previously indicated at trial. (RT 707-08.) 
During the autopsy of Kaye Tiede, I recovered a spent 
medium caliber bullet in the right shoulder region during 
removal of the victim's sweatshirt. Although this bullet was 
close to the exit of Gunshot Wound #2, and could have 
caused the through-and-through bullet track in the body, I 
found no exit perforation through the underlying T-shirt 
between the exit of the skin and the sweatshirt. I would have 
expected to find such a perforation if the recovered projectile 
was responsible for Gunshot Wound #2. An unattached 
bullet in the clothing may have changed position within the 
clothing by movement of the body after being shot and 
post-mortem. The location of this bullet is consistent with 
Gunshot Wound #2, but I cannot be certain that this bullet 
caused the injuries of Gunshot Wound #2. 
Because the bullet I recovered was not recovered from the 
body itself, I know of no characteristics on the bullet at this 
point, that allow me to definitively conclude that it went 
through Kaye Tiede 
(Petition Exhibit JL *,, 1fl[5-6.) 
Although the crime lab and Detective Offret implied that the one bullet fired from 
ILC j s caliber passed through Kaye I iede, no conclusive determination was made, and 
(fii.111^ id l r i i r r "Jim M", , Hi il Ihi IX M I U 1 • h ill"! n h i a l h a i j i u hi i.ills g i a / c d l\a;« c h a l t ^ 
arm. (Petition Exhibit 86.) Whereas the five .44 caliber bullets were either referred to as 
having "passed through" or having been "fired through" one of the victims, Detective 
<>'!:ei Purely states ; . caliber slug, "was recovered from the body of 
K t\ r ] i > . f ** l , I, mi i i i ' i ^ I n f i l l in 
was patently incorrect, as the autopsy report shows that the bullet was not recovered from 
the body, it was pulled from her sweatshirt: 
The projectile passes through-and-through the body and no 
projectile is recovered from the body itself. During removal 
of the sweatshirt, a projectile is located in the right shoulder 
region which appears to be adjacent to the exit of Gunshot 
Wound #2. It is a lead projectile with a base diameter of 0.8 
cm and is submitted in an evidence container. 
(Petition Exhibit 84, at 620; emphasis added.) 
Tiede and his daughter Tricia arrived. Mr. Iay lor grabbed Linae by the throat and W- l 
8 
his gun to her back. Mr. Tiede and Tricia were both ordered into the garage and Mr. 
Taylor asked Mr. Tiede for money. Mr. Tiede complied and then Mr. Taylor shot Mr. 
Tiede in the face with bird shot. Mr. Taylor shot Mr. Tiede again in the head with bird 
shot while Mr. Tiede was lying face down on the ground. Gasoline was scattered through 
the cabin and it was set on fire before Mr. Taylor and Mr. Deli left with Linae and Tricia. 
When the four of them arrived at the gate to the development, they got into the 
Tiedes' car and drove away. Mr. Tiede took a snowmobile to the Weber Canyon Road 
gate, where he found a family member and they called the police. Mr. Taylor and Mr. 
Deli were apprehended shortly thereafter. Neither Linae nor Tricia were harmed. 
On May 1, 1991, Mr. Taylor pled guilty to two counts of capital homicide in the 
deaths of Kaye Tiede and Ms. Potts and the State agreed to dismiss several other felony 
counts of attempted aggravated murder, aggravated arson, aggravated kidnapping, 
aggravated robbery, theft, and failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop. On May 
16, 17, 21, and 22, 1991, the penalty phase trial was conducted. On May 24, 1991, the 
jurors returned a unanimous sentencing decision in favor of death for Mr. Taylor on each 
count of capital homicide. Mr. Taylor then sought to withdraw his guilty plea, which was 
denied by the trial court. 
Through his trial counsel, Elliott Levine, Mr. Taylor appealed to this Court on July 
8,1992. However, after Mr. Taylor's opening brief was filed, on July 20,1992, the State 
requested that the brief be stricken and that Mr. Levine be removed from his 
representation of Mr. Taylor. Although Mr. Levine was ordered to withdraw and was 
r e p l a c e d b y B r u c e S;nrfi!2C in Si^i lcrnln, i I'^'H. ih t ' op i ' i in i i j , hr'n, if \\ ijs 11 ml s l m k n in I  h i n n t i 
the direct appeal, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing 
under Utah Rules o f Appellate Procedure, Rule 23B, on the claim that trial counsel had 
be en in effect i\ e 1; v ulenee vv as presented to the trial court at that hearing on M a y 15, 16, 
o f his right to effective representation under the Sixth Amendment. 
Mr. Savage then pursued the direct appeal by filing Mr. Taylor's brief on June 3 , 
<..v, ;.. opinion rejecting all o. ... . d > i u . ^ 
appellate claims. State v. Tavu^ U -T w * ,; ' n " ) I he! In . •• A <x • • v 
denied the petition for a writ o f certiorari on October 5, 1998. 
On February 2 3 , 1 9 9 8 , Richard P. Mauro was appointed as post-conviction counsel 
p i i i . i j i i I i n t i n IN 1" ^ \ j > ( h i A i i t M . i i l\ i i i i i \ c a r L I I L - J M I I . n l o i " l i l n l I n s P e t i t i o n f o r 
Rel ie f Under the U tah PCRA. v^ i * < le< I. his Firsl !| iiic :n< !< M 1 
Petition for Rel ie f U n d e r the Utah PCRA. Respondent, Hank Galetka, w h o was the 
warden/respondent at the time, filed a motion for summary judgment on September 13, 
M1'1,1 ' h'\\ .ui ' i i f i ienl M" \ u r , > " i n n , ' , ' Min . ' iMi) j i i f l g i n n i l wiv l i za rd v\\ A p i . I l i V O ' B 
On March 1, 2004 , the post-conviction trial court granted Respondent's mo t ion for 
summary judgment and denied post-conviction relief on all o f Mr. Taylor's claims. The 
signed order and judgment was entered on September 22 , 2004 . 
]^ ' ' l.i*' ' ,ll,m I< i ippt j l f l nil i - i l invhii ,nul ""i ( 'i u l t inned the 
post-conviction court on January 26, 2007 . Taylor v. State, r!0(l7 11 i P I So I11 ;<| 7 \{). 
10 
The request for a rehearing was denied on March 27, 2007. On September 4, 2007, Mr. 
Taylor filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus and, on November 2,2007, a first 
amended petition was filed in federal court. Although Mr. Taylor's federal case was, and 
is, still pending, on November 5, 2007, he filed this Petition. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah state law provides several exceptions to procedural bar, including: unusual 
circumstances, newly discovered or suppressed evidence, good cause, and that the claims 
in the petition were neither frivolous nor withheld for tactical reasons. Mr. Taylor has 
alleged in two claims (Fourteen and Twenty-Four) that newly discovered evidence 
preempts the procedural bar. The first of these violations, that the prosecution excluded 
non-Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints members from the jury because of their 
religion, rendered the penalty phase unconstitutional under the Utah State Constitution. 
Mr. Taylor's entire case suffers from "the existence of fundamental unfairness in 
a conviction," as Mr. Taylor has credibly pled that he is actually innocent. Mr. Taylor's 
innocence of the intentional murders of Kaye Tiede and Beth Potts renders his conviction 
fundamentally unfair. Mr. Taylor's innocence is a gateway through procedural bar under 
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1036 (Utah 1989). Accordingly, there is good cause for 
Claims 5, 9, 10,12,14, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27 to be raised in the Petition currently before 
this Court and the district court erred in holding that these claims were procedurally barred 
because they could have been, but were not previously raised. Accordingly, the Court 
should set aside the procedural bars, consider Mr. Taylor's claims on the merits, and grant 
n 
relief. Alternatively, the Court should reverse the district court and remand the case to 
allow the district court to consider the claims on the merits, and to afford Mr. Taylor the 
discovery and evidentiary hearing he requested below to further develop the facts entitling 
him to relief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Introduction 
Petitioner appeals the denial of Claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27, 
which the district court determined were barred because they could have been, but were 
not previously raised on direct appeal or in Petitioner5 s initial petition for post-conviction 
relief. (See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(d); Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613 
(Utah 1994) ("Gardner IT').) 
Mr. Taylor hereby raises and preserves, but does not brief at length any of the 
claims deemed successive by the district court. Noting that "Petitioner candidly and 
commendably concedes that the following claims were raised and addressed in a prior 
proceeding" (ROA 1274-79), the district court determined that Claims 1-4, 6-8, 11,13, 
15-18, 20, 22-23, 26, and 28-30 are procedurally barred under the PCRA: 
All of the foregoing claims were raised and addressed in a 
prior proceeding, either at trial, on direct appeal, in 
Petitioner's initial petition for post-conviction relief, or in his 
appeal from the denial of his initial petition for 
post-conviction relief and, therefore, they are procedurally 
barred under the PCRA and no statutory exception exists that 
would permit the Court to consider the merits of these claims. 
(ROA 1279-80 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(b) and (d)).) 
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Mr. Taylor filed these claims in the Petition before this Court to obviate any 
exhaustion arguments in federal court and to allow both this Court and the district court 
to fully consider the cumulative error claim. 
The district court's independent review concurs with both Respondent's (ROA 
976-77) and Mr. Taylor's analysis that Claims 1-4, 6-8,11,13,15-18,20,22-23, 26, and 
28-30 were previously before this Court. Therefore, Mr. Taylor will not burden this Court 
with arguments on the merits of most of these claims again unless this Court determines 
that it has not had a full opportunity to review one of these claims before, or if Respondent 
reverses course and contends that any or all of these claims have not previously been 
presented to this Court for consideration. 
This Court's rule on successive petitions is clear, "ground for relief from a 
conviction or sentence that has once been fully and fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a 
prior [post-conviction] proceeding should not be readjudicated unless it can be shown that 
there are 'unusual circumstances.'" Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1036. While unusual 
circumstances exist in the form of Mr. Taylor's assertion of innocence, which would act 
as a gateway through procedural bar under Hurst, these claims appear to be unnecessarily 
repetitive unless the Court should conclude that these claims are not successive and were 
not previously before this Court. 
If this Court determines that Respondent, Petitioner, and the district court were 
incorrect in their analysis, Mr. Taylor requests that he be permitted to file supplemental 
briefing of the relevant claims at that point. Alternatively, if Respondent challenges the 
1Q 
district court's holding, Mr. Taylor will brief the claims in his reply pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(c). Ultimately, if this Court, after examining the 
Petition, agrees with Judge Lubeck of the district court that these claims are not materially 
different from what was previously presented to this Court, then there is no cause to 
reexamine Claims 1-4, 6-8, 11, 13, 15-18, 20, 22-23, and 26 in this appeal.5 
II. Procedural Bar 
A. Mr. Taylor's Petition Was Timely 
The district court "opted to simply assume that Petitioner's successive petition was 
timely filed and consider first whether the successive claims are procedurally barred." 
(ROA 1273.) Nonetheless, Mr. Taylor's claims would not be subject to timeliness 
restrictions because the "interests of justice" exception articulated by this Court in Julian 
v. State applies herein. Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (1998) ("proper consideration 
of meritorious claims raised in a habeas corpus petition will always be in the interests of 
justice. It necessarily follows that no statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied 
to bar a habeas petition") (emphasis in original). Mr. Taylor has pled that he is actually 
innocent of the two murders he was convicted of, therefore if he were facing a timeliness 
bar, the interests of justice exception would apply. 
5
 Mr. Taylor previously moved to withdraw Claim Twenty-Eight (lethal injection) 
from the Petition. In the wake of new developments of law, Mr. Taylor does not believe 
that the Petition was the proper forum to present that claim as pled. Claims Twenty-Nine 
(ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel) and Thirty (cumulative error) are 
being raised again by Mr. Taylor because they have necessarily changed since their first 
presentation to this Court. The ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel 
could not be fully realized by state post-conviction counsel and cumulative error has 
changed with the addition of Claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27. 
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B. The New PCRA Is Not Retroactive 
The district court correctly held that the PCRA does not retroactively apply. (ROA 
1266.) Therefore, Mr. Taylor was entitled to the effective representation of 
post-conviction counsel throughout his initial post-conviction proceeding. 
C. Utah State Law Provides Several Exceptions to Procedural Bar 
The district court noted that both the PCRA and the common law preclude a 
petitioner from obtaining "relief... upon any ground that was raised or addressed in any 
previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a 
previous request for post-conviction relief." (ROA 1243-44 (citing Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-35a-106(l)(d); Gardner II, 888P.2dat613 ("Issues that could and should have been 
raised on direct appeal, but were not, may not properly be raised in a habeas corpus 
proceeding absent unusual circumstances.").) 
This Court has recognized four basic exceptions to this procedural bar: unusual 
circumstances, newly discovered or suppressed evidence, good cause, and the claims in 
the petition were neither frivolous nor withheld for tactical reasons. 
1. Unusual Circumstances 
In Hurst v. Cook, this Court held that claims previously raised and addressed may 
be considered if the petitioner is able to demonstrate "unusual circumstances." Hurst, 111 
P.2d at 1036. See also Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, 1J20, 128 P.3d 1123 (the Utah 
Supreme Court has "consistently recognized exceptions to [the procedural bar] rule in 
'unusual circumstances' where 'good cause5 excuses a petitioner's failure to raise the 
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claim earlier.5') 
Unusual circumstances include newly discovered evidence. Hurst, 111 P.2d at 
1036. In addition to the other exceptions explained infra, Mr. Taylor's Petition explains 
that two claims (Fourteen and Twenty-Four) rest on newly discovered evidence and are 
therefore exempt from procedural bar. 
2. Newly Discovered Evidence 
There are two instances of newly discovered evidence in the Petition. The clearest 
example is found in Claim Fourteen, where Mr. Taylor has pled that the prosecution 
excluded non-Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints members from the jury because 
of their religion. This exclusion deprived Mr. Taylor of the right to trial by a jury drawn 
from a representative cross-section of the community in violation of the Utah Constitution. 
Specifically, juror Holly Conner was impermissibly struck by the prosecution. Ms. 
Conner was similarly situated to the jurors accepted by the prosecution in every aspect 
except for her religion. 
This violation was uncovered by federal habeas counsel when they were provided 
with one of the prosecutors5 notes by the district court. (Petition Exhibit 77, at Bates Nos. 
575-80.) Those notes were not provided to any of Mr. Taylor's former counsel. As 
detailed in Section IV(D)(4)? infra, those notes allowed Mr. Taylor's current counsel to 
discover the exclusion of non-Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints members from 
the jury because of their religion. 
Additionally, Claim Twenty-Four described the newly discovered evidence within 
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Scott Manley' s declaration. Mr. Manley' s declaration was obtained after a thorough, time 
consuming, and costly investigation by the Office of the Federal Public Defender. 
Because state post-conviction counsel did not receive the funding deemed reasonable and 
necessary by the district court, he could not locate and interview Mr. Manley. 
3. Good Cause 
In Hurst, this Court identified five "good cause" common law exceptions to the 
procedural bar rule. Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1037. Those exceptions are: (1) the denial of a 
constitutional right pursuant to new law that is, or might be, retroactive; (2) new facts not 
previously known which would show the denial of a constitutional right or might change 
the outcome of the trial, (3) the existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction, 
(4) the illegality of a sentence, and (5) a claim overlooked in good faith with no intent to 
delay or abuse the writ. Id. The latter four are all applicable in Mr. Taylor's case. 
Moreover, this Court has held that these five exceptions are not an exhaustive list. See 
Gardner v. Galetka, 2007 UT 3, f 18, 151 P.3d 968 {"Gardner IV) ("We later clarified 
that this list of 'good cause5 exceptions is not exhaustive.5'). 
The third of those reasons, "the existence of fundamental unfairness in a 
conviction,55 applies to Mr. Taylor's entire case. Mr. Taylor has credibly pled that he is 
actually innocent. If Mr. Taylor is innocent of the murders of Kaye Tiede and Beth Potts, 
then his conviction and sentence for intentional murder are fundamentally unfair. Mr. 
Taylor's innocence is a gateway through procedural bar under Hurst. See also Sawyer v. 
Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 120 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1992) ("We have 
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previously held that even if a state prisoner cannot meet the cause and prejudice standard, 
a federal court may hear the merits of the successive claims if the failure to hear the claims 
would constitute a 'miscarriage of justice.'"). 
There is good cause for Claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19,21,24,25, and 27 to be raised 
in the Petition currently before this Court. While the district court held that these claims 
could have been, but were not previously raised, that conclusion should not be 
determinative because Mr. Taylor is actually innocent. Moreover, some of these claims 
relate to new facts not previously known. These two factors, in combination and 
individually, have resulted in a fundamentally unfair conviction. Moreover, the claims 
were overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the writ. 
Hurst is not alone in explaining exceptions to procedural bar. In Gardner IV, this 
Court held that-
procedural default is not always determinative of a collateral 
attack on a conviction where it is alleged that the trial was not 
conducted within the bounds of basic fairness or in harmony 
with constitutional standards." Therefore, even where a 
claim of error could have been raised earlier, post-conviction 
relief may be available in those "rare cases" or "unusual 
circumstances" where "an obvious injustice or a substantial 
and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right has occurred" 
that would make it "unconscionable" not to reexamine the 
issue. 
Gardner IV, 2007 UT 3,117. 
4. The Claims Were Neither Frivolous Nor Withheld for Tactical 
Reasons 
According to this Court's definition in Gardner III, a claim is frivolous if it is 
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facially implausible. Gardner III, 2004 UT 42, %L 1. Tactical reasoning was addressed by 
the United States Supreme Court in Yarboroughv. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1,5,124S.Ct. 1,157 
L. Ed. 2d 1 (2003) ("When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, 
there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer 
neglect."). Cited by the district court in its Ruling, the court noted that 
Other than merely asserting that his claims were overlooked 
in good faith, Petitioner nowhere demonstrates that they were 
not withheld for tactical reasons. It may well be that all of 
the claims he now raises which could have been raised in a 
prior post-conviction petition are non-frivolous in nature, but 
the Court must presume that post-conviction counsel had a 
legitimate tactical reason for not raising them in the prior 
petition... in order to overcome this presumption, Petitioner 
must show that "there was no 'conceivable tactical basis for 
counsel's actions.'" [citation] Not only has Petitioner not 
even attempted to specifically meet his burden, it is unlikely 
that he could do so. 
(ROA 1297-98.) 
The district court is incorrect, Mr. Taylor voluminously detailed state post-
conviction counsel's failings. If, after examining the Petition, the district court believed 
that state post-conviction counsel may have had a tactical basis for his failure to bring 
these claims, it should have held an evidentiary hearing to further examine the issue. This 
is not dissimilar to what this Court did in regards to trial counsel when it ordered the Rule 
23B hearing. 
A defendant has a right to discovery or an evidentiary hearing if they make a 
"substantial threshold showing." Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186, 112 S. Ct. 
1840,118 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1992); United States v. Berger, 251 F.3d 894,907 fn.4 (10th Cir. 
1Q 
2001); United States v. Duncan, 242 F.3d 940 (10th Cir. 2001). Mr. Taylor made such a 
showing in the Petition. 
There is no conceivable basis for ignoring Mr. Taylor's innocence or doing less 
than everything to overturn his death sentence, therefore the district court's presumption 
of a tactic or strategy was wrong and further inquiry was necessary. 
III. Statutory Right to the Effective Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel 
The district court held that under the PCRA, Mr. Taylor had a statutory right to 
post-conviction counsel. (ROA 1263.) "[T]he PCRA required the trial court to determine 
whether the petitioner was indigent and, if so, 'promptly appoint counsel who is qualified 
to represent [petitioners] in death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure.'" (ROA 1263 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(l)(2)(a)).) 
This right to counsel would be meaningless without a right to effective counsel. See 
Menzies, 2006 UT 81, {^82 ("[petitioner] has a statutory right to effective assistance of 
counsel under Utah Code section 78-35a-202.") 
The district court properly noted that the right to the effective assistance of counsel 
is a substantive right. However, the district court wrongly concluded that Mr. Taylor was 
prohibited from bringing Claims 5,9,10,12,14,19,21,24,25, and 27 because they could 
have been, but were not, raised in a prior post-conviction petition. In order to have been 
raised in a prior petition, state post-conviction counsel would have had to have had the 
opportunity to properly plead the claims. State post-conviction counsel was prevented 
from developing these claims by his lack of funding. 
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IV. The District Court Erred in Procedurally Barring Claims that Were Not 
Raised in Petitioner's Initial Post-Conviction Petition 
The district court relied on Menzies and Utah Code Ann. §78-35 a-106 to determine 
that: 
because the right to post-conviction counsel is a legislatively 
created protection, it is constitutionally permissible, and 
within the Legislature's power, to exclude from the PCRA an 
exception to the procedural bar for successive claims that 
were raised and addressed, or could have been, but were not, 
raised in a prior post-conviction petition based upon 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Therefore, 
Petitioner cannot rely on a statutory right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel to overcome the 
procedural bar for successive claims that were raised and 
addressed, or could have been, but were not, raised in a prior 
post-conviction proceeding. 
(ROA1271.) 
First, the district court failed to distinguish between ineffective assistance of 
counsel in failing to bring a claim that could have been brought and ineffective assistance 
of counsel in being unable to bring a claim because of a State manufactured impediment. 
Second, because Mr. Taylor is actually innocent of the intentional murders, he is not 
procedurally barred from raising these claims at this time. 
A. Mr. Taylor Was Denied Critical Funds Necessary to Properly 
Challenge His Conviction and Sentence 
Mr. Taylor has pled that his state post-conviction counsel was prevented from 
properly investigating his case and accumulating evidence as a result of the State's 
deliberate interference with funding. Although the district court ultimately determined 
that the lack of funding did not excuse any of the procedural bars, it conceded that a lack 
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of adequate funding may result in constitutional or statutory violations. (ROA1292.) The 
court recognized that Menzies noted that "it may be the case that the statutory [funding] 
scheme imposes a crippling burden on [the petitioner]." Menzies, 2006 UT 81, {^20 n.3. 
State post-conviction counsel attempted to investigate both guilt and penalty issues 
but was hampered by Utah law, which initially capped expenditures at $10,000 per case. 
This amount was intended to cover all "expenses," which included the costs of retaining 
investigators, experts, and consultants. State post-conviction counsel repeatedly explained 
to the district court that the funding cap prevented him from folly developing the factual 
bases of Mr. Taylor's habeas claims. (Petition Exhibit 106, at bates nos. 864-74.) 
Mr. Taylor's prior post-conviction petition was impaired by (1) the limitations on 
expenditures pursuant to Utah Code of Admin. Proc. Rule 25-14-5; (2) generally 
insufficient fonds from the Utah Division of Finance ("DOF"); (3) state litigation that 
complicated and delayed the authorization and release of fonds; and (4) substantial delays 
by the DOF, amounting to, at times, years between the order for payment of fonds and the 
actual release of fonds to state post-conviction counsel. 
The district court dismissed the problem because of state post-conviction counsel's 
failure to use the funds he did have in his possession. However, as explained by Mr. 
Taylor's current counsel at the oral argument before the district court on July 14, 2009, 
if the quantity of fonds remaining are too little to afford that which is needed, it might as 
well be nothing: 
when you really look at it, if, for instance, you want to hire a 
social historian, which is something that the ABA guidelines 
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suggest should happen in each capital case, if a social 
historian costs $5,000 and you have $1,000 left, you can't 
spend that $1,000 to get the social historian. You're not 
going to get the social historian that you need for $ 1,000. So 
it's a catch 22. Do you have $1,000? Yes. Will it get you 
something? No. And I think that may have been part of the 
problem. Is the experts he needed, the investigation he 
needed, exceeded the funds he had. 
(ROA 1330; Transcript of July 14, 2009 hearing at 28-29.) 
In order for the district court to properly evaluate the impact of the lack of funding, 
it was critical that there be clarity on what funds remained. There is a material 
discrepancy between what the district court determined and what Mr. Taylor contends. 
According to the Ruling, 
based upon the information provided by Petitioner and the 
State in their pleadings, it appears that, although the 
post-conviction court authorized up to $40,258.59 in 
litigation expenses beyond the $ 10,000 maximum at the time, 
prior post-conviction counsel ultimately only requested actual 
litigation expenses in the amount of $11,555.16, leaving 
unused the amount of $8,444.84 by the court's math.6 Even 
if incorrect, the principle is sound. Even if prior 
post-conviction counsel could not do all he wanted, funding 
in some amount existed to do more. Despite the apparent 
funding problems Petitioner argues existed during his prior 
post-conviction proceedings, it is difficult for the Court to 
conclude that, with unused litigation funds still available in 
some amount, the new evidence that Petitioner now possesses 
is evidence that could not have been discovered through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence as a result of insufficient 
funding. 
(ROA 1287-88.) 
6
 The district court evidently relied on Respondent's figures. (See ROA 1030.) 
State post-conviction counsel was later allotted an additional $10,000 under an increase 
in the funding regulation. This increase brought his total investigative budget to $20,000. 
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Mr. Taylor concurs that if over $8,400 remained of the $20,000 he received, state 
post-conviction counsel was not financially prevented from raising these claims. 
However, Mr. Taylor's math is very different from the district court's and Respondent's. 
Mr. Taylor believes that less than $2,000 remained. 
State habeas counsel had reached the $10,000.00 limit by March 2000. (ROA 
1024.) State habeas counsel filed a request with the DOF for expenses exceeding the 
$10,000.00 on July 31, 2000 (State's Ex. 10 to Reply to Petitioner's Opposition to 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss), but was denied on August 16, 2000. (State's Ex. 11 
to Reply to Petitioner's Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.) When the Utah 
Attorney General's Office opposed state habeas counsel's OSC for court-approved funds 
over the statutory limit on November 13,2000, the cap was still $10,000.00. (State's Ex. 
13 to Reply to Petitioner's Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.) State habeas 
counsel was forced to expend a significant amount of time and energy fighting the 
$10,000.00 limit-rather than working on Mr. Taylor's initial post-conviction petition. 
After March 2000, state habeas counsel had no way of investigating the case until January 
2001 when the statute changed and Mr. Taylor became entitled to an additional $10,000 
in expenses. (ROA 1028.) 
The district court was incorrect in its conclusion that state habeas counsel 
submitted expenses to DOF totaling $11,555.16, because while the expenses as of May 
23,2002 were close to that number, state habeas counsel later submitted bills to the DOF 
of $4,000.00 for Dr. Linda Gummow on September 13, 2002, $1,530.27 on March 24, 
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2003 for Ted Cilwick, $300.00 on March 25, 2003 for Dr. Gummow, and $650.01 On 
October 13, 2003 for Mr. Cilwick, for total expenses (including the district court's 
$11.555.16 figure) of $18,035.44. (See Addendum C.) That means state habeas counsel 
had less than $2,000.00 left unused. The problem facing state habeas counsel has been 
before this Court before. See Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ^ [20. 
The district court's conclusion that "[e]ven if incorrect, the principle is sound," is 
wrong for the reason explained by counsel at oral argument. 
Turning a blind eye to the costs of conducting a proper post-conviction 
investigation is not sound. Post-conviction proceedings are expensive. As a third circuit 
judge, Justice Nehring gave the first order on October 8, 1998 for $5,000 to be paid to 
state post-conviction counsel. (Petition Exhibit 106.) Several orders for funds deemed 
"reasonable and necessary" by the district court followed. Judge Noel ordered almost 
$9,000 be paid for investigation on March 31, 1999. (Petition Exhibit 106.) He ordered 
almost $3,500 on January 18, 2000. (Petition Exhibit 106.) Finally, saying it was 
"reasonable and necessary," Judge Noel ordered $10,000 to be given to state post-
conviction counsel on July 26, 2000 for the retention of an investigator, $4,800 on that 
same date for the retention of a mental health expert, and up to $25,000 for a mitigation 
specialist. (Petition Exhibit 106.) It is difficult to reconcile how the district court could 
both consider these funds to be necessary and regard the initial state post-conviction 
petition to be adequate when it was produced without the benefit of the investigation and 
experts that these funds would have obtained. Either the district court was wrong in the 
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first instance, or in its current ruling. Mr. Taylor posits to this Court, as he did to the 
district court, that at a minimum, an evidentiary hearing is necessary to: (1) determine 
what funds were received and what were used, and (2) whether the funds were reasonable 
and necessary in the first instance.7 
In the alternative, should this Court determine that Justice Nehring and Judge 
Noel's orders are entitled to the presumption of correctness, then Mr. Taylor's state post-
conviction counsel must have had his hands unreasonably tied throughout the course of 
the initial post-conviction litigation, and the failure to plead the claims appealed herein 
was a direct result of the State's failure to "make good" on the amounts ordered to be paid. 
B. Meritorious Claims Are Always Subject to Review 
In each of the claims not raised in Petitioner's prior post-conviction petition, Mr. 
Taylor should not be procedurally defaulted for the following reasons: 
Mr. Taylor argued at the district court below that these claims are not procedurally 
barred because: (1) new facts not previously known show the denial of a constitutional 
right or might have changed the outcome of Mr. Taylor's trial; (2) fundamental unfairness 
existed in Mr. Taylor's conviction; and/or (3) these claims were overlooked in good faith 
with no intent to delay or abuse the writ. Each of these factors constitutes "good cause" 
7
 Mr. Taylor need not address the district court's own "infinite continuum of 
litigation" conundrum at length. Denying relief to Petitioner, the district court argued that 
inadequate funding cannot be a basis for a common law exception to the procedural bar 
rule because "if 40,000 is provided for post-conviction proceedings, it can always be 
claimed that $60,000 was needed; if that is provided, $80,000 could be claimed as 
necessary, and there could never be an end to such a claim. There is never enough time 
or money." (ROA 1303.) However, the amounts alleged herein as reasonable and 
necessary came from the findings of two district court judges, not from Petitioner. 
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to justify the filing of these claims. Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1037. This Court's holding in 
Hurst survives the enactment of the PCRA. Gardner III, 2004 UT 42, [^17. 
Moreover, the principles of Julian regarding statutes of limitation apply equally to 
procedural bar. Julian, 966 P.2d at 254. The district court's Ruling provides no guidance 
regarding the court's analysis of the claims or why they were deemed non-meritorious. 
C. The PCRA Has Been Crafted by the Utah Attorney General's Office to 
its Decided Advantage 
Utah is uniquely situated in that the state legislature relies on the Utah Attorney 
General's Office ("UAGO") to draft legislation relating to post-conviction proceedings. 
As a result, the UAGO has been able to craft the PCRA to its decided advantage. As the 
UAGO was the drafter of this legislation, they should be estopped by this Court from 
arguing in favor of procedural bars now that their impartiality has resulted in a denial of 
Mr. Taylor's basic constitutional rights. 
D. Mr. Taylor's Claims Are Meritorious 
A claim is meritorious when it has "an arguable basis in fact, where the alleged 
facts would support a claim for relief." Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, ]fl9. 
1. Claim Five - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and District Court 
Error in Connection with Mr. Taylor's Change of Venue Motion 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews a district court's application of the PCRA 
de novo. See Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, [^8, 194 P.3d 913. The Court reviews a district 
court's application of the common-law procedural bar de novo. See Parsons v. Barnes, 
871 P.2d516,518 (Utah 1994); Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 876-77 (Utah 1990). "When 
confronted with ineffective assistance of counsel claims/9 this Court "review[s] a lower 
court's purely factual findings for clear error, but review[s] the application of the law to 
the facts for correctness." Taylor, 2007 UT 12,1J13 (quoting Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ^58). 
a. This Claim Could Not Have Been Brought Earlier 
The town of Coalville, Utah was too small for Mr. Taylor to get a fair trial in such 
a high profile case. (ROA 233-48.) A defendant is entitled to a venue change when there 
is a reasonable likelihood that pretrial publicity will deny the defendant a fair trial. Actual 
prejudice need not be shown if the publicity is so inflammatory that the defendant cannot 
receive a fair and impartial trial. Sheppardv. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352-53, 86 S. Ct. 
1507,16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966). However, in most situations actual prejudice will need to 
be established to prevail on this claim. This Court held in Lafferty v. State that, 
[w]hen a change of venue decision is challenged on appeal 
following a jury verdict, the determinative question is 
'whether [the] defendant was ultimately tried by a fair and 
impartial jury.' The standard for review is abuse of 
discretion. In Stubbs, for example, we relied on the juror's 
actual voir dire answers to conclude that the jury pool was so 
tainted that the trial court probably could not impanel an 
impartial jury. 
Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, *{A2 (Utah 2007) (quoting State v. Stubbs, 2005 UT 65, 
THflO, 18, 123 P.3d 407 (quoting State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^38, 28 P.3d 1278)). 
Because Mr. Taylor brought this claim after the jury's verdict and not on an 
interlocutory appeal, it is his burden to show that he was not ultimately tried by a fair and 
impartial jury. One of the few ways to make such a showing is to interview the jurors 
themselves. After conducting interviews with approximately three-quarters of the jurors, 
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Mr. Taylor's federal habeas counsel was able to establish that he was not ultimately tried 
by a fair and impartial jury. While a general venue claim could admittedly have been 
brought on appeal, only through post-conviction investigation could the specific facts 
necessary to make a determination of fairness and impartiality have been accumulated. 
b. The District Court Erred in Failing to Consider this 
Claim Because Good Cause Pre-Empted the Procedural 
Bar 
State post-conviction counsel had neither the individual resources, nor the funds 
to seek additional resources, that were required to interview the jurors and conclusively 
establish the prejudice of the trial court's ruling denying the change of venue motion. The 
investigation performed by federal habeas counsel revealed that most of the jurors knew 
one another, as well as Mr. Taylor's prosecutors. Additionally, many were tied either by 
friendship or relationship to members of the Sheriffs Department. 
Mr. Taylor's Petition substantively pled that a biased juror sat because juror 
number five, Blaine Moore, was neither open-minded nor impartial in his jury service. 
State post-conviction counsel's failure to plead this claim is understandable when viewed 
in the context of the resources expended by the Office of the Federal Public Defender in 
establishing the claim. After investigators narrowed potential addresses, many times 
multiple visits to the juror's home were necessary before finding and interviewing each 
juror. Moreover, Mr. Taylor's jurors were not only spread across Utah, but also peppered 
around California. Without significant resources, these interviews could not have 
occurred. Because Mr. Moore has passed away, interviews with as many jurors as 
on 
possible were necessary to conclusive!) e stablish his bias. 
The district court abused its discretion in denying Claim Five without a thorough 
inquiry into the denial of funding and its impact on this claim. 
"i 11 it 11 I  11 i •, 11 u' 1111»i in MIL; a n d p r e s e n t s n e w facts n o t p rev ious ly known w hich show 
the denial of a constitutional r 
ineffective assistance of prior state post-conviction counsel occasioned by his lack of 
landing. Moreover. Mr. Taylor's actual innocence pn A ides iYood cause to consider this 
not procedurall> bancd. 
2. Claim Nine - Mr. Taylor \\ *b Frejudiced by the Trial Court's 
Error in Failing to Properly Strike Venire-Members for Cause 
During the Penalty Phase Voir Dire 
Standard of Review; The Court reviews a district court's application of the PCRA 
Vi * .. ... u >,- .c.wws a uiMi'iti ^ jurt's application 
of the common-law procedure 
P.2d at 876-77. 
a. The Trial Court Erred in Denying this Claim Because it 
Is Not Procedurally Barred and the State's Arguments to 
Dismiss Were Baseless 
The State's main argument in opposition i •? 
use all of his available peremptory challenges. Therefore, he could have used one of his 
]x . .\y :: „. .. . . . ^ u strike juror Moore, if he ha J wanted to " i ^ ^ \ "* N "~> 
S'- \ "- "- ciear that i\ . < -
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exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. (CT8 125-27; RT 463.) Mr. Taylor is 
uncertain as to basis for the State's assertion. 
The State further justified its Motion to Dismiss by citing to this Court's 
determination that trial counsel may have had strategic reasons for keeping Mr. Moore. 
(ROA 571.) Although there could be no reasonable strategic reason for trial counsel 
choosing to keep Mr. Moore, the point is irrelevant, as this claim is against the trial court, 
not trial counsel. 
Mr. Taylor has now provided substantial evidence that Mr. Moore was 
unconstitutionally biased; accordingly, the trial court's erroneous denial of a for-cause 
challenge and trial counsel's exhaustion of his peremptory challenges in removing other 
unconstitutionally biased jurors, caused Mr. Taylor to be prejudiced by the trial court's 
determination. 
Claim Nine is meritorious and, as in Claim Five, presents new facts obtained via 
a costly in-depth post-conviction investigation, that were not previously known and which 
show the denial of a constitutional right. (ROA 294-311.) Moreover, Mr. Taylor's actual 
innocence provides good cause to consider this claim. Therefore, Mr. Taylor's claim is 
not procedurally barred. 
8 " C T »
 refers to the clerk's transcripts lodged with the Utah Supreme Court in 
Utah v. Taylor, Case No. 910496. 
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3. Claim I weive - Mr. I ay lor' s Venire Was Prej udicially Biased by 
the Trial Court's Introduction of Blood Atonement into the Voir 
Dire 
Standard of Review; The Court reviews a district court's application of the PCRA 
Vi .\ . >^s ,il(ii.v.,cvic\\>j HMJiU court's applied — 
P.2d at 876-77. 
a. The Trial Court Erred in Denying this Claim Because it 
Is Not Procedurally B a r r e d a n d the S t a t e ' s Arguments to 
Dismiss W e r e Baseless 
Blood atonement is a | ><i I u wl;u l\ iii'.nlii mh ,nidil i n In ,i \ iipiKi! penally ) >h.i»t 11 
inclusion upends mitigation entirely, creating a situation where it is an act of benevolence 
and compassion to sentence someone U M! . 
(hi a : i in i.' II in in llu Mate ^ubiiiil, llial ml does not agree that Taylor ran out of 
peremp* M" *•* i !engesbe\v ' . * s . '5 
Tay lo r^ counsel did not use all of his available pcr-xrnrto* • chal!e:iizc\s K '^c ~>~'; 
3 ! f-.-.465-66)." (ROA 576.) This is a material fact in dispute that necessitated that the 
dNri i 1 i null y mi III i ii(lc!ilhii*\ hearing. 
Claim Twelve is meritorious and presents nrw f.n Is mil i I'N Mihk km iv< i v<, \\u Ii 
show the denial of a constitutional right. (ROA 318-29.) Moreover, Mi". Taylor's actual 
innocence provides good cause to consider this claim. Therefore, Mr. Taylor 's claim is 
occ(iiiii"(ill\ Ikinoil 
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4. Claim Fourteen - The Exclusion of Non-Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints Members from the Jury Because of Their 
Religion Deprived Mr. Taylor of the Right to Trial by a Jury 
Drawn from a Representative Cross-Section of the Community 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews a district court's application of the PCRA 
de novo. See Kell, 2008 UT 62, ^ [8. The Court also reviews a district court's application 
of the common-law procedural bar de novo. See Parsons, 871 P.2d at 518; Dunn, 791 
P.2d at 876-77. 
a. The District Court Wrongly Held That Mr. Taylor Did 
Not Argue That This Claim Constituted Newly 
Discovered Evidence 
The district court is materially incorrect in stating that, "Petitioner nowhere argues 
that the foregoing claims are ones that could not have been known and raised in a prior 
post-conviction petition." (ROA 1295.) 
In his Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Taylor argued: 
This claim evolves from federal counsel's acquisition of 
Exhibit 77 to the Petition. Despite state habeas counsel's 
request for all records from the district court, he never 
received Exhibit 77. (Addendum A; Decl. of Richard Mauro, 
Tf6.) . . . As the State withheld this document from state 
habeas counsel, there is no credible argument in favor of 
barring this claim. Claim Fourteen is meritorious and 
presents new facts not previously known. 
(ROA 762; emphasis added.) 
This Claim is based on newly discovered evidence which strongly indicates that the 
prosecution was striking jurors based on their religious affiliation. The newly discovered 
evidence rule requires all of the following: 
' ithc i;,c i^unoiicr nor petitioner's coun^u MIU\ » •• m^ 
M.iK^ at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to 
include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion 
or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not 
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence; 
indiericu v^ -.* -. uulative of evidence 
(:i:; he material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; 
.ucu with all the other evidence, the newly discovered 
material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of 
\:u\ could have found the petitioner gmhv eftl c offense or 
• ' - \ v ' U- the \rn1tm t • - . ' -J 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-lU4(eXiM^/ • 
b. Prior Counsel Did Not Receive (lie Prosecutor's Notes 
When federal habeas counsel requester .,. u . * , nui^ hu iruiii < le district 
court in mid-2007, counsel was proi ided < Itli copie s of se < eral pages of handv i itt s n 
notes initially generated by one of the prosecutors. rhese notes, submitted with the 
* v^uiion as Exhibit 77, were never provided to state post-conviction counsel, despite his 
\^ .v.^ i w.i, wuu« nvi ^'»^H)^ition 
to Motion to Dismiss Petition for Post-(\>n\idii»n I«Y]ief \\i()\ f>™ K00V | v I | 
Richard Mauro, |6.) The revelation of this document a decade later, when federal counsel 
made the same request, was significant. Petition exhibit 77 does more than indicate that 
9
 Although Mr. Taylor's facts fit the criteria of Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-104(e), 
he c - not believe that the code section is mandatorily applicable because the newly 
disc -A evidence relates to stn ictural error. 
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the prosecutors were improperly striking jurors based on their religion, it shifts the burden 
of proof to the prosecution to explain the impermissible peremptory strikes. 
The Petition goes to great pains to conduct the sort of inquiry mandated by Miller -
El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 162 L. Ed 2d 196 (2005) and Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), and explains the facts at 
issue that make this claim worthy of relief. (ROA 336-53.) Mr. Taylor will not burden 
this Court with a recapitulation of what has already been pled in detail. Although the 
United States Supreme Court has failed to extend to jurors the right to be free from 
religious persecution, this Court should do so under the Utah State Constitution. The Utah 
State Constitution states: 
The State shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious 
test shall be required as a qualification for any office of 
public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall any 
person he incompetent as a witness or juror on account of 
religious belief or the absence thereof. 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 4 (emphasis added). 
Additionally, Utah Code states that a "qualified citizen may not be excluded from 
jury service on account of... religion . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-103 (formerly Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-46-3). See also State v. Ball 685 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah 1984). 
The prosecutor's notes make clear that there was no permissible purpose for 
striking juror Holly L. Conner. Because the prosecutor instituted and followed a scoring 
system for each of the jurors, it is apparent that Ms. Conner was struck for grounds outside 
of her attitudes regarding the death penalty, or any other permissible distinction. 
The Ruling concluded that Mr. Taylor 
does not discuss nor demonstrate that the new evidence he 
now7 possesses is evidence that could, not have been 
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence and. 
included in a prior post-conviction petition. See Utah ( ode 
Ann. § 78B-9-104(l)(f)(I) [sic] ("neither the petitioner nor 
petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence. . , in f,"w * 
include the evidence in any previously filed . . . 
post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have 
been discovered through AIL exercise of reasonable 
diligence/'). 
I1A ( ",(1(1 | 
I lull d d o i m h ' 
post-conviction, appellate, or trial counsel to have known that the prosecutor was striking 
jurors based on religion. No amount of diligence could have led to the discover}. In iact, 
state post;- v ic tionc ounsel requested the same fj^> iiwinihc^ame district court, but for 
some u ' f * • . i 
exercised reasonable _ 0 ™ c c to no avail. Mr. I a>lor does not know \*'- tl\ -^  »*-!y 
now came to light, but now that they have,, this claim,,, is timely raised. This evidence is not 
c • • vnown evidence because there was no way to know why the 
prosecutor struck Ms. Conner i iiitll his note s si irfaced 
The striking of Ms. Conner constitutes structural error, therefore no inquiry 
pursuant i.* , i^, v. UUL Ann. < ^8-35a-104(e)(i)-(iv) is necessary. 
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c. This Claim Is Not Procedurally Barred 
The district court's determination ignores the reality of how this document made 
its way to counsel. Had the document been provided to counsel earlier, it could have been 
included in a prior post-conviction petition, but it was not. Accordingly, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-35a-104(e)(1) permits an action in the district court of original jurisdiction for 
post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence on the grounds that 
newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the conviction 
or sentence, because petitioner's counsel did not know of the evidence at the time of trial 
or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion 
or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered through 
the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
Finally, the State failed to provide material evidence by not turning over the 
prosecutor's notes to state post-conviction counsel sooner. As the State withheld this 
document from state post-conviction counsel, there is no credible argument in favor of 
barring this claim. Claim Fourteen is meritorious and presents new facts not previously 
known which show the denial of a constitutional right. Moreover, Mr. Taylor's actual 
innocence provides good cause to consider this claim. Therefore, Mr. Taylor's claim is 
not procedurally barred. 
5. Claim Nineteen - The Jury Was Prejudiced by its Consideration 
of Extrinsic Evidence in Violation of the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews a district court's application of the PCRA 
in 
of the common-law procedural bar de novo. See Parsons, 8" 1 P.2d at 518; Dunn 7° 1 
P.2d at 876-77. 
a. The Jurors Considered Two Pieces of Constitutionally 
Impermissible Extrinsic Evidence Pr ior to or During 
Deliberations 
Juror Jerry Lewis explained that, 
At fhe end of each day everyone on the jury, including the 
aiiernates, would meet for 10-20 minutes to compare notes 
and discuss the case amongst ourselves. We would compare 
notes to see if there was something we had missed ihat 
someone else had caught. We talked as a group u»make sure 
everyone was on the same page and to *-\plain our 
interpretation to the people who had questions about 
something. 
(Petition bxliii^. j j . ui * :>.) 
Jurors iir" ni*l pennitl.'d In discuss (In, i a.-.e w illu/;/vr;/7t? prior to deliberations. This 
conduct between the jurors violated the court's instmel HI .ind ,.»ubstantialh efftvled 11 it 
verdict, as it removed the individual Dpiiron that each juror is expected to bring to 
deliberations. Kichardson v. Marsh* 48 . < ,">. 200„ 206. 107 S. C t 1702, 95 L. Ed. 2d I ?6 
(1(>S7) I I 111 !',|l lln almi J in unable .lssimiplmii Il IIIIIIK lav il I i. 11 |iin >i:> l< II iv illllln iir 
instructions."). 
Additionally, the jury foreperson, Richard Andrews, impermissibly suggested that 
the IUIOI.S put themselves in I he place ol the \ iclims ' 1 here was one woman in particular 
who washesit.iut 1>a \ -Me fonlrath Sh. \ ah'J1 lo» diMlli aller lln foreman said Mainlining 
like, ' i f it was your mother or daughter, how would you vote?"* ilVtitinii Klmlm '0 ,it 
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Ilio.) 
That suggestion interfered with the jury's function to weigh the evidence and 
determine whether the government had sustained its burden of proof. To the same degree 
that it is improper for a prosecutor to inflame the passions or prejudice of the jury by 
implying that the jury has a different role, it is equally impermissible for one juror to take 
on that role for the state. See United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570, 574 (1st Cir. 1994) 
("Arguments urging a jury to act in any capacity other than as the impartial arbiter of the 
facts in the case before it are improper."); Blevins v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 728 F.2d 1576, 
1580(10thCir. 1984);/vyv. Security Barge Lines, Inc., 585 ¥2d732,741 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(Golden rule appeals are regarded as "improper because it encourages the jury to depart 
from neutrality and to decide the case on the basis of personal interest and bias rather than 
on the evidence."). 
In the district court, the State criticized Mr. Taylor for not having provided an 
affidavit or statement from jury foreperson Richard Andrews in support of this claim. 
(ROA 587.) Mr. Andrews passed away on December 18, 2003. The State's protest 
highlights the prejudice that delays in this case have caused and provides a prime example 
of the prejudice suffered by Mr. Taylor as a result of the deficiencies of former counsel. 
Had an evidentiary hearing been previously conducted on this issue, Mr. Andrews' 
testimony would be preserved as part of the record. Fearful that more evidence may 
disappear if not properly sought out and preserved now, Mr. Taylor requested that the 
district court hold an evidentiary hearing on this and the other claims in his Petition. The 
district court wrongly failed to urani ,i !v -nng. 
tah Rule ol Kvidence 606(b) Allows for an Inquiry into 
the Extrinsic K\ idence Considered by the Jury 
. ... Mau argued in tne district court that i > h^ ^ livid. 606(b) prevents the jurors5 
declaratk :- * • . si dun I 1 Huh K . . . . 
Evidence 606(b), disallowing the admission of evidence of mental processes - 4' (hr | ' * 
The Tenth Circuit has recognized that juror testimony about consideration of extrinsic 
i . .JL-LC mav DC eoriMuciVvi by a reviewing court: 
While li^oi iiicA tesiih ... . JULMUH: •: .* .J extraneous 
prejuii^ nil information w^ .mproperly brought to the jury's 
attention.' a juror kma\ not testify' as to . . . the effect of 
anything nncerning the juror's menial processes in 
connection therevxith " K\l '<<, l*w N-nb) ^ee generally 
Tanner v I L -< J States. 485 U.S. H'T. ' T-2 \ 107 S. Ct. 
2739, 97 L. kd. 2d 90 (198" i (discussing the L.mimon-law 
history of Rule ^()6(b) and the policies underk ii u it). As we 
observed in N /;;/?>w/. the dichotomy established by Rule 
606(b) pernii i * : juror to testify (either literally or by way of 
affidavit) on »!ie question of 'whether any extraneous 
prejudicial information was improperly brought to bear upon 
a jure \i\. a iuror may not testify as to the effect the 
outside inlormation had upon the juror.5 [United States v.] 
Simpson. 950 F.2d 11 ^ 19. | 1521 [(10th Cir. 1991)] (emphasis 
in original); Math>\ - :> nited States, 146 U.S. 140, 149, 13 
S. Ct. 50? 36 i . Ld. yl7 (1892) (recognizing a distinction 
between affidavits bearing on 'the motives and influences' of 
the jurors, which are inadmissible to impeach the verdict, and 
affi.dav.its bearing on the "existence ui any extraneous 
influence/ which are admissible). 
I huti'd Stales t Davis. 611 -. . ,<; * • • ' 
The distinction between i- svir . : 
the juror was literally inside ur outside the jury room when the alleged irre£ :^!< ~iM took 
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place; rather, the distinction [is] based on the nature of the allegation." Tanner, 483 U.S. 
at 117. The Supreme Court has "held admissible the testimony of jurors describing how 
they heard and read prejudicial information not admitted into evidence." Tanner, 483 U.S. 
at 117 (quoting Mattox, 146 U.S. at 149). 
Therefore, whether Mr. Taylor's jury considered extrinsic evidence is an issue that 
requires factual development in an evidentiary hearing. The evidence elicited would not 
be barred by the rules of evidence. 
Claim Nineteen is meritorious and presents new facts not previously known which 
show the denial of a constitutional right. Moreover, Mr. Taylor's actual innocence 
provides good cause to consider this claim. Therefore, Mr. Taylor's claim is not 
procedurally barred. 
6. Claim Twenty-One - Mr. Taylor's Constitutional Rights Were 
Violated by the Improper Admission of Evidence at the Penalty 
Phase of His Trial 
Mr. Taylor re-pled this claim because he believed that the State might have argued 
that some of the facts raised in this claim were not previously before this Court. As the 
State appears to concede that parts (a), (c), (d), and (f) of this claim have already been 
raised and are fully exhausted, Mr. Taylor accepts the State's representation as true and 
need not oppose the dismissal by this Court of those parts of Claim Twenty-One as 
successive. 
The dismissal of subsections (b) and (e) as procedurally barred is inappropriate 
because Mr. Taylor has pled actual innocence. 
^ Claim Twenty-Foui -
Exculpatory Evidence 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews a district court's application of the PCRA 
de novo. See Kelt, 2008 UT 62, TJ8. The Court also re\ iews a district court's application 
de novo. See Parsons, K ,' I I'.Jd «11 ^ 18: Dunn, i{^ I 
P.2d at 876-77. 
a. Hie District Court Erred in Declaring the Evidence of 
Scott Manley's Fabricated Testimony to Be Procedurally 
Barred 
Informal ion obtained horn SI, nil Man lej, describing the extent ol the prosecution's 
relationship with him, shows Ihnl lim Sl„ifr fall'iil I Int l^e critical impeaelimcnl 
e\ idence to Mr. Taylor. (Petition Exhibit 115.) Neither Respondent, nor the district court 
aw.ii *j;^ cd Liic iuu LUtji impeachment evidence fells within the Brady rule.. United States 
v. 3av.>* ' • . ' , .- - . *vi" . c u; /• g vjii-m) v. 
United States, 405 U.S. 150. I >J *>? " ' • 
In his declaration, Mr. Manley states that he was pressured by the parole officers 
.^ . ,« .^ ..nit u i.ie interrogation room;, "two parole officers told me that they knew Von 
was gi ii in y i i:ii'! :;) i ;xpected me to make the stoi ) • :: n « : n bigger. I hey toldme that if 
I did not do it they were going to send me back to the pirn on some big liea;1' < 3 tim z ' "' 
(Petition Exhibi! " r f "his informal ion could have been used to impeach the 
testimoiT . . - .aa^i^v. li^.u^v. mv, Stale iailed to disclose the circumstances under 
wh i, Ii f\;l v- . .-: .. v\Linpatory 
evidence in violation of Brady and its progeny. 
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Scott Manley's declaration was obtained after a thorough, time consuming, and 
costly investigation by the Office of the Federal Public Defender. Mr. Manley was found 
in custody in the State of California, and declared that his statement to law enforcement 
was a product of coercion and deception. (Petition Exhibit 115,1f1f5-6.) Had state post-
conviction counsel received the funding deemed reasonable and necessary by the district 
court, he would have located and interviewed Mr. Manley, and been able to discredit his 
highly damaging testimony, thus reducing the weight of the evidence against Mr. Taylor. 
Mr. Manley was identified as a necessary witness by state post-conviction counsel. 
Unable to obtain the necessary funding to locate Mr. Manley, neither Petitioner nor 
Petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of the state post-conviction 
proceeding. His declaration constitutes newly discovered evidence. This material 
evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known, and is not merely 
impeachment evidence, as it describes misconduct by the police. Finally, viewed with all 
the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence undermines a critical witness 
against Mr. Taylor, removing premeditation from the jury. Without that evidence, no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found Mr. Taylor guilty of the offense of intentional 
murder. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(e)(i)-(iv). 
Because it meets the statutory requirements for newly discovered evidence, and 
because Mr. Taylor's actual innocence provides good cause to consider this claim, it is not 
procedurally barred. 
Claim I wenty-Fivv I'aylor's Death Sentence Is 
Disproportionate i< I li 'ulpability and Violates Hi* : 
Constitutional K i y 11 I s 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews a district court's application oi the PCI -1 
• ix , .uri ciLso a\ia\.^ a district court's application. 
of the n. y 
P 2d at 876-77. 
a. Recently Developed Evidence Indicates 'That Mr. Taylor 
May Not Have Killed Anyone 
In iis ,i tiiiHlaiiinnti'il pi u'pl (I , w-uciei.aanL .-.,.,.
 v,.ir* ^ 'ujvuta 
life sentence, was the actual killer ol k r • r v - * .-> } v 
sentence is disproportionate to his culpability and violates his constitutional rights. Mr. 
Taylor's post-conviction petition has included, among other things, a declaration from, the 
i U'iniit/T vtho iwiimiiiril Kan1 'I tnlr .mil 1U ill) I nil , bodies tfiat questions her testimony 
against Mr. Taylor at trial. 
Dr. Schnittker's declaration calls into question many of the facts relied on by the 
Sur.^. .,^a rai^c ^bstantial concerns surrounding whether Mr. Taylor was even guilty of 
the * * . wi*/.ivi ion was 
effectively unavailable to state post-conviction counsel, as he was improper1 y 
the lack of funding he received from the State. Mr, Taylor lias credibly pled actual 
innocence, meeting the good cause" exception to procedural bar, Moreover, because the 
additional evide* i ' * " unhu.:,_ rcxeaied laets 
not previously known which questioned "the existence ' '* J * • -• •• i n 
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[Petitioner's] conviction/' it further meets the good cause exception. See Gardner III, 
2004 UT 42, fl4; Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1037. 
9. Claim Twenty-Seven - Inadequate Appellate Record 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews a district court's application of the PCRA 
de novo. See Kell, 2008 UT 62, ^ [8. The Court also reviews a district court's application 
of the common-law procedural bar de novo. See Parsons, 871 P.2d at 518; Dunn, 791 
P.2d at 876-77. 
a. The District Court Erred in Failing to Order a Hearing 
into the Prejudice Caused by the Inadequate Appellate 
Record 
In Claim Twenty-Seven, Mr. Taylor argues, in part, that the transcript of Mr. 
Taylor's penalty phase appears to be possibly incorrect, and that the transcripts of Edward 
Deli's trial are no longer available. According to the transcript of Mr. Taylor's penalty 
phase, Cheryl Chamberlain stated that one of her sons was married to a sister of one of the 
prosecutors. (RT 113.) After interviewing veniremembers, federal habeas counsel has 
been unable to confirm the statement attributed to Ms. Chamberlain. Mr. Taylor alleges 
that if the record is not sound on this one point, then Mr. Taylor cannot rely on any portion 
of the record being correct, potentially depriving appellate and habeas counsel of the 
ability to recognize errors at trial and bring claims appropriately thereon. Thus, Mr. 
Taylor's claim has an arguable basis in fact, that is, that the information attributed to Ms. 
Chamberlain is incorrect. The potential error in the record supports Mr. Taylor's claim 
that his right to an accurate and complete record may have been violated. See, e.g., Frank 
v.Mangum ? ^ I ) S W) V?^x ^^K < I S I S 1 S M ( i d %'MWIS) »f'Wei . ' M I W M . 
333 U.S. 196, 201, 68 S. Ct. 514, 92 L. Ed. 64-4
 v . r , , . 
Mr. Taylor has further alleged that he has been harmed by the fact 'that Edward 
ial ti anscripts are no longer available ,- I.U,W.,^M .»,• i ^ : KM .mu .v... .-ui were 
nol tried together, thrv wvw Hunted v\ iih ideiiiieiil en ni^ e\i ept loi ;ni addih mail * « i ni 
against Mr. l a ) lor for failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, (CT 2-5,) Yd., Mr. 
Deli was sentenced to two counts of second-degree murder, whereas Mr. I aylor was given 
...:-i* pci-„. - .;v;:s..^—, siven that the State seems to have introduced 
th1 •;•: * --:.J---
 x- . •;," -. * proprr i mpiii i inn nl llir diflervnl n nil!1 
must entail a comparison of the transcripts of both trials.10 If the prosecution knowingly 
used false evidence or acted in bad faith, pursuing fundamentally inconsistent theories in 
separate trials against co- dclciidaiits charged with the same murders, the prosecution may 
have \ iolated cii le process Si u ?, e g,5 Ngu) }en i } lif it he 3 5 J i ? I! ^11 ? Ui I " III 1 M'th 1  n 
2000). A transcript of Mr. Deli's trial is necessary to make the required comparison. 
Here again, state post-conviction counsel was precluded from obtaining 
the lack o I I ui id nig available to him.. State post-
conviction counsel was effectively prevailed troin inli n \r\\ 1 « tiiu > \ niivniuiiU r v 
If the same evidence was indeed used against both defendants, and the only 
difference between the defendants was that Mr. Taylor pled guilty, the different res 
support a conclusion that Mr. Taylor's counsel's deficient performance in inducing Mr. 
Taylor to plead guilty was prejudicial to Mr. Taylor. Similarly, if the only difference was 
the introduction of the Scott Manley taped statement, the different result supports Mr. 
Taylor's claim that Mr. Taylor was prejudiced by the trial court's error in admitting the 
taped statement -?n ovidena HViihon Exhibit 1.7, at f6,) 
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well as the jurors from Mr. Taylor's trial. (Addendum A to Petitioner's Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (ROA 659-800); Decl. of Richard 
Mauro, }^8.) Because this claim is meritorious and because the evidence to support this 
claim reveals new facts not previously known which would show the denial of the 
constitutional right to an accurate and complete record, Mr. Taylor meets the "good cause" 
exception and is therefore not procedurally barred. Moreover, Mr. Taylor's actual 
innocence provides a good cause exception to consider this claim. 
10. Claim Twenty-Nine - Ineffective Assistance of State Counsel 
The district court held that "[bjecause Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance 
of prior post-conviction counsel is not a claim that challenges his conviction or sentence, 
it is not a cognizable ground for relief under the PCRA and, therefore, not a claim for 
which the PCRA can provide a legal remedy." (ROA 1309.) 
The district court missed the import of this claim. Claim Twenty-Nine is not pled 
to warrant relief as a stand alone claim, but rather to explain universal failures that 
undermined Mr. Taylor's initial state post-conviction proceeding and that excuse 
procedural bar. 
11. Claim Thirty - Mr. Taylor Was Denied His Constitutional 
Rights Because of the Cumulative Impact of Errors 
With the addition of even a single new claim, this Court must conduct a new 
cumulative error analysis. Mr. Taylor is entitled to have this Court consider the 
cumulative effect of the new facts developed in the investigation paid for by federal 
counsel and the newly discovered evidence uncovered by counsel. 
Because Mi 1 \\\ hum li/t, pled IIKII lit IS ,H IIJ;I 11S niiiotuin and has presented new 
facts not previously known which show the denial of a constitutional right, h i s c I; i i m i s 11»i«i 
procedurally barred. 
E, J Claims W ere Withheld for Tactical Reasons 
Si (id*' * i.i^s lur tactical 
reasons. There was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's with 
could potentially yield relief for Mr, Taylor. For Instance, Claim Fourteen alleges 
.. . s: , . «... ..,, - ^ ourt Imd that the Utah Constitution pr Vbits the striking 
ui " r * s~ " •. new pena ;\ phase. 
Likewise, Claim 1 \\ enty-Four undermines the testimony of S. : 5 
led the jury to believe that the crime was premeditated. 
As discussed sup? -a, tactical reasoning was addressed in Gentry, where it was noted 
that "fwlheti nminsrl Ionises nni ^onir i>sur- In Hit t \n lliihiuii nul olliei;., Ihere is a strong 
presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than through she i - 1 >, 
540 U.S. at 5. Gentry further stated "[t]he issues counsel omitted were not su w.w^ly more 
persuasiu: llii.i • llio.i I i discussed dial llieir omission can only be attributed U* a 
professional error of constitute * " » .L. ...„t 
Claims such as Twelve, Fourteen, Nineteen, and Twenty-Four are strong claims that are 
more persuasive than some of the claims in Petitioner's mti'.A slate post-conviction 
petition 111-,/11111111;LJ», ( I t * *. - v,n:\. ,iu*u l\\cnl\ 'E 5ve 
The district court's cor^ , >:,j; , 
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successive petition that were not previously raised are claims for which a reasonable basis 
can be articulated as to why they were not raised in a prior proceeding," is confusing at 
best. (ROA 1297.) The district court supports this statement by way of example, stating 
that "given all of the circumstances of the case and the limitations in terms of time, 
funding, and resources, it is certainly plausible that these claims were not raised in the 
initial post-conviction petition because they were weaker or less persuasive than the other 
claims that were raised." (ROA 1298.) 
After finding that funding was not at issue, the district court puts it squarely in 
question. The prejudice of the lack of funding is inherent in this statement by the district 
court. The district court's explanation strongly supports Mr. Taylor's fundamental 
argument on appeal that he should not be penalized because of the lack of funding. 
The district court's hypothesis that these are weaker claims is incorrect. Nowhere 
in the Ruling is there evidence that the district court engaged in an analysis or weighing 
of the claims in the initial state post-conviction petition versus the Petition currently 
before the Court. 
Because no claims were withheld for tactical reasons, the district court was 
required to consider whether any of the common law exceptions to the procedural bar rule 
apply to this Petition. The district court failed to make such a consideration. (ROA 1299.) 
Finally, the district court's reliance on Gentry is misplaced, as Gentry relates to 
trial counsel, not state post-conviction counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Taylor asks that the Court reverse the judgment of 
the district court, consider his claims on the merits, and grant relief. Alternatively, the 
Court should reverse the judgment and remand the case to allow Mr. Taylor, after 
discovery and an evidentiary hearing, to prove exceptions to the defaults and entitlement 
to relief on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SEAN K.KENNEDY 
Federal Public Defender 
DATED: April 30, 2010 By: ^ ^ ^**~ ^ ^ 
BRIAN M. POMERANTZ 
Deputy Federal Public Defender 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Addendum A 
Fed. Rules of Evidence Rule 606 (3d ed.) 
Federal Rules of Evidence 
ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES 
Rule 606. Competency of Juror as Witness 
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before that jury in the trial of 
the case in which the juror is sitting. If the juror is called so to testify, the opposing party shall be 
afforded an opportunity to object out of the presence of the jury. 
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or 
indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of 
the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or 
emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or 
concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith. But a juror may testify about (1) 
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention, (2) 
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether 
there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form. A juror's affidavit or evidence 
of any statement by the juror may not be received on a matter about which the juror would be 
precluded from testifying. 
Utah Administrative Code R25-14-5. 
Payment of Reasonable Litigation Expenses. 
The Division of Finance shall pay reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed a total amount of 
$20,000 except as provided in subsection (2). 
(2) The Division of Finance shall pay amounts exceeding the total amount if: 
(a) before services are performed or expenses are incurred, appointed counsel files a 
request with the court to exceed the total amount; 
(b) appointed counsel serves the request upon the Division of Finance before or on the 
date of filing the request with the court; 
(c) the Division of Finance is allowed to respond to the request; and 
(d) the court determines there is sufficient cause to exceed the total amount in accordance 
with Section 78B-9-202. 
(3) Travel costs, including mileage, per diem for meals, and lodging will be reimbursed based on 
state rates and criteria published in rule or policy by the Division of Finance. Travel is not 
reasonable when the purpose of the travel can reasonably be accomplished in another way, such 
as by telephone or correspondence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104 
78-3 5a-104. Grounds for relief ~ Retroactivity of rule. 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has been convicted 
and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district court of original 
jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence upon the 
following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United 
States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the United States 
Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was prosecuted 
is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was revoked in an 
unlawful manner; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States 
Constitution or Utah Constitution; or 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the 
conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time 
of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed 
post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have 
been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence 
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty 
of the offense or subject to the sentence received. 
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule announced by the 
United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after the 
petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by applicable state and federal principles 
of retroactivity. 
Enacted by Chapter 235, 1996 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 
78-35a-106. Preclusion of relief — Exception. 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could 
have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the 
ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground 
was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Enacted by Chapter 235, 1996 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202 
78-35a-202. Appointment and payment of counsel in death penalty cases. 
(1) A person who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and sentence has been 
affirmed on appeal shall be advised in open court, on the record, in a hearing scheduled no less 
than 30 days prior to the signing of the death warrant, of the provisions of this chapter allowing 
challenges to the conviction and death sentence and the appointment of counsel for indigent 
defendants. 
(2) (a) If a defendant requests the court to appoint counsel, the court shall determine whether 
the defendant is indigent and make findings on the record regarding the defendant's 
indigency. If the court finds that the defendant is indigent, it shall promptly appoint 
counsel who is qualified to represent defendants in death penalty cases as required by 
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(b) A defendant who wishes to reject the offer of counsel shall be advised on the record 
by the court of the consequences of the rejection before the court may accept the 
rejection. 
(c) Costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation expenses incurred in providing the 
representation provided for in this section shall be paid from state funds by the Division 
of Finance according to rules established pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
Enacted by Chapter 76, 1997 General Session 
A . c 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78A-3-102 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-2-2 
§ 78A-3-102. Supreme Court jurisdiction 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a 
court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority to 
issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or in 
aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, 
over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment 
by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing 
actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States 
or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the 
Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony 
or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative 
subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the 
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record 
involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review those 
cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 344, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2209, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 
2009, c. 344, § 41, eff. May 12, 2009. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-103 
Formerly cited as U.C.A. § 78-46-3 
§ 78B-1-103. Jurors selected from random cross section - Opportunity and obligation to serve 
(1) It is the policy of this state that: 
(a) persons selected for jury service be selected at random from a fair cross section of the 
population of the county: 
(b) all qualified citizens have the opportunity in accordance with this chapter to be 
considered for service; and 
(c) all qualified citizens are obligated to serve when summoned, unless excused. 
(2) A qualified citizen may not be excluded from jury service on account of race, color, religion, 
sex, national origin, age, occupation, disability, or economic status. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-104 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-104 
§ 78B-9-104. Grounds for relief-Retroactivity of rule 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78B-9-106 or 78B-9-107, a person who has been convicted and 
sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district court of original jurisdiction for 
post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence upon the following 
grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United 
States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed under a statute that is in 
violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which 
the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed or probation was revoked in violation of the controlling 
statutory provisions; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States 
Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the 
conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time 
of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed 
post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have 
been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence 
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty 
of the offense or subject to the sentence received; or 
(f) the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by the United 
States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of Appeals after 
conviction and sentence became final on direct appeal, and that: 
(i) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's 
conviction or sentence became final; or 
A - Q 
(ii) the rule decriminalizes the conduct that comprises the elements of the crime 
for which the petitioner was convicted. 
(2) The court may not grant relief from a conviction or sentence unless the petitioner establishes 
that there would be a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in light of the facts 
proved in the post-conviction proceeding, viewed with the evidence and facts introduced at trial 
or during sentencing. 
(3) The court may not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner is 
innocent of the crime for which convicted except as provided in Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, 
Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1168, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 3, eff. May 5, 2008. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-106 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-106 
§ 78B-9-106. Preclusion of relief-Exception 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could 
have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107. 
(2) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, including during the 
state's appeal from an order granting post-conviction relief, unless the court determines that the 
state should have raised the time bar or procedural bar at an earlier time. Any court may raise a 
procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, provided that it gives the parties notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the 
ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground 
was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1170, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 5, eff. May 5, 2008. 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 4 
Constitution of Utah 
Article I. Declaration of Rights 
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall 
any person be incompetent as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the absence 
thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or 
interfere with its functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to 
any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1999, S.J.R. 5, § 1, adopted at election Nov. 7, 2000, eff. Jan. 1, 2001. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4 
Title II. Appeals from Judgments and Orders of Trial Courts 
RULE 4. APPEAL AS OF RIGHT: WHEN TAKEN 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter 
of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be 
filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry 
or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk 
of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions. 
(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the time for 
all parties to appeal from the judgment runs from the entry of the order disposing of the 
motion: 
(b)(1)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
(b)(1)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not 
an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted, under 
Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; or 
(b)(1)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
(b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but before entry 
of an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry 
of the order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice of appeal is effective to 
appeal only from the underlying judgment. To appeal from a final order disposing of any 
motion listed in Rule 4(b), a party must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of 
appeal within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of 
a decision, judgment, or order but before entry of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed 
after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party 
may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of appeal was 
filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule, whichever 
period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good 
cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days 
after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule. A motion filed 
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties 
in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past 
the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever 
occurs later. 
(f) Motion to reinstate period for filing a direct appeal in criminal cases. Upon a showing that a 
criminal defendant was deprived of the right to appeal, the trial court shall reinstate the 
thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal. A defendant seeking such reinstatement shall file a 
written motion in the sentencing court and serve the prosecuting entity. If the defendant is not 
represented and is indigent, the court shall appoint counsel. The prosecutor shall have 30 days 
after service of the motion to file a written response. If the prosecutor opposes the motion, the 
trial court shall set a hearing at which the parties may present evidence. If the trial court finds by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has demonstrated that he was deprived of his 
right to appeal, it shall enter an order reinstating the time for appeal. The defendant's notice of 
appeal must be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the 
order. 
(g) Appeal by an Inmate Confined in an Institution. If an inmate confined in an institution files a 
notice of appeal in either a civil or criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely filed if it is 
deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely 
filing may be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of 
deposit and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in the 
manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in paragraph (d) runs from the 
date when the trial court receives the first notice of appeal. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Amended effective November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999; November 1, 2002; November 1, 2005; 
November 1, 2006.] 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 23B 
Title V. General Provisions 
RULE 23B. MOTION TO REMAND FOR FINDINGS NECESSARY TO DETERMINATION 
OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM 
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court to 
remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the appellate court's 
determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only 
upon a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if 
true, could support a determination that counsel was ineffective. 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon a showing of good 
cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing of the appellant's brief. In no 
event shall the court permit a motion to be filed after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall 
prohibit the court from remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the 
claim has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party. 
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall conform to the 
requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging facts 
not fully appearing in the record on appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the 
attorney. The affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the 
appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion shall also be accompanied 
by a proposed order or remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual 
issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed on remand. 
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed. The response shall include a 
proposed order of remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual 
issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed by the trial court in the event remand is 
granted, unless the responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any reply shall 
be filed within 10 days after the response is filed. 
(c) Order of the court. If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule have been met, the 
court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to the trial court for the purpose of entry 
of findings of fact relevant to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of remand 
shall identify the ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual issues relevant to each such claim 
to be addressed by the trial court. The order shall also direct the trial court to complete the 
proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the order of remand, absent a finding by 
the trial court of good cause for a delay of reasonable length. 
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on the appeal faces a 
conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct that counsel withdraw and that new 
counsel for the appellant be appointed or retained. 
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be vacated upon the filing 
of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural steps required by these rules shall not be 
stayed by a motion for remand, unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion 
of the parties or upon the court's motion. 
(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon remand the trial court shall promptly conduct 
hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the findings of fact necessary to determine the 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Any claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the 
order of remand shall not be considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial court 
determines that the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consideration of issues not 
specifically identified in the order of remand. Evidentiary hearings shall be conducted without a 
jury and as soon as practicable after remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the 
proponent of the fact. The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial 
court shall enter written findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient performance by 
counsel and the claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result, in accordance with the order 
of remand. Proceedings on remand shall be completed within 90 days of entry of the order of 
remand, unless the trial court finds good cause for a delay of reasonable length. 
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all proceedings before the trial 
court, the clerk of the trial court and the court reporter shall immediately prepare the record of 
the supplemental proceedings as required by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings 
before the trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial court shall 
immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon preparation of the 
supplemental record. If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court has not been 
transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the 
supplemental proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record. 
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial court, the clerk of the 
court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for briefing or oral argument under these rules. 
Errors claimed to have been made during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this 
rule are reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals. The 
findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same standards as the 
review of findings of fact in^other appeals. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Adopted effective October 1, 1992; amended effective April 1, 1998.] 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and 
in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose 
judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on 
appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page 
which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, 
rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where 
they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the 
standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in 
the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall 
be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is 
lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an 
addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the 
case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the 
facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and 
references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in 
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be 
a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall 
not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts 
of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such 
an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(l 1) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this 
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the 
brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall 
contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(l 1)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(l 1)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals 
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not 
available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(l 1)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral 
decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph 
(a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the 
statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the 
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the 
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant 
to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new 
matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed 
except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to 
keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It 
promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or 
the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured person,' "the 
taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record 
as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings 
or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published 
depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each volume as 
marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered page(s) referred to 
within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be 
made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in 
controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, 
and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, 
tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the 
record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of 
this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice 
of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise 
orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no 
party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in 
the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and 
present the issues raised in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief 
of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of 
Cross-Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to 
the Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good cause 
shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this rule. The 
motion shall state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages 
requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days before 
the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be accompanied by a 
copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is due and seeking 
more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera 
inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of 
additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the 
draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one 
appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of 
either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of 
the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the 
attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before 
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the 
citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the 
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall state 
the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any 
response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or 
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the 
offending lawyer. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 8 
Rule 8. Appointment of counsel 
(a) A defendant charged with a public offense has the right to self representation, and if indigent, 
has the right to court-appointed counsel if the defendant faces a substantial probability of 
deprivation of liberty. 
(b) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an indigent defendant who is charged 
with an offense for which the punishment may be death, the court shall appoint two or more 
attorneys to represent such defendant and shall make a finding on the record based on the 
requirements set forth below that appointed counsel is proficient in the trial of capital cases. In 
making its determination, the court shall ensure that the experience of counsel who are under 
consideration for appointment have met the following minimum requirements: 
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have tried to verdict six felony cases 
within the past four years or twenty-five felony cases total; 
(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as counsel or co-counsel in 
a capital or a felony homicide case which was tried to a jury and which went to final 
verdict; 
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have completed or taught within the past 
five years an approved continuing legal education course or courses at least eight hours of 
which deal, in substantial part, with the trial of death penalty cases; and 
(4) the experience of one of the appointed attorneys must total not less than five years in 
the active practice of law. 
(c) In making its selection of attorneys for appointment in a capital case, the court should also 
consider at least the following factors: 
(1) whether one or more of the attorneys under consideration have previously appeared as 
counsel or co-counsel in a capital case; 
(2) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have sufficient time and support 
and can dedicate those resources to the representation of the defendant in the capital case 
now pending before the court with undivided loyalty to the defendant; 
(3) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have engaged in the active 
practice of criminal law in the past five years; 
(4) the diligence, competency and ability of the attorneys being considered; and 
(5) any other factor which may be relevant to a determination that counsel to be appointed 
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will fairly, efficiently and effectively provide representation to the defendant. 
(d) In all cases where an indigent defendant is sentenced to death, the court shall appoint one or 
more attorneys to represent such defendant on appeal and shall make a finding that counsel is 
proficient in the appeal of capital cases. To be found proficient to represent on appeal persons 
sentenced to death, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys must meet the following 
requirements: 
(1) at least one attorney must have served as counsel in at least three felony appeals; and 
(2) at least one attorney must have attended and completed within the past five years an 
approved continuing legal education course which deals, in substantial part, with the trial 
or appeal of death penalty cases. 
(e) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an indigent petitioner pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78B-9-202(2)(a), the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to represent 
such petitioner at post-conviction trial and on post-conviction appeal and shall make a finding 
that counsel is qualified to represent persons sentenced to death in post-conviction cases. To be 
found qualified, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys must meet the following 
requirements: 
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have served as counsel in at least three 
felony or post-conviction appeals; 
(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as counsel or co-counsel in 
a post-conviction case at the evidentiary hearing, on appeal, or otherwise demonstrated 
proficiency in the area of post-conviction litigation; 
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have attended and completed or taught 
within the past five years an approved continuing legal education course which dealt, in 
substantial part, with the trial and appeal of death penalty cases or with the prosecution or 
defense of post-conviction proceedings in death penalty cases; 
(4) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have tried to judgment or verdict three 
civil jury or felony cases within the past four years or ten cases total; and 
(5) the experience of at least one of the appointed attorneys must total not less than five 
years in the active practice of law. 
(f) Mere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow the guidelines set forth in this rule shall 
not of itself be grounds for establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively represented the 
defendant at trial or on appeal. 
(g) Cost and attorneys' fees for appointed counsel shall be paid as described in Chapter 32 of Title 
77. 
(h) Costs and attorneys fees for post-conviction counsel shall be paid pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78B-9-202(2)(a). 
A _ ni 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 606 
Article VI. Witnesses 
RULE 606. COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS 
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before that jury in the trial of 
the case in which the juror is sitting. If the juror is called so to testify, the opposing party shall be 
afforded an opportunity to object out of the presence of the jury. 
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or 
indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the 
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as 
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the 
juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question 
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or 
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's 
affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror 
would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.] 
Addendum B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VON LESTER TAYLOR, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 070500645 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: August 17, 2009 
The above matter came before the court on July 14, 2009 for 
oral argument on respondent's motion to dismiss. 
Petitioner was present through Brian M. Pomerantz and Megan 
B, Moriarty and respondent was present through Thomas B, Brunker 
and Erin Riley, Counsel for petitioner waived the appearance of 
petitioner. 
In this capital homicide case petitioner filed a successive 
petition (petitioner calls it a complete petition) for relief 
under the Utah Post Conviction Remedies Act and URCP, Rule 65C, 
on November 5, 2007. 
To explain the delays involved in this case, the court notes 
that petition contained 426 pages of argument. It contained just 
over 5 volumes of attachments, perhaps 1000 pages of material. 
\\i\l?i 
The parties have often either informally or by motion and order 
obtained extensions of filing deadlines under the rules given the 
complexity, length and importance of the issues. 
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, consisting of 89 
pages, on February 15, 2008. Petitioner filed an opposition 
response on May 13, 2008, and it was 129 pages in length. On 
June 13, 2008, respondent moved for permission to file a 
supplemental memorandum in support if its motion to dismiss. 
Petitioner opposed that on June 23, 2008, Respondent filed a 
reply on that request June 26, 2008, and the court on that same 
date, June 26, 2008, allowed the supplemental memorandum by the 
State. On July 3, 2008, the parties stipulated to substitute the 
State of Utah as the correct respondent rather than the warden 
named in the petition. On July 25, 2008, the State filed a 
supplemental memo of rather standard length, 23 pages. Petitioner 
filed an opposition on August 27, 2008. On March 4, 2009, 
respondent filed a 179 page reply. On March 13, 2009, respondent 
filed a request to submit. Based thereon oral argument was 
scheduled originally for April 22, 2009. Respondent filed on 
March 17, 2009, a notice that permission to file a sur reply may 
be filed. Respondent also moved to continue the oral argument due 
to the press of other business and unavailability of counsel. 
This date was then scheduled for oral argument. 
-ii-
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Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under 
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the 
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. The 
court has read all of the pleadings and all of the transcripts 
that are part of this record, including the preliminary hearing 
and penalty phase hearing, that are on file in the office of the 
clerk of this court. The court has examined the exhibits which 
are attached to the pleadings and has examined the trial exhibits 
which still remain in the office of the clerk of this court in 
Summit County. Since taking the issues under advisement, the 
court has further considered the law and facts relating to the 
issues and the memoranda of the parties. Now being fully 
advised, the court renders the following Ruling and Order. 
-iii-
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I. Background 
Gleaned from the record of court proceedings as found by the 
court and jury at the time, almost nineteen years ago, on 
December 14, 1990, Petitioner left the Orange Street Community 
Correctional Center in Salt Lake City and failed to return. On 
December 21, 1990, Petitioner, along with an accomplice, Edward 
Deli, broke into the family cabin of Rolf and Kaye Tiede in 
Summit County while the Tiedes were in Salt Lake City shopping. 
The following day, the Tiedes returned to the cabin. Part of the 
family parked at the gate to the Beaver Springs development and 
Ms. Kaye Tiede, together with her mother, Beth Potts, a woman in 
her mid-70s, and daughter Linae Tiede, age 20, drove two 
snowmobiles to the cabin, which was located approximately two 
miles from the gate which was on the Weber Canyon road. Mr. 
Rolfe Tiede and his 16 year-old daughter Ticia Tiede drove to a 
repair shop to pick up additional snowmobiles which were being 
repaired. 
Linae was the first to arrive at the cabin and when she 
opened the door at the top of the stairs Petitioner confronted 
her with his gun drawn. He ordered Kaye Tiede and Ms. Potts 
upstairs. Ms. Potts needed assistance because she was partially 
blind and needed help walking. Once all three were upstairs, 
Kaye Tiede offered Petitioner money and whatever else he wanted• 
Petitioner shot Kaye Tiede near her left shoulder. The bullet 
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passed through her lungs and aorta, causing her death, Ms. Potts 
was then shot several times, including at least once in the chest 
and in the head, either of which could have been the cause of her 
death. During the shooting, Linae began to pray, but Petitioner 
told her that praying would not help because he worshiped the 
devil. 
Once the shooting ended, Petitioner determined that he, 
Deli, and Linae would leave and that the cabin should be burned 
in order to prevent the discovery of any fingerprints. As they 
were preparing to leave, Mr. Tiede and his daughter Ticia 
arrived. Petitioner grabbed Linae by the throat and held his gun 
to her back. Mr. Tiede and Ticia were both ordered into the 
garage and Petitioner asked Mr. Tiede for money. Mr. Tiede 
complied and then Petitioner ordered Deli to shoot Mr. Tiede. 
When Deli hesitated, Petitioner shot Mr. Tiede in the face. 
Petitioner said nothing. Prior to leaving the cabin with Linae 
and Ticia, Petitioner returned to the garage, shot Mr. Tiede 
again in the head while Mr. Tiede was lying face down on the 
ground "pretending" to be dead, and poured gasoline over him. 
Gasoline was scattered through the cabin and it was set on fire 
before Petitioner and the others left. When Petitioner, Deli, 
Linae, and Ticia arrived at the gate to the Beaver Springs 
development at the Weber Canyon Road, Petitioner ordered everyone 
into the Tiede's car and they drove away. Mr. Tiede, who was not 
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killed by the attack, was ultimately able to arouse himself, and 
take a snowmobile to the Weber Canyon Road where he found a 
family member and they called police. Following a high-speed 
chase, Petitioner and Deli were apprehended and the two girls 
were safely taken from Petitioner and Deli. 
On December 24, 1990, Petitioner was charged with two counts 
of capital homicide in the deaths of Kaye Tiede and Ms, Potts, in 
addition to several other felony counts of attempted aggravated 
murder, aggravated arson, aggravated kidnaping, aggravated 
robbery, theft, and failure to respond to an officer's signal to 
stop. 
On May 1, 1991, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the two counts 
of capital homicide and the State agreed to dismiss all of the 
other charges. On May 16, 17, 21, and 22, 1991, a sentencing 
proceeding was convened for the purpose of receiving evidence 
concerning the appropriate sentence that should be imposed upon 
Petitioner by the jury. Following their deliberations, on May 
24, 1991, the jurors returned a unanimous sentencing decision in 
favor of death for Petitioner on each count of capital homicide. 
Petitioner then sought to withdraw his guilty plea, which 
was denied by the trial court. 
Through his trial counsel, Elliott Levine ("Levine"), 
Petitioner appealed to the Utah Supreme Court on July 8, 1992. 
However, after Petitioner's opening brief was filed, on July 20, 
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1992, the State requested that the brief be stricken and that 
Levine be removed from his representation of Petitioner. 
Although Levine was ordered to withdraw and was replaced by J. 
Bruce Savage ("Savage") in September 1993, the opening brief was 
not stricken. During the direct appeal, the Supreme Court 
remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing 
under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 23B, on the claim 
that trial counsel had been ineffective. Evidence was presented 
to the trial court at that hearing on May 15, 16, 18, 22, 23, and 
24, 1995. The trial court concluded that Petitioner had not been 
deprived of his right to effective representation under the Sixth 
Amendment. 
Savage then pursued the direct appeal by filing Petitioner's 
brief on June 3, 1996. On October 24, 1997, the Utah Supreme 
Court issued its opinion rejecting all of Petitioner's appellate 
claims. State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681 (Utah 1997) (Taylor I), 
The United States Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of 
certiorari on October 5, 1998. 
On February 23, 1998, Richard P. Mauro ("Mauro") was 
appointed as post-conviction counsel pursuant to the PCRA to 
represent Petitioner in his post-conviction action. Approximately 
one year later Petitioner filed his Petition for Relief Under the 
Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act, On May 30, 2002, Petitioner 
filed his First Amended Petition for Relief Under the Utah Post-
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Conviction Remedies Act. Respondent, Hank Galetka, who was the 
warden/respondent at the time, filed a motion for summary 
judgment on September 13, 2002. Oral argument on the motion for 
summary judgment was heard on April 18, 2003. On March 1, 2004, 
the post-conviction trial court, granted Respondent's motion for 
summary judgment and denied post-conviction relief on all of 
Petitioner's claims. The signed order and judgment was entered 
on September 22, 2004. 
Petitioner timely appealed that decision and the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the .post-conviction court, the Honorable 
Frank. G. Noel, on January 26, 2007. Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 
12, 156 P.3d 739 (Taylor II). The request for a rehearing was 
denied on March 27, 2007. The Office of the Federal Public 
Defender for the District of Utah was appointed to represent 
Petitioner in federal court on March 6, 2007. On September 4, 
2007, Petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas 
corpus and, on November 2, 2007, a first amended petition was 
filed in federal court. Although Petitioner's federal case was, 
and is, still pending, on November 5, 2007, Petitioner filed this 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
To explain the delays involved in this case, the Court notes 
that the successive petition contained 426 pages of argument and 
over five volumes of attachments. Moreover, the parties have, 
either informally or by motion and order, obtained extensions of 
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the filing deadlines given the complexity, length, and importance 
of the issues raised. On February 15, 2008, Respondent filed a 
motion to dismiss, consisting of 89 pages. Petitioner filed a 
129 page response in opposition on May 13, 2008. On June 13, 
2008, Respondent requested permission to file a supplemental 
memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss, which Petitioner 
opposed on June 23, 2008. Respondent filed a reply on that 
request on June 26, 2008 and the Court, on that same date, 
allowed the supplemental memorandum by Respondent. On July 3, 
2008, the parties stipulated to substitute the State of Utah as 
the correct respondent rather than the warden of the Utah State 
Prison. On July 25, 2008, Respondent filed its supplemental 
memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss and Petitioner 
filed his response in opposition to the supplemental memorandum 
on August 27, 2008. On March 4, 2009, Respondent filed a 179 
page reply to Petitioner's opposition to the motion to dismiss. 
On March 13, 2009, Respondent filed a request to submit and, 
based upon this request, oral argument was scheduled for April 
22, 2009. Petitioner moved to continue that date due to 
conflicts with counsel's schedule. On March 17, 2009, Respondent 
filed a request for permission to file a sur reply. Oral 
argument on the motion to dismiss was held on July 14, 2009 and 
the Court took the issues raised under advisement. 
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II. Summary of the Arguments 
A, Claims Raised in the Successive Petition 
Petitioner raised thirty (30) separate grounds for relief in 
his successive (complete) petition. These include claims that 
trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to properly 
investigate the case, failed to conduct an adequate mitigation 
investigation, failed to adequately counsel and advise Petitioner 
in connection with his pleas of guilty to two counts of capital 
homicide, failed to properly litigate and renew the motion for 
change of venue, was laboring under an actual conflict of 
interest, performed deficiently during the jury selection process 
including failing to properly challenge jurors, failed to make 
appropriate challenges for cause, failed to uncover potential 
juror bias, and failed to submit voir dire questions, failed to 
present an adequate mitigation case, and failed to challenge the 
State's case in aggravation. Petitioner has now abandoned one of 
those thirty claims. 
Petitioner alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective 
because he failed to properly argue the correct legal standard 
for ineffective assistance of trial counsel and failed to raise 
issues that could, and should, have been raised. 
Petitioner asserts a claim that because the funding 
available for his initial post-conviction petition and counsel 
was inadequate, his prior post-conviction counsel was unable to 
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provide effective representation. 
Petitioner also raises claims asserting that the trial court 
committed error including that the court improperly denied 
Petitioner's motion for change of venue, improperly conducted 
individual voir dire of prospective jurors in chambers, failed to 
properly grant Petitioner's challenges for cause, asked 
impermissible questions and ignored responses during jury 
selection, improperly excluded prospective jurors who were not 
members of the LDS Church, provided jurors with confusing and 
erroneous jury instructions and a special verdict form, and 
improperly admitted evidence. 
In addition to the foregoing claims related to alleged trial 
court error and ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and 
post-conviction counsel, Petitioner also asserts that his 
conviction and death sentences should be vacated because he did 
not receive the competent assistance of mental health experts, he 
is actually innocent of causing the deaths of Kaye Tiede and Beth 
Potts, there is no factual basis for his guilty pleas, a 
disproportionate number of the jurors who served were members of 
the LDS Church, jurors were improperly influenced by LDS Church 
practices and the relationship between Church leaders and the 
victims' families, there was juror misconduct, there was 
prosecutorial misconduct, the State failed to disclose 
exculpatory evidence, the sentences of death are disproportionate 
-8-
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to Pet i t ioner ' s cu lpabi l i ty , the Utah death penalty scheme i s 
unconstitutional because i t f a i l s to narrow the class of 
murderers e l ig ible for the death penalty, there i s an inadequate 
appellate record, l e tha l intravenous injection const i tu tes cruel 
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, (that claim i s 
now abandoned) and the cumulative impact of a l l the errors 
committed in his case violated his const i tu t ional r igh t s . 
B. State's Motion to Dismiss 
The State responded to Pe t i t ioner ' s successive pe t i t ion with 
a motion to dismiss. 
Firs t , the State argues that most of Pe t i t i one r ' s claims 
were raised and adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, therefore, 
under both the PCRA and the common law they are absolutely 
procedurally barred. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(b) and (d) 
(2007) .* 
Second, a l l of Pe t i t i one r ' s claims are ones that could have 
been, but were not, raised in a prior proceeding* Therefore, 
under the PCRA, they are a l l procedurally barred. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-35a-106( c) and (d). 
Third, the State i n i t i a l l y argued that a l l of Pe t i t ioner ' s 
claims were time-barred because they were not raised within one 
1In 1996, the PCRA was found in T i t l e 78, Chapter 35a. In 2008, the PCRA 
was re-codi f ied as T i t l e 78B, Chapter 9. All references in t h i s ru l ing to T i t l e 
78, Chapter 35a are to the vers ion of the PCRA t h a t ex i s t ed at the time 
Pe t i t i one r f i l ed h i s successive pos t -convic t ion p e t i t i o n in 2007. 
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year of the petition's accrual date and he had not shown that any 
of the claims satisfied the interests of justice exception; i.e., 
he had not established that he had a legitimate reason for not 
raising the claim in a prior proceeding nor that any of his 
claims were meritorious. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(3). 
According to the State, the time frame for "accrual" of the post-
conviction action under the PCRA, even under the 1996 version, 
was the date on which the petition for a writ of certiorari was 
denied, which was October 5, 1998, Thus, Petitioner's successive 
post-conviction petition is eight years late. 
However, in a supplemental memorandum, the State argues that 
the 2008 amendments to the PCRA, which removed the interests of 
justice exception to the statute of limitations and replaced it 
with an equitable tolling provisions, apply to Petitioner's 
successive petition. Thus, according to the State, the interests 
of justice exception cannot be relied upon by Petitioner to 
excuse an untimely claim. Furthermore, because Petitioner has 
not shown that the tolling provision applies to any of his 
claims, all of his claims are time-barred under 2008 amendments 
to the PCRA. 
Finally, the State argues that Petitioner's claim of 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel must be 
dismissed because it is not a proper claim under the PCRA. At 
the time Petitioner filed his successive petition, the PCRA 
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"establishe[d] a substantive legal remedy for any person who 
challenges a conviction or sentence." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-
102. Because a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel is not a challenge to Petitioner's conviction or 
sentence, it is not a claim for which relief can be granted under 
the PCRA. Moreover, in its supplemental memorandum addressing 
the applicability of the 2008 amendments to the PCRA, the PCRA 
now states that xx[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed as 
creating the right to the effective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel, and relief may not be granted on any claim that post-
conviction counsel was ineffective." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
202(4). In light of this new language, the State also argues 
that the current version of the PCRA precludes Petitioner from 
obtaining relief on his ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel claim. 
C. Petitioner's Response to the State's Motion to Dismiss 
In response to the State's motion to dismiss, Petitioner 
begins by asserting that he was falsely led to believe that he, 
rather than his co-defendant Edward Deli, caused the deaths of 
Kaye Tiede and Ms. Potts and therefore he is factually innocent 
of the murders to which he pleaded guilty. According to 
Petitioner, his factual innocence necessarily "trumps the 
procedural and timeliness bars relied on by the State." (Pet'r 
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Mem. in Opp. at 15.) The failure to discover this new evidence 
concerning his factual innocence and to raise the claims in his 
first petition was the result of ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel, which in turn was the result of the 
inadequate amount of funding that was made available to prior 
post-conviction counsel. Petitioner argues that his claims are 
not time-barred because the mere passage of time can never 
justify the continued imprisonment of one who has been denied 
fundamental rights. Moreover, the interests of justice exception 
under the PCRA has been satisfied. 
In addition, he also argues that he has shown "good cause" 
or Munusual circumstances" to overcome the procedural bar raised 
by the State. Specifically, he contends that as a result of the 
lack of adequate funding and ineffective assistance of prior 
post-conviction counsel his claims could not have been raised in 
an earlier petition and new facts not previously known 
demonstrate either the denial of a constitutional right, that the 
outcome of his trial might have been different, or the existence 
of fundamental unfairness in his conviction. Because his claims 
were overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay the post-
conviction process, Petitioner contends that good cause exists 
that permits him to raise these claims in his successive 
petition, despite the procedural bar, 
-12-
D. Supplemental Memoranda 
Prior to filing a reply to Petitioner's oppo3ition, the 
State filed a supplemental memorandum in which it argues that the 
2008 amendments to the PCRA that removed the interests of justice 
exception to the time-bar and ostensibly clarified that post-
conviction petitioners do not have a right to the effective 
assistance of counsel, apply retroactively to Petitioner's 
successive post-conviction petition. Therefore, the State 
asserts, Petitioner cannot rely upon the interests of justice 
exception to excuse the untimely filing of any successive claim 
and cannot assert as a ground for relief that his post-conviction 
counsel provided ineffective representation. 
In Petitioner's memorandum in opposition to the State's 
supplemental memorandum, he argues that the Utah Supreme Court 
has exclusive authority to define post-conviction remedies and 
procedures. Because the Supreme Court has already held that the 
mere passage of time can never justify rejecting a meritorious 
claim, removing the interests of justice exception from the PCRA 
is necessarily ineffectual. Moreover, Petitioner also argues 
that the 2008 amendments cannot apply retroactively because (1) 
the interests of justice exception constitutes a vested right 
that cannot be removed retrospectively, and (2) he has a right 
under the Utah Constitution to the effective assistance of post-
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conviction counsel that the legislature cannot extinguish. 
E. State's Reply 
In reply, the State repeats the arguments that were set 
forth in its supplemental memorandum concerning the retroactive 
application of the 2008 amendments to the PCRA. In addition, 
the State argues that even if the 2008 amendments do not apply, 
claims alleging ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel 
are not cognizable under the PCRA, Petitioner has no state or 
federal constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel, the statutory right to post-conviction 
counsel does not give Petitioner the right to a claim of 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in a successive 
petition, and in any event, Petitioner has failed to establish 
that his post-conviction counsel was, in fact, ineffective. 
Further, the State also contends that Petitioner's claims 
are procedurally barred because they are claims that were either 
raised and addressed, or could have been, but were not, raised in 
a prior proceeding and Petitioner has failed to show that any 
exception applies or that unusual circumstances exist. Finally, 
although Petitioner frequently asserts that, with appropriate 
funding finally provided, his current counsel have discovered new 
evidence in the case, Petitioner has not shown that any of the 
recently discovered evidence satisfies the requirements of the 
-14-
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"newly discovered evidence" standard set forth in the PCRA. At 
best he is essentially making a claim of ineffective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel, a claim for which no relief may be 
granted under the PCRA. 
III. Discussion 
A. Legal Analysis 
1. The Interests of Justice Exception 
a. Introduction 
Under the provisions of the PCRA as they existed when 
Petitioner filed his successive post-conviction petition, a 
petitioner was "not eligible for relief . , . upon any ground 
that . . . [was] barred by the limitation period established in 
Section 78-35a-107." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(1)(e)• As with 
the current version of the PCRA, the statute of limitations 
entitled a petitioner to "relief only if the petition [was] filed 
within one year after the cause of action [had] accrued." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (1). Nevertheless, at the time Petitioner 
filed his successive petition, the PCRA included an exception 
that, if satisfied, would excuse an untimely filing. Under this 
exception, "if the court finds that the interests of justice 
require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within 
the time limitations." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (3). 
In considering this exception, the Utah Supreme Court has 
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specifically held that a trial court "presented with an untimely 
post-conviction petition must consider the interests of justice 
exception before disposing of the petition . . . [and] has no 
discretion to grant relief on an untimely . . . petition if the 
^interests of justice' do not so require," Johnson v. State, 
2006 UT 21, 116, 134 P. 3d 1133. On the other hand, if the trial 
court makes specific findings in support of the interests of 
justice exception, then the untimeliness of the successive 
petition must be excused. See id. at 117. "An analysis of what 
constitutes an exception in the ^interests of justice' should 
involve examination of both the meritoriousness of the 
petitioner's claim and the reason for an untimely filing.'' Adams 
v. State, 2005 UT 62, 116, 123 P.3d 400. However, it is not 
necessarily required that both prongs of this test be satisfied. 
As noted by the Supreme Court, depending upon the facts of the 
particular case under consideration, some claims may require no 
justification for an untimely filing—such as a claim of actual 
innocence supported by DNA evidence—while uan entirely frivolous 
claim would not meet the ^interests of justice' exception even 
with the best possible excuse for the late filing." Id. In 
other cases, a clear assessment of both prongs will be necessary 
to determine whether the interests of justice exception is 
satisfied. x>[W]e expect that the district court will give 
appropriate weight to each of [these] factors according to the 
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circumstances of a particular case." Id. 
b. Retroactive Application of Statutory Amendments 
During the 2008 legislative session the interests of justice 
exception was removed from the PCRA and replaced with equitable 
tolling provisions which toll the limitations period "for any 
period during which the petitioner was prevented from filing a 
petition due to state action in violation of the United States 
Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-9-107 (3). This change went into effect on May 5, 
2008 and therefore, no interests of justice exception currently 
exists in the PCRA to excuse the failure of a petitioner to 
timely file a petition for post-conviction relief. "Ordinarily 
the facts and the law in a given lawsuit are to be applied as of 
the date of the filing of the original complaint." Archer v. 
Utah State Land Bd. , 392 P.2d 622, 624 ( UT 1964). It is 
generally true that "legislation is not given retroactive 
effect." B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2006 UT 2, 
120, 128 P.3d 1161. See also Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. 
Co., 2004 UT 80, 139, 104 P.3d 1185 (MA statute is not to be 
applied retroactively unless the statute expressly declares that 
it operates retroactively.")/ Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 ("No part 
of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared."), 
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However, "[a]n exception to the general rule against 
retroactivity applies to changes which are procedural only," 
Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 261 (Utah 1998). 
Unlike substantive law, which "creates, defines[,] and regulates 
the rights and duties of the parties which may give rise to a 
cause of action," procedural law "prescribes the practice and 
procedure or the legal machinery by which the substantive law is 
determined or made effective." Petty v. Clark, 192 P.2d 589, 
593-594 (Utah 1948). Thus, "statutes which operate in 
furtherance of a remedy already existing and which neither create 
new rights nor destroy existing rights . . . appl[y] 
retrospectively to accrued or pending actions to further the 
legislature's remedial purpose," Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n, 
704 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1985). Furthermore, "statutory amendments 
that merely clarify an ambiguity in an original statute will be 
given retroactive effect." Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435, 440 (Utah 1997) (emphasis 
added) , See also Oakland Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 520 
P.2d 208, 210-211 (Utah 1974) (general principle against 
retroactive application "has no application where the later 
statute or amendment deals only with clarification or 
amplification as to how the law should have been understood prior 
to its enactment." (emphasis added)). That is, "an exception 
exists for amendments clarifying statutes, which are applied 
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retroactively, so long as they Mo not enlarge, eliminate, or 
destroy vested or contractual rights.'" Keegan v. State, 896 
P. 2d 618, 620 (Utah 1995) (quoting Board of Equalization v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n ex rel. Benchmark, Inc., 864 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah 
1993)). Nevertheless, as the Utah Court of Appeals has expressly 
held, "[w]hen the Legislature amends a statute, we presume it 
intended to make a substantive, rather than procedural or 
remedial change." Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, 113, 35 P. 3d 
341. 
c. Whether the 2008 Amendments to the PCRA Apply 
Retroactively 
Nowhere in the 2008 amendments is there language declaring 
that the removal of the interests of justice exception should 
apply retroactively* In addition, because the amendments also do 
not expressly state that they are clarifying in nature, there is 
a rebuttable presumption that the amendments are substantive and, 
therefore, should not be applied retroactively. See State v. 
Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Every 
amendment not expressly characterized as a clarification carries 
the rebuttable presumption that it is intended to change existing 
legal rights and liabilities."). See also Thomas v. Color 
Country Mgmt., 2004 UT 12, 136, 84 P.3d 1201 (Durham, C,J., 
concurring) (same). Even without the presumption, however, a 
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persuasive argument exists that removing the interests of justice 
exception from the PCRA constitutes a substantive change. 
Whether an amendment affects substantive rights "should be 
informed and guided by ^familiar considerations of fair notice, 
reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.'" Martin v. 
Radixr 527 U.S. 343, 357-58 (1999) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994)). See also Goebel, 2004 UT 80 
at 139 ("Convenience, reasonableness, and justice are factors we 
consider in deciding whether a statute has a merely remedial or 
procedural purpose."). 
When Petitioner filed his successive post-conviction 
petition in November 2007 he had a reasonable expectation that if 
the State raised the time-bar as a ground for dismissing the 
claims, he would have the opportunity to argue that the interests 
of justice exception applies and that his untimely filing should 
be excused. Having reasonably relied on the existence of the 
interests of justice exception to excuse his untimeliness, to now 
preclude him from asserting it would constitute an unfair 
windfall for the State and would be unfair to some one in 
Petitioner's position. Moreover, in the same way that a 
legislative amendment removing the defense of an expired statute 
of limitations is a change that affects the vested rights of a 
defendant, see Roark v. Crajbtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1062 (Utah 1995) 
("Since 1900, this court has consistently maintained that the 
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defense of an expired statute of limitations is a vested 
right."), it follows by force of logic that a legislative 
amendment removing a statutory exception to the defense of an 
expired statute of limitations is also a change that affects the 
vested rights of a plaintiff. Thus, the 2008 amendments are 
substantive in nature because they eliminate a vested right held 
by Petitioner at the time he filed his successive post-conviction 
petition. See Smith v. Cook, 803 P. 2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) (a 
statute is considered substantive if it "eliminate[s] or 
destroy[s] vested rights,"). 
Notwithstanding language in Keegan suggesting that 
clarifying statutes cannot be applied retroactively if they 
eliminate vested rights, Keegan, 896 P.2d at 620, the State 
argues that Keegan does not state the governing law. The State 
contends that the purpose of the 2008 amendments was to clarify 
the unamended PCRA, and therefore the amendments should be 
applied retroactively to Petitioner's case. The court does not 
find this argument to be persuasive. 
First, despite the State's contention otherwise, more recent 
cases appear to provide support for Keegan. The case of Evans & 
Sutherland, which was decided after Keegan, specifically states 
that "under a long-standing exception to the general rule against 
applying statutes retroactively, statutory amendments that merely 
clarify an ambiguity in an original statute will be given 
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retroactive effect." Use of the word "merely" certainly 
suggests that amendments that do more than simply clarify should 
not be applied retroactively. Clearly, as the Keegan case holds, 
changes that enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual 
rights do more than merely clarify and, therefore, are not 
applied retroactively. Furthermore, the case of Kilpatrick v. 
Wiley, 2001 UT 107, 31 P. 3d 1130, which the State cites as an 
example of a recent case that ostensibly treats the clarifying 
exception as independent from the general rule against 
retroactivity, also can be read as supporting Keegan. After 
stating that legislative amendments may be applied retroactively 
when the purpose of the change is to clarify the meaning of an 
earlier statute, the Supreme Court went on to state that 
"[f]urther, in light of the fact that we have now reversed the 
jury's verdict, the plaintiffs have no vested or contractual 
right that would prohibit application of the amended statute." 
Id, at 159. In other words, because the clarifying amendments do 
not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights, 
i.e. they are procedural, they may be retroactively applied to 
the case. 
Second, the Utah Court of Appeals has directly held that 
clarifying amendments are procedural in nature. See Wilde, 2001 
UT App 318 at 114 (X\A procedural or remedial law ^provides a 
different mode or form of procedure for enforcing substantive 
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rights,' or clarifies the meaning of an earlier enactment." 
(quoting Pilcher v. Department of Soc. Servs., 663 P.2d 450, 455 
(Utah 1983) (emphasis added)). Based upon the foregoing 
analysis, the principle enunciated in Keegan that clarifying 
amendments may be applied retroactively as long as they do not 
enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights, 
appears to be controlling law. 
However, even if the principle set forth in Keegan is 
incorrect, the State has nevertheless failed to persuasively 
demonstrate that the 2008 amendments are clarifying in nature. 
Relying on State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), overruled 
on other grounds as recognized by State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280, 
1283 (Utah 1994), the State contends that legislative acts 
amending a statute constitute "persuasive evidence of the 
legislature's intent when it passed the former, unamended 
statute," Id. at 486, i.e., that the amending statute was meant 
to clarify. Because, according to the State, the Utah Supreme 
Court incorrectly interpreted the interests of justice exception 
in the Adams case to allow a petitioner to escape the time-bar 
any time the petitioner could explain the delay and show that the 
claim was potentially meritorious, the fact alone that the 
legislature amended the PCRA to remove the interest of justice 
exception and replace it with an equitable tolling provision is 
persuasive evidence that the legislature intended to clarify what 
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it meant when the interests of justice exception was originally 
included in the PCRA. 
However, while the State correctly quotes Bishop, the 
amending statute referred to in the case was specifically 
entitled "Clarifying Child Kidnaping and Sexual Abuse Act." Id. 
(emphasis added), It is at least arguable that the language 
quoted by the State draws its meaning from this context, and 
therefore that the persuasiveness referred to is tied to the 
language of the amending statute itself stating that it is 
clarifying the prior enactment. Thus, simply because the 
legislature amended the PCRA after the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the interests of justice exception in Adams, 
this does not necessarily mean that the legislature intended the 
2008 amendments to be clarifying in nature, particularly in light 
of the fact that, unlike Bishop, no legislative language was 
included in the amendments suggesting that the amendments were 
intended only to be clarifying. 
In addition, citing to the case of Horton v. Goldminer's 
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989), the State also argues that 
because a "purpose of a statute of limitations is to cut off 
untimely claims regardless of the claim's potential merit/" 
(State's Supplemental Mem. in Supp. at 9) {emphasis added), the 
Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the interests of justice 
exception is illogical insofar as it defeats the purpose of 
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having a limitations statute in the first place. The Horton case 
states that "[i]n general, statutes of limitation are intended to 
compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time 
and to suppress stale and fraudulent claims so that claims are 
advanced while evidence to rebut them is still fresh." Id. at 
1091. Nothing in this language suggests that statutes of 
limitations are intended to cut off claims regardless of their 
potential merit* Indeed, following the above-quoted language, 
Horton case cites to Burnett v. New York Central R.R., 380 U.S. 
424 (1965) which held that 
[s]tatutes of limitations are primarily designed to 
assure fairness to defendants. Such statutes "promote 
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of 
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence 
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just 
claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice 
to defend within the period of limitation and that the 
right to be free of stale claims in time comes to 
prevail over the right to prosecute them." . . • The 
policy of repose, designed to protect defendants, is 
frequently outweighed, howeverr where the interests of 
justice require vindication of the plaintiffrs rights. 
Id. at 428 (quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway 
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Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944) (emphasis 
added)). This language suggests that it is not true that a 
limitations statute cuts off untimely claims "regardless of the 
claim's potential merit." While the State argues that the Utah 
Supreme Court "made the interests of justice exception so broad, 
that it defeated the purpose of the statute of limitations," 
(State's Supplemental Mem, in Supp. at 9), and therefore, that 
the 2008 amendments removing the interests of justice exception 
should be viewed as clarifying in nature, this argument is not 
particularly persuasive given the fact that the "rule" relied 
upon by the State may not stand for the precise proposition the 
State suggests it does. The State's arguments simply do not show 
that the 2008 amendments merely clarify the prior unamended PCRA. 
Furthermore, as Petitioner points out, prior to the Adams 
case being decided, the Utah Supreme Court held in Julian v. 
State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998) that the "proper consideration of 
meritorious claims raised in a habeas corpus petition will always 
be in the interests of justice. It necessarily follows that no 
statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied to bar a 
habeas petition." Id. at 254. Based upon this language, the 
legislature should have been on notice of the broadness of the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the interests of justice 
exception. Yet, if the 2008 amendments were genuinely intended 
to clarify the legislature's original intent with respect to the 
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interests of justice exception, the State has failed to 
adequately explain why the legislature waited nearly ten years to 
ultimately remove the interests of justice exception from the 
PCRA. 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is the court's 
conclusion that the 2008 amendments removing the interests of 
justice exception from the PCRA are not necessarily clarifying in 
nature. Moreover, even if their purpose is to clarify, the 
amendments do more than clarify insofar as they eliminate a 
vested right held by Petitioner at the time he filed his 
successive post-conviction petition, namely his right to raise 
the interests of justice exception as a reason to excuse the 
untimely filing of his successive petition. The 2008 amendments 
are substantive in nature and, consistent with the general rule 
against retroactive application of substantive changes, they 
cannot be applied retroactively. Petitioner is entitled, 
therefore, to assert the interests of justice exception to excuse 
the untimeliness of his successive post-conviction petition. 
2 . Procedural Bar Rule 
a. Introduction 
The PCRA "establishes a substantive legal remedy for any 
person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal 
offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies." Utah 
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Code Ann. § 78-35a~102(1). While the "PCRA affords a convicted 
defendant the opportunity to have his conviction and sentence 
vacated or modified under certain circumstances," Lafferty v. 
State, 2007 UT 73, $44, 175 P.3d 530, because a petition for 
post-conviction relief "is a collateral attack on a conviction or 
sentence [and] . . . not a substitute for appellate review," 
Taylor II, 2007 UT 12 at $14, a petitioner "is not eligible for 
relief on claims that were ^raised or addressed7 on direct 
appeal." Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, 113, 194 P.3d 913 (citing 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106{l)(b) (2002)). See also Lafferty, 
2007 UT 73 at $44 ("Claims that were brought on direct appeal are 
ineligible for consideration in post-conviction actions."). Such 
issues are dismissed as an abuse of the post-conviction process 
without a ruling on the merits. No exceptions exist for this 
procedural bar under the PCRA, including assertions that 
appellate counsel less than adequately raised or argued the 
issues on appeal. See Kell, 2008 UT 62 at $17 (after opportunity 
to be heard on appeal, "[w]e presume that this court gave full 
consideration to the claims, regardless of whether [petitioner's] 
counsel raised them in the most effective manner."). 
In addition to permitting the dismissal of successive post-
conviction claims previously raised and addressed at trial or on 
direct appeal, the PCRA also precludes a petitioner from 
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obtaining "relief . . . upon any ground that was raised or 
addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or 
could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for 
post-conviction relief.'' Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (1) (d) . The 
same is true under the common law. See Gardner v. Holden, 888 
P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994) (Gardner I) ("Issues that could and 
should have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, may not 
properly be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding absent unusual 
circumstances."). Unlike the procedural bar rule that applies to 
initial post-conviction petitions, see Utah Code Ann, § 78-35a-
106(1)( c), which includes a statutory exception based upon 
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2), no exception based upon ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel is expressly included in 
the PCRA that would apply to claims raised in a successive 
petition for post-conviction relief that could have been, but 
were not, raised in a prior proceeding. Thus, any successive 
claim that was raised or that could have been raised, but was 
not, in a prior post-conviction petition is procedurally barred 
and no exception exists under the PCRA to excuse this failure. 
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b . Common Law Exceptions t o the Procedural Bar Rule2 
Notwithstanding the language of the PCRA, under the common 
law as se t for th by the Utah Supreme Court, the mer i t s of a claim 
t h a t was previously r a i sed and addressed in a p r io r proceeding 
may be considered by the t r i a l court i f the p e t i t i o n e r i s able t o 
demonstrate "unusual c i rcumstances ." See Hurst v. Cook, 111 P. 2d 
1029, 1036 (Utah 1989) (a "ground for r e l i e f from a convict ion or 
sentence t h a t has once been fu l ly and f a i r l y adjudicated on 
appeal or in a p r i o r habeas proceeding should not be 
readjudicated unless i t can be shown t h a t t he r e are ^unusual 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ' " ) . See a l so Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, $12, 194 
P. 3d 903 ("When the ground for p rec lus ion i s t h a t the p e t i t i o n e r 
already addressed . . . the i s s u e , the p e t i t i o n e r ' s claim wi l l 
not be allowed in a pos t -convic t ion r e l i e f proceeding absent 
unusual c i rcumstances . "} ; Lairjby v. Barnes, 793 P.2d 311, 318 
(Utah 1990) (same). "For example, a p r i o r adjudicat ion i s not a 
bar to reexamination of a convict ion i f t he re has been a 
r e t r o a c t i v e change in the law, a subsequent discovery of 
suppressed evidence, or newly discovered evidence ." Hurst, 111 
2When Pe t i t i one r f i l e d h is successive p e t i t i o n for post -convict ion r e l i e f , 
the PCRA "es tab l i she [d] a subs tant ive l ega l remedy for any person who 
challenge[d] a convict ion or sentence for a cr iminal offense and who ha[d] 
exhausted a l l other l ega l remedies." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102(1), However, 
in 2008, the phrase "a subs tant ive l ega l remedy" was removed and replaced with 
"the sole remedy." Nevertheless, although the "amendment appears to have 
extinguished [the] common law writ au thor i ty for future cases [ , bjecause 
[Pe t i t ioner ] sought pos t -convic t ion r e l i e f p r io r t o the implementation of the 
2008 amendment, r e l i e f through [the] common law writ au thor i ty i s s t i l l ava i lab le 
t o h im." Peterson v. Kennard, 2008 UT 90, 116, 201 P.3d 956. 
-30-
P.2d at 1036. 
With respect to claims not previously raised, the Utah 
Supreme Court has "consistently recognized exceptions to [the 
procedural bar] rule in ^unusual circumstances' where ^good 
cause' excuses a petitioner's failure to raise the claim 
earlier." Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56r 120, 128 P.3d 1123 
(citing Hurst, 177 P.2d at 1036). See also Utah R. Civ. P. 
65C( c) ("Additional claims relating to the legality of the 
conviction or sentence may not be raised in subsequent [post-
conviction] proceedings except for good cause shown."). 
According to the Supreme Court, it has 
long been our law[] that a procedural default is not 
always determinative of a collateral attack on a 
conviction where it is alleged that the trial was not 
conducted within the bounds of basic fairness or in 
harmony with constitutional standards. Therefore, even 
where a claim of error could have been raised earlier, 
post-conviction relief may be available in those "rare 
cases" or "unusual circumstances" where "an obvious 
injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional right has occurred" that would make it 
"unconscionable" not to reexamine the issue. 
Gardner v. Galetka, 2007 UT 3, 117, 151 P.3d 968 (Gardner III). 
See also Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, 120, 184 P.3d 1226 
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P[P]rocedural defaults (such as the ban on successive petitions) 
should not be determinative in those rare and unusual cases . . . 
[where it would be] unconscionable not to reexamine the issue 
[raised]."). 
The Supreme Court has identified five "good cause" common 
law exceptions3 to the procedural bar rule, three of which have 
been codified either by statute or procedural rule. These common 
law exceptions are: 
(1) the denial of a constitutional right pursuant to 
new law that is, or might be, retroactive, (2) new 
facts not previously known which would show the denial 
of a constitutional right or might change the outcome 
of the trial, (3) the existence of fundamental 
unfairness in a conviction, (4) the illegality of a 
sentence, [and] (5) a claim overlooked in good faith 
with no intent to delay or abuse the writ. 
Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1037. At the time Petitioner filed his 
successive petition, exception (1) was implicitly included in the 
PCRA via Section 78~35a-106(d), exception (2) was expressly 
provided for in Section 78-35a~104(1)(e), and exception (4) was 
covered by Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Importantly, because the common law exceptions ^retain their 
The Utah Supreme Court has also made clear that the list of common law 
exceptions set forth in Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989) is not an 
exhaustive list. See Gardner v. Galetka, 2001 UT 3, $18, 151 P. 3d 968 ("We later 
clarified that this list of ^good cause' exceptions is not exhaustive."), 
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independent constitutional significance/' Gardner v. Galetka, 
2004 UT 42, 115, 94 P. 3d 263 (Gardner II), they can be asserted 
by petitioners raising successive post-conviction claims 
regardless of whether the exception has been included in the 
PCRA. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has also held that because 
frivolous claims and claims previously withheld for tactical 
reasons must be summarily denied, see Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1031, 
post conviction petitioners must first demonstrate that a claim 
is neither frivolous nor was it withheld for tactical reasons 
before the post-conviction court is required to consider whether 
any common law exceptions apply that would excuse a petitioner's 
failure to raise the successive claim in a prior proceeding. See 
Gardner III, 2001 UT 3 at 126 (because "[f]rivolous claims, . . . 
and claims that are withheld for tactical reasons should be 
summarily denied[,] . , . a separate and distinct procedural 
determination for successive post-conviction claims [must be] 
made before [the trial court] reach[es] an analysis under the 
^good cause' common law exceptions."). In other words, the trial 
court is required to summarily dismiss all successive post-
conviction claims that are frivolous or that were withheld for 
tactical reasons before considering the applicability of the 
common law exceptions. 
A claim is frivolous if it is facially implausible. See id. 
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at 121. Thus, a petitioner raising a successive post-conviction 
claim must first demonstrate that the claim is not facially 
implausible before requesting that the trial court consider the 
common law exceptions. As for claims withheld for tactical 
reasons, in nearly all cases, if the substance of a successive 
claim was not raised in a prior post-conviction petition, it must 
be presumed that the reason for not raising it was tactical or 
strategic in nature. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 
(2003) ("When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of 
others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical 
reasons rather than through sheer neglect."); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668r 689 (1984) (n[T]he defendant must 
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action ^might be considered sound trial strategy.f" 
(quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 
Thus, with respect to any successive claim, in order for the 
trial court to even consider the common law exceptions, the 
petitioner must overcome the strong presumption that no tactical 
reasons existed for counsel not to have raised the claim which is 
now raised in the successive proceeding. That is, the petitioner 
must demonstrate that "there was no ^conceivable tactical basis 
for counsel's actions.'" State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, 16, 89 P. 3d 
162 (quoting State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998)). See also State v, Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) 
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("[W]e give trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical 
decisions and will not question such decisions unless there is no 
reasonable basis supporting them."); State v. Farnsworth, 368 
P.2d 914, 915 (Utah 1962) (defendant charged with burglary did 
not have incompetent counsel where the "record indicate[d] no 
action or inaction by the trial attorney which could not 
rationally find explanation in a legitimate exercise of 
strategy."). 
c. Whether an Exception Exists to the Procedural Bar 
Rule Based Upon a State Constitutional Right to 
the Effective Assistance of Post-Conviction 
Counsel 
In addition to raising an independent claim of ineffective 
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, Petitioner also 
argues that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel 
constitutes a common law exception to the procedural bar rule 
and, therefore, many of his other claims are not procedurally 
barred because the failure to raise these claims in his prior 
post-conviction petition was the result of ineffective 
representation. In his memorandum opposing the State's 
supplemental motion to dismiss, he provides support for this 
argument by arguing that he has both a state constitutional right 
and a statutory right to the effective assistance of post-
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conviction counsel* 
There is no question that Petitioner had a state 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of trial and 
appellate counsel during his criminal proceedings. See Utah 
Const, art. I, § 12 ("In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to . . . defend . . . by counsel.")• The Utah 
Supreme Court has expressly held that a "defendant in a criminal 
proceeding has a constitutional right to the assistance of 
counsel at all critical stages of the prosecution." State v. 
Hamilton, 132 P.2d 505, 506-507 (Utah 1986) (citing Utah Const, 
art. I, § 12). See also State v. Eichler, 483 P.2d 887, 889 
(Utah 1971) ("It is in accordance with the assurance of the Utah 
State Constitution that an accused be provided with the 
assistance of counsel at every important stage of the proceedings 
against him."). This includes not only the criminal trial, but 
the appeal as well. See Utah Const, art. I, § 12 ("In all 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to 
have a speedy public trial . . . and the right to appeal."). See 
also State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985) ("The Utah 
Constitution provides that a defendant in a criminal prosecution 
shall have a ^right to appeal in all cases.' This shows that the 
drafters of our constitution considered the right of appeal 
essential to a fair criminal proceeding." (quoting Utah Const, 
art. I, § 12). Furthermore, as noted above, because the "right 
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to counsel includes effective assistance of counsel/" State v. 
Burns, 2000 UT 56, 123, 4 P. 3d 795, i t follows that Pet i t ioner 
had a s ta te const i tu t ional r ight to the effective assistance of 
counsel both at t r i a l and on appeal. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the Utah Constitution guarantees 
a criminal defendant the r ight to effective representation at 
t r i a l and on appeal does not, in and of i t se l f , warrant the 
conclusion that a s t a te const i tu t ional r ight -to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel ex i s t s . The Utah Supreme 
Court has never held that post-conviction pe t i t ioners in a death 
penalty case4 have a s t a t e const i tu t ional r ight to post-conviction 
counsel. In Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480, the 
Supreme Court expressly avoided the issue when i t declared that , 
[wjhile we have not yet considered whether such a r ight 
exis ts under the Utah Constitution, there i s no need to 
do so in t h i s case . . . . We do not foreclose the 
poss ib i l i ty that an indigent death row inmate may have 
a right to the effective assistance of counsel under 
the Utah Constitution, but that question must wait for 
4 In t h e case of Hutchlngs v. State, 2003 UT 52, 84 P.3d 1150, t h e Utah 
Supreme Court considered a dec is ion by the Utah Court of Appeals affirming the 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s d ismissal of a success ive , non-capi ta l p e t i t i o n for pos t -convic t ion 
r e l i e f . One of the claims r a i s e d by the p e t i t i o n e r was t ha t he was "wrongfully 
denied counsel for purposes of . , . h i s f i r s t p e t i t i o n for pos t -convic t ion 
r e l i e f . Id . at 119. The Supreme Court held tha t while the p e t i t i o n e r "may have 
benef i t t ed from profess iona l a s s i s t ance in the d ra f t ing and p re sen ta t ion of h i s 
[ f i r s t ] p e t i t i o n , t he re i s no s t a t u t o r y or c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i gh t t o counsel in a 
c i v i l p e t i t i o n for pos t -convic t ion r e l i e f . ' ' Id . a t 520 {emphasis added). 
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another day. 
Id. at 184. Because the Supreme Court has never expressly 
recognized a constitutional right to effective post-conviction 
counsel, Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that a 
proper interpretation of the Utah Constitution yields such a 
right. 
Although the Supreme Court has held that the "scope of 
Utah's constitutional protections 'may be broader or narrower 
than' those offered by the [federal constitution], ^depending on 
[our] state constitution's language, history, and 
interpretation,'" American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 
UT 40, %9, 140 P. 3d 1235 fquoting West v. Thomson Newspapers, 812 
P.2d 999, 1004 n.4 (Utah 1994)), based upon a careful 
consideration of Petitioner's arguments, it is the Court's 
conclusion that Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Utah 
Constitution includes the right to the effective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel. 
First, Petitioner argues that he has a state constitutional 
right to post-conviction counsel under Article I, Section 12. 
However, any reliance on Article I, Section 12!s guarantee of the 
right to counsel is misplaced. While it may be true that the 
underlying facts associated with a post-conviction petition 
concern a criminal conviction and sentence, post-conviction 
proceedings themselves are civil in nature. The Utah Supreme 
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Court has specifically held that "a petition for post-conviction 
relief is a civil action, specifically governed by rule 65C of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 
12, 110, 61 P. 3d 978. See also Hutchings v. State, 2003 UT 52, 
120, 84 P.3d 1150 ("[T]here is no statutory or constitutional 
right to counsel in a civil petition for post-conviction 
relief."). Moreover, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that, to 
navoid any misconceptions . . ., it is reiterated that the Utah 
Const. Art. I, § 12 declares the right to be defended by counsel 
applies only in criminal prosecutions, not civil actions." 
Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372, 1373-14 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(emphasis added). Thus, because post-conviction proceedings are 
civil in nature, Petitioner cannot justifiably rely upon Article 
I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution to argue that he had a 
state constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel while prosecuting his first post-conviction 
petition. 
Second, although Petitioner claims that there has been a 
steady movement toward the recognition of a state constitutional 
right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, his 
argument relies primarily on language from cases emphasizing the 
need for state-funded post-conviction counsel and he does not 
cite to any language suggesting that a state constitutional right 
to effective post-conviction counsel is or may be necessary. 
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See, e.g., Julian, 966 P. 2d at 259 (Zimmerman, J, , concurring) 
(because the "initial post-conviction proceeding is really part 
of the criminal trial and review process[,] . . . the defendant 
should be provided with paid counsel and one state-financed 
automatic post-conviction proceeding." (emphasis added)); Parsons 
v. Barnes, 811 P.2d 516, 530 (Utah 1994) ("We decline to address 
and decide in this proceeding'whether under the Utah Constitution 
appointed counsel in a first habeas proceeding has a right to be 
compensated by the state." (emphasis added)); Gardner I, 888 P.2d 
608 at 622 ("[T]here may be extraordinary cases in which a 
petitioner for habeas corpus might be entitled under the Utah 
Constitution to state-compensated counsel, expert witnesses, or 
investigators." (emphasis added)). 
Third, Petitioner argues that while "the [Supreme] Court 
stated that it has xnot yet considered whether [the right to 
counsel] exists under the Utah Constitution,' the [Supreme] 
[C]ourt indicated that such a right may exist, for example when 
the lack of state funding %imposes a crippling burden' on capital 
petitioners." (Pet'r Mem. in Opp. to Supplemental Mot. at 23) 
(citing Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at 1 84 and %20 n.3.) However, a 
plain reading of the Menzies decision indicates that in footnote 
3 the Supreme Court was referring to administrative rules 
implementing the now-outdated funding requirements of the PCRA 
and was simply commenting on the fact that the former statutory 
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funding scheme, with i t s absolute caps on the payment of 
attorneys fees and l i t i ga t i on costs , could impose a crippling 
burden on capi tal pe t i t ione r s . While i t may be argued that the 
Supreme Court was suggesting that without sufficient funds, post-
conviction counsel may be unable to properly represent his 
c l ien t , i . e . provide effective representation, nowhere in the 
decision, ei ther impliedly or expressly, did the Supreme Court 
link inadequate s ta te funding with the existence of a s ta te 
const i tut ional r ight to the effective assistance of counsel. 
Thus, Peti t ioner has fai led to show that there has been a "steady 
movement" toward recognizing a s ta te const i tut ional r ight to 
effective post-conviction counsel or that such a const i tu t ional 
right i s required where inadequate funding is provided. 
Fourth, Pet i t ioner argues that because the due process 
clause in Art ic le I , Section 7 of the Utah Constitution has been 
interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court to provide broader 
protections than i t s federal counterpart, the Utah Const i tut ion 's 
due process clause should be interpreted to guarantee the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel.5 This i s 
Presumably, P e t i t i o n e r makes the argument t ha t the due process clause 
under the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n i s broader than i t s federal counterpar t because he 
recognizes t ha t he had no federa l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o the e f fec t ive 
ass i s tance of pos t -convic t ion counsel during h i s i n i t i a l s t a t e pos t -convic t ion 
proceeding. The United S ta tes Supreme Court has express ly held t h a t , under the 
federal cons t i t u t i on , %v[t]here i s no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i gh t t o an a t to rney in s t a t e 
pos t -convic t ion proceedings. Consequently, a p e t i t i o n e r cannot claim 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i ne f f ec t ive a s s i s t ance of counsel in such proceedings ." Coleman 
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991). See a l s o Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 
184, 150 P. 3d 480 (nWe do, however, note t h a t the United S ta tes Supreme Court has 
previously declined t o recognize a federa l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i gh t t o the e f fec t ive 
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consistent, he argues, with other jurisdictions that have 
recognized a state constitutional right to effective post-
conviction counsel under the due process clause of their state 
constitutions. However, the case law from Alaska, Florida, and 
Mississippi upon which Petitioner relies and the arguments he 
makes are unpersuasive. It is true that in Grinols v. State, 14 
P. 3d 889 (Alaska 2003) the Alaska Supreme Court held that "the 
right to counsel in a first application for post-conviction 
relief is of a constitutional nature, required under the due 
process clause of the Alaska Constitution," id. at 894, and, not 
surprisingly, that this includes the right to effective 
representation which may be challenged in a second petition for 
post-conviction relief. See id. at 895. However, whether the 
Florida Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to 
the effective assistance of counsel under the Florida 
Constitution is, at best, unclear. As noted in the concurring 
opinion in Arbelaez v. JButterworth, 138 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1999), 
the Florida Supreme Court has "sent out an ambiguous, if not 
implicitly contradictory signal, when [it] declined to recognize 
a specific constitutional obligation of the State for provision 
of post-conviction counsel in capital cases, while at the same 
time recognizing a limited constitutional due process right to 
counsel in all post-conviction proceedings." Id. at 329 
assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings."). 
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(Anstead, J,, concurring). 
The same is true of the Mississippi case, Jackson v. State, 
732 So.2d 187 (Miss. 1999), cited by Petitioner. Although the 
concurring opinion in that case stated that the majority erred in 
suggesting that a right to post-conviction counsel is found in 
the Mississippi Constitution, see id. at 191-92, the majority 
opinion itself makes no such express conclusion. Rather, in the 
context of encouraging the Mississippi legislature to establish a 
statewide public defender system, the Mississippi Supreme Court 
stated, "[w]e therefore find that [the petitioner], as a death 
row inmate, is entitled to appointed and compensated counsel to 
represent him in his state post-conviction efforts." Id. at 191. 
No mention was made whether this entitlement was constitutional 
or statutory in nature. 
Moreover, it is at least noteworthy that the supreme courts 
of other states have specifically held that their state 
constitutions do not include a right to post-conviction counsel. 
See In re Beasley, 107 S.W.3d 696, 697 (Tex. App. 2003) 
("Similarly, the Texas Constitution provides no right to counsel 
in a post-conviction collateral attack."); McKague v. Warden, 
Nevada State Prison, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (Nev. 1996) ("The Nevada 
Constitution also does not guarantee a right to counsel in post-
conviction proceedings. . . ."}; State v. Crowder, 573 N.E.2d 
652, 653-654 (Ohio 1991) ("We agree with the court of appeals 
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that an indigent petitioner has neither a state nor a federal 
constitutional right to be represented by an attorney in a post-
conviction proceeding."). 
Finally, in its reply to Petitioner's memorandum in 
opposition to the motion to dismiss, the State raises a 
noteworthy policy argument against the position that the Utah 
Constitution should be interpreted to guarantee a right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. According to the 
State, if the Utah Constitution guarantees a right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, it will allow 
petitioners "to file endless successive petitions re-litigating 
claims that they previously lost and raising new claims that they 
should have raised in a prior proceeding, and arguing that the 
court must reach their merits because any one of a seemingly 
endless string of post-conviction counsel had been ineffective." 
(State's Mem. in Reply at 31.) Under this "infinite continuum of 
litigation" argument, a state constitutional right to post-
conviction counsel would result in "an infinite continuum of 
litigation in many criminal cases." Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 
425, 429 (9th Cir. 1993). As the Bonin court noted, if a 
petitioner 
has a [constitutional] right to competent counsel in 
his or her first state post-conviction proceeding 
because that is the first forum in which the 
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ineffectiveness of trial counsel can be alleged, it 
follows that the petitioner has a [constitutional] 
right to counsel in the second state post-conviction 
proceeding, for that is the first forum in which he or 
she can raise a challenge based on counsel's 
performance in the first state post-conviction 
proceeding. . . . And so it would go. 
Id. at 429-30. The same conclusion was reached by the Arizona 
Supreme Court when it considered this same issue. In State v. 
Mata, 916 P.2d 1035 (Ariz. 1996), the Arizona Supreme Court held 
that 
if defendant deserved effective representation on his 
first [post-conviction petition] to litigate effective-
ness on appeal, then it must follow that he be 
effectively represented on the second in order to 
litigate the first. This is because defendant's 
argument is based on the ill-begotten notion that the 
right to effective counsel on appeal is empty without 
effective counsel to challenge appellate counsel's 
performance. According to defendant's own logic, the 
right to effective assistance on the first [post-
conviction petition] would also be meaningless without 
another proceeding in which defendant could argue that 
counsel on that petition was inadequate. We reject 
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this infinitely regressive notion. 
Id. at 1052-53. 
In light of the foregoing policy argument, if the Utah 
Constitution is interpreted to include a right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel, then any capital 
petitioner would be in a position to effectively delay and even 
halt the full effects of his sentence. In order to avoid this 
arguably unjust and one-sided result, the Utah Constitution 
should not be interpreted to include a right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel. Support for this 
conclusion is found in Menzies itself. There the State argued 
that a state constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel ^would make capital post-conviction 
litigation interminable and end the finality of death sentences." 
Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at 184. The Utah Supreme Court side-stepped 
making a direct ruling on this argument by stating that "A[a]s 
important as finality is, it does not have a higher value than 
constitutional guarantees of liberty."' Id. {quoting Hurst, 111 
P.2d at 1035). Nevertheless, in the context of the State's 
infinite continuum of litigation argument, the Supreme Court 
specifically noted that the PCRA prevents this from occurring 
because "Utah's post-conviction legislation and associated rules 
contain appropriate limitations to assist courts in streamlining 
post-conviction review in death penalty cases." Id. Since a 
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constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel would not be subject to the statutory and rule 
constraints the Supreme Court has held exists to prevent the 
possibility of endless post-conviction litigation, the Supreme 
Court's statement is at least an implied rejection of the notion 
that the Utah Constitution includes a right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel. 
Based upon a careful assessment of the arguments provided by 
Petitioner in support of his contention that capital petitioners 
enjoy a state constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel, it is the Court's conclusion that 
Petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated that a proper 
interpretation of the Utah Constitution includes a right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Therefore, 
Petitioner cannot assert an exception, common law or otherwise, 
to the PCRA's procedural bar for claims that were raised and 
addressed, or could have been, but were not, raised in a prior 
post-conviction petition based upon a state constitutional right 
to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel because he 
has failed to demonstrate that a proper interpretation of the 
Utah Constitution guarantees him such a right. 
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d. Whether an Exception Exists to the Procedural Bar 
Rule Based Upon a Statutory Right to the Effective 
Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel 
Although Petitioner has not shown that he had a state 
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel during his 
initial post-conviction proceedings, nor that a common law 
exception to the procedural bar rule exists based upon 
constitutional and common law considerations, under the PCRA he 
had a statutory right to post-conviction counsel. During the 
pendency of his initial petition for post-conviction relief, the 
PCRA required the trial court to determine whether the petitioner 
was indigent and, if so, "promptly appoint counsel who is 
qualified to represent [petitioners] in death penalty cases as 
required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(1)(2)(a). In the Menzies case, the 
Utah Supreme Court considered whether the statutory right to 
post-conviction counsel entitled capital petitioners to the 
effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court noted that 
"[g]iven the high stakes inherent in such [capital post-
conviction] proceedings—life and liberty—providing a petitioner 
the procedural safeguard of appointed counsel is an important 
step in assuring that the underlying criminal conviction was 
accurate." Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at 182. In order to take 
seriously this legislatively created protection, the Supreme 
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Court concluded that the statutory right to post-conviction 
counsel necessarily includes "a statutory right to effective 
assistance of counsel." Id. 
When the State filed its memorandum in support of the motion 
to dismiss on February 15, 2008, the State did not contest that 
Petitioner had a statutory right to the effective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel. However, new amendments to the PCRA 
that went into effect on May 5, 2008 added language specifically 
stating that "[njothing in this chapter shall be construed as 
creating the right to the effective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel, and relief may not be granted on any claim that post-
conviction counsel was ineffective." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
202(4). In light of this change, in both a supplemental pleading 
filed on July 25, 2008 and its memorandum in reply filed on 
February 26, 2009, the State argues that the "no effective 
assistance of counsel" provision in the PCRA retroactively 
applies to Petitioner's case and, as a result, while he may have 
had a statutory right to post-conviction counsel, he did not have 
a statutory right to the effective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel. Therefore, the State argues, Petitioner cannot overcome 
the PCRA's procedural bar for claims that were raised and 
addressed, or could have been, but were not, raised in a prior 
post-conviction petition by relying on a statutory right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel because the PCRA 
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now expressly denies Petitioner this statutory right. 
The State provides three reasons in support of its 
contention that the new "no effective assistance of counsel" 
amendment applies retroactively: First, the new amendment is 
merely procedural in nature because it neither narrows nor 
eliminates Petitioner's cause of action and only affects how 
Petitioner will proceed with his litigation. Second, the new 
amendment merely clarifies the Legislature's original intent with 
respect to the right to effective representation in post-
conviction proceedings that may have been put into question by 
the Utah Supreme Court's erroneous conclusion in Menzies that the 
prior Section 202 of the PCRA included the right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel. Third, the Legislature 
intended that the new amendment apply to Petitioner's case. 
During the 2008 legislative session, Petitioner's case was 
pending and counsel for the State testified before the Senate 
Judiciary, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Justice Committee and 
enumerated the problems the new amendment was intended to remedy 
and that the amendments were needed immediately. 
Petitioner argues in response that the Menzies decision 
effectively vested him with a statutory right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel and that this Court does 
not have the authority to overrule the Utah Supreme Court. In 
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addition, he also contends that his right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel is substantive in nature 
and that the amendment does more than simply clarify the PCRA, it 
eliminates this substantive right. Therefore, according to 
Petitioner, the "no effective assistance of counsel" amendment 
should not be applied retroactively. 
After carefully considering the arguments, it is the Court's 
conclusion that the "no effective assistance of counsel" 
amendment to the PCRA does not retroactively apply to 
Petitioner's case and, therefore, that Petitioner was entitled to 
the effective representation of post-conviction counsel during 
his initial post-conviction proceeding. 
First, the Court finds unpersuasive the State's argument 
that the Legislature intended the new amendment to apply 
retroactively. Nowhere in the 2008 amendments to the PCRA is 
there language that either impliedly or expressly declares that 
the new legislation should apply retroactively. Moreover, the 
fact that counsel for the State argued before a Senate committee 
that "[w]e need these amendments now for the reasons that I've, 
I've already said," (State's Supplemental Mem. in Supp. at 18,) 
does little, in the Court's view, to suggest that the Legislature 
itself intended the 2008 amendments to apply retroactively. 
Second, because Petitioner was appointed counsel under the 
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PCRA and the Utah Supreme Court has held that capital post-
conviction petitioners are statutorily entitled to the effective 
assistance of counsel under the PCRA, the mandate rule requires 
this Court to abide by the Supreme Court's ruling. Under the 
mandate rule, 
pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in 
a case become the law of the case and must be followed 
in subsequent proceedings of that case. The lower 
court must not depart from the mandate, and any change 
with respect to the legal issues governed by the 
mandate must be made by the appellate court that 
established it or by a court to which it, in turn, owes 
obedience. 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P. 2d 1034, 1037-1038 (Utah 
1995)• The fact that the Supreme Court held in a separate case 
that capital petitioners have a statutory right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel does not alter the 
application of the rule. In light of the Supreme Court ruling in 
Menzies, this Court must afford Petitioner the right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. 
Third, while it is true that "statutory amendments that 
merely clarify an ambiguity in an original statute [must] be 
given retroactive effect/' Evans & Sutherland, 953 P.2d at 440, 
they can only be "applied retroactively[] so long as they Mo not 
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enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights.'" 
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 620 (quoting Board of Equalization, 864 P.2d 
at 884) . While not dispositive, the timing of the "no effective 
assistance of counsel" amendment certainly suggests that- it was 
intended not as a clarification of the prior PCRA, but as a 
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Menzies. In 
addition, the amendment nowhere includes language indicating that 
it was enacted for purposes of clarification. Moreover, as noted 
above, Petitioner had a vested right to the effective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel during his initial post-conviction 
proceedings which the amendment would eliminate if applied 
retroactively. 
Finally, the right to the effective assistance of counsel is 
a substantive right. In the Menzies decision, the Supreme Court 
set aside the trial court's judgment against the petitioner 
because the deficient performance of his attorney "effectively 
forfeited the entire post-conviction proceeding itself." 
Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at 1100. Clearly, post-conviction counsel's 
failure in that case to provide effective representation 
literally undermined every substantive right the petitioner was 
entitled to during the course of the proceedings. The fact that 
the failure to provide effective representation affected the 
petitioner's substantive rights is a good indication that the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel is itself a 
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substantive right. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is the Court's 
conclusion that the "no effective assistance of counsel" 
provision cannot retroactively apply to Petitioner's case and, 
therefore, that Petitioner had a statutory right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel during his initial post-
conviction proceedings. 
Despite this conclusion, however, it is not accurate that 
Petitioner's statutory right requires the Court to read into the 
PCRA an exception to the procedural bar for successive claims 
that were raised and addressed, or could have been, but were not, 
raised in a prior post-conviction petition based upon ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel. The statutory right to 
the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel is a 
legislatively created protection and, therefore, it is the 
Legislature that has the power, and the prerogative, to determine 
whether this statutory right constitutes an exception to the 
procedural bar rule with respect to successive post-conviction 
claims that were raised and addressed, or could have been, but 
were not, raised in a prior post-conviction proceeding. Indeed, 
language from the Menzies decision itself does not demonstrate 
otherwise and, in fact, supports this general principle. As 
previously explained, on appeal in Menzies the State presented 
the Supreme Court with the "infinite continuum of litigation" 
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argument contending "that ^writing an effective assistance 
requirement into section [7 8-35a-202] would make capi ta l post-
conviction l i t i g a t i o n interminable and end the f ina l i ty of death 
sentences. ' ' ' Id. at 184. In response to t h i s argument, the 
Supreme Court stated tha t , while "[w]e would be remiss in our 
const i tut ional role if we were to allow f ina l i ty to trump the 
in te res t s at stake in post-conviction death penalty 
proceedings[, ] . . . Utah's post-conviction l eg i s la t ion and 
associated rules contain appropriate l imitat ions to ass i s t courts 
in streamlining post-conviction review in death penalty cases ." 
Id. For support, the Supreme Court cited to Section 78-35a-106, 
where the Legislature excluded from the PCRA any reference to 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as an exception 
to the procedural bar for successive claims that were raised and 
addressed, or could have been, but were not, raised in a prior 
post-conviction pe t i t ion . 6 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, i t i s the Court 's 
6In addi t ion , in concluding tha t the s t a t u t o r y r i gh t to post -convic t ion 
counsel includes the r i gh t t o the e f fec t ive a s s i s t ance of counsel , the Supreme 
Court explained tha t , by providing for t h i s r i g h t , i t be l ieved the Legis la ture 
had express ly recognized the "high s takes inherent in such proceedings ," Menzies 
v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 182, 150 P. 3d 480. In order to take se r ious ly the 
L e g i s l a t u r e ' s provis ion for the appointment of counsel, i t was e s s e n t i a l , in the 
Supreme Cour t ' s view, to conclude t h a t the r i gh t t o pos t -convic t ion counsel 
included the r igh t to the e f f ec t i ve ass i s t ance of counsel . See id . {"We refuse 
merely to pay l i p se rv ice t o t h i s l e g i s l a t i v e l y crea ted p ro t ec t i on by holding 
t h a t a p e t i t i o n e r in a pos t -conv ic t ion death penal ty proceeding i s only e n t i t l e d 
to ine f fec t ive ass i s t ance of appointed counsel. Therefore, we hold tha t [the 
p e t i t i o n e r ] has a s t a t u t o r y r i g h t to e f fec t ive ass i s t ance of counsel under Utah 
Code sec t ion 78-35a-202,") . There was never any i nd i ca t i on i n the Supreme 
Cour t ' s reasoning tha t t h i s conclusion was somehow c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y mandated. 
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conclusion that because the right to post-conviction counsel is a 
legislatively created protection, it is constitutionally 
permissible, and within the Legislature's power, to exclude from 
the PCRA an exception to the procedural bar for successive claims 
that were raised and addressed, or could have been, but were not, 
raised in a prior post-conviction petition based upon ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel. Therefore, Petitioner 
cannot rely on a statutory right to the effective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel to overcome the procedural bar for 
successive claims that were raised and addressed, or could have 
been, but were not, raised in a prior post-conviction proceeding, 
B, Petitioner's Post-Conviction Claims 
1. Timeliness 
The statute of limitations set forth in the PCRA required 
Petitioner to file his successive petition for post-conviction 
relief within one year from the time his cause of action accrued. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (1). In Petitioner's case, his 
post-conviction action accrued on October 5, 1998, the date on 
which the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review of 
his direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. Thus, Petitioner 
had until October 5, 1999 to file his current post-conviction 
action. Because his petition was not filed until November 5, 
2007, it is over eight years too late, and therefore it is 
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untimely. With the exception of claim I,7 Pet i t ioner does not 
d i rec t ly contest the untimeliness of his successive pe t i t ion 
other than to quote language from Julian indicating that "the 
mere passage of time can never jus t i fy continued imprisonment of 
one who has been denied fundamental r i g h t s , " Julian, 966 P. 2d at 
254 (emphasis in o r ig ina l ) . Rather, Peti t ioner asser ts that the 
Court should excuse the untimeliness pursuant to the PCRA's 
" in te res t s of jus t i ce" exception. As explained previously in 
Section I I I . A . l . a . , the Utah Supreme Court has specif ical ly held 
that a t r i a l court "presented with an untimely post-conviction 
pe t i t ion must consider the in te res t s of jus t ice exception before 
disposing of the p e t i t i o n . " Johnson, 2006 UT 21 at 116. An 
analysis of what const i tu tes an exception "in the i n t e r e s t s of 
jus t ice" involves more than simply making a determination that 
the successive claim is non-frivolous. The Court must go one 
step further and examine both the meritoriousness of the 
pe t i t i one r ' s claim and the reason for [the] untimely f i l i n g . " 
Adams, 2005 UT 62 at 116, 
The apparent advantage of th i s approach i s tha t , by engaging 
in a merits analysis of each untimely successive claim, the post-
in claim 1, Pe t i t i one r a s s e r t s t h a t he could only have brought t h i s claim 
a f t e r learning of the Utah Supreme Cour t ' s use of an erroneous l ega l standard to 
evaluate whether he had been prejudiced by t r i a l counse l ' s de f i c i en t performance 
during the penal ty phase of the t r i a l . Since the Supreme Cour t ' s decis ion 
affirming the denia l of h i s i n i t i a l pos t -convic t ion p e t i t i o n was not entered 
u n t i l January 26, 2007r he asse r ted t h a t he had one year from tha t date to r a i s e 
t h i s claim. 
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conviction court will presumably be ensuring that "truly" 
legitimate claims are not overlooked, i.e., those claims "where 
xan obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of 
a constitutional right has occurred' that would make it 
^unconscionable' not to reexamine the issue." Gardner III, 2007 
UT 3 at 117. However, a merits review of claims is generally 
inconsistent with the purposes of the procedural bar rule- to 
promote finality, conserve judicial resources, and encourage the 
orderly and prompt administration of justice. See United States 
v. Wiseman, 297 F.3d 975, 979-80 (10th Cir. 2002) (procedural bar 
rule promotes uAthe interests of judicial efficiency, 
conservation of scarce judicial resources, and orderly and prompt 
administration of justice.'" (quoting Hines v. United States, 971 
F.2d 506, 509 (10th Cir. 1992)). Indeed, in the case of 
successive claims that are untimely, this purpose is undermined 
by the interests of justice analysis which requires that a merits 
review of each claim be performed even for those claims which 
may, ultimately, be procedurally barred and, hence, would 
otherwise not require a merits review. 
In order to avoid having to engage in an unnecessary review 
of the merits of Petitioner's successive claims, the Court has 
opted to simply assume that Petitioner's successive petition was 
timely filed and consider first whether the successive claims are 
procedurally barred. If, and only if, the Court determines that 
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a claim would not be procedurally barred had it been timely filed 
will the Court then conduct an interests of justice analysis on 
that claim to determine whether the untimeliness of the claim 
should be excused. 
2. Claims that Were Raised and Addressed in a Prior 
Proceeding 
Petitioner candidly and commendably concedes that the 
following claims were raised and addressed in a prior proceeding: 
Claim 1, alleging that Petitioner's constitutionally 
deficient legal representation at the penalty phase of his 
capital trial requires reversal of his death sentence. This 
claim was previously raised as claim 1 in the direct appeal of 
his conviction and sentence, and as claims 4, 17, 18, and 21 in 
his initial post-conviction petition, and as claims 1, 3, and 10 
in the appeal from the denial of his initial post-conviction 
petition* (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 34); 
Claim 2, alleging that Petitioner's conviction and sentence 
of death were obtained in violation of his constitutional right 
to the competent assistance of mental health experts. This claim 
was previously raised as claim 1 in the direct appeal, and as 
claims 3 and 21 in his initial petition for post-conviction 
relief, and as claims 1 and 7 in the appeal from the denial of 
his initial post-conviction petition. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. 
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at 133-34); 
Claim 3, alleging that Petitioner's guilty plea is 
constitutionally defective. This claim was previously raised as 
claim 1 in the direct appeal of his conviction and sentence, and 
as claims 1, 1(a)(1), 1(a)(2), 1(a)(3), 2, and 17 in his initial 
petition for post-conviction relief, and as claim 2 in the appeal 
from the denial of his initial post-conviction petition. (See 
Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 140); 
Claim 4, alleging that Petitioner is actually innocent of 
Kaye Tiede's and Beth Potts' homicides and there is no factual 
basis for his guilty plea. This claim was previously raised as 
claims 17 and 18 in is initial petition for post-conviction 
relief. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 157); 
Claim 6, alleging that Petitioner's conviction and sentence 
are invalid because defense counsel labored under actual 
conflicts of interest that adversely impacted his representation 
of Petitioner. This claim was previously raised as claim 24 in 
his initial post-conviction petition and as claim 12 in the 
appeal from the denial of his initial post-conviction petition. 
(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 190); 
Claim 7, alleging that Petitioner's penalty phase voir dire 
was infected by trial court error, prosecutorial misconduct, and 
the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. This claim was 
previously raised as claim 14 in his initial petition for post-
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conviction relief and as claims 5 and 6 in the appeal from the 
denial of his initial post-conviction petition. (See Petfr Mem. 
in Supp. at 201); 
Claim 8, alleging that Petitioner was prejudiced by trial 
counsel's constitutionally ineffective assistance throughout the 
penalty phase voir dire. This claim was previously raised as 
claim 14 in the initial petition for post-conviction relief and 
as claim 5 in the appeal from the denial of his initial post-
conviction petition. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 221); 
Claim 11, alleging that trial counsel did not submit written 
proposed voir dire questions to the court and failed to take 
steps to insure that the jury selection process would result in a 
fair and impartial jury. This claim was previously raised as 
claim 14 in the initial petition for post-conviction relief. 
(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 255); 
Claim 13, alleging that the trial court unconstitutionally 
limited the scope of voir dire and asked inappropriate questions 
regarding the religion practiced by the jurors. This claim was 
previously raised as claim 15 in the initial petition for post-
conviction relief. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 270); 
Claim 15, alleging that the trial court erred in giving jury 
instructions and a special verdict form that were 
unconstitutionally weighed in favor of aggravation over 
mitigation. This claim was previously raised as claims 7, 9, and 
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11 in the initial petition for post-conviction relief and as 
claim 4 in the appeal from the denial of his initial post-
conviction petition. (See Pet'r Mem, in Supp. at 294); 
Claim 16, alleging that the jury instructions contained no 
option for imposition or consideration of a life sentence in 
violation of Petitioner's constitutional rights. This claim was 
previously raised as claims 12 and 13 in the initial petition for 
post-conviction relief and as claim 4 in the appeal from the 
denial of his initial post-conviction petition. (See Pet'r Mem. 
in Supp. at 310); 
Claim 17, alleging that the reasonable doubt instruction was 
unconstitutional. This claim was previously raised as claim 6 in 
the initial petition for post-conviction relief and as claim 4 in 
the appeal from the denial of his post-conviction petition. (See 
Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 322); 
Claim 18, alleging that the trial court erred in giving jury 
instructions at the penalty phase that improperly shifted the 
burden of proof to Petitioner. This claim was previously raised 
as claims 5 and 8 in the initial petition for post-conviction 
relief. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 327); 
Claim 20, alleging that Petitioner's conviction is 
unconstitutional because there was a complete breakdown in the 
adversarial process. This claim repeats the claims alleged in 
claim 1 and claim 6 of his current post-conviction petition. As 
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noted above, the allegations raised in these claims were 
previously raised as claims 1 in the direct appeal of his 
conviction and sentence, and as claims 4, 17, 18, 21, and 24 in 
his initial post-conviction petition, and as claims 1, 3, 10, and 
12 in the appeal from the denial of his initial post-conviction 
petition. (See Pet'r Mem, in Supp, at 34, 190); 
Claim 22, alleging that Petitioner's constitutional rights 
were violated by the improper admission of the taped statement of 
Scott Manley. This claim was previously raised as claim 22 in 
the initial petition for post-conviction relief and as claim 8 in 
the appeal from the denial of his initial post-conviction 
petition. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 350); 
Claim 23, alleging that Petitioner's convictions, 
confinement, and sentence are unconstitutional due to 
prosecutorial misconduct. This claim was previously raised as 
claim 23 in the initial petition for post-conviction relief and 
as claim 9 in the appeal from the denial of his initial post-
conviction petition. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 368); 
Claim 26, alleging that the instructions, taken as a whole, 
fail to narrow the category of persons eligible for the death 
penalty in violation of Petitioner's constitutional rights. This 
claim was previously raised as claim 10 in the initial petition 
for post-conviction relief. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 390); 
Claim 28, alleging that lethal injection violates 
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Petitioner7 s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishment. This claim was previously raised as claims 
20 and 25 in the i n i t i a l pe t i t ion for post-conviction re l ief and 
as claims 11 and 13 in the appeal from the denial of his post-
conviction pet i t ion . (See Pet ' r Mem. in Supp. at 401);8 
Claim 29, alleging ineffective assistance of s t a t e counsel. 
With respect to the ineffective assistance of t r i a l and appellate 
counsel, th i s claim was previously raised as claim 19 in the 
i n i t i a l pet i t ion for post-conviction re l ief and as claim 10 in 
the appeal from the denial of his post-conviction pe t i t ion . (See 
Pet ' r Mem. in Supp. at 409); 
Claim 30, alleging that Petit ioner was denied his 
constitutional r ights because of the cumulative impact of errors . 
This claim was previously raised as claim 2 in the direct appeal 
of his conviction and sentence. (See Pet ' r Mem. in Supp. at 
416} . 
All of the foregoing claims were raised and addressed in a 
prior proceeding, e i ther at t r i a l , on direct appeal, in 
Pet i t ioner ' s i n i t i a l pe t i t ion for post-conviction re l ie f , or in 
his appeal from the denial of his i n i t i a l pe t i t ion for post-
8In addi t ion to acknowledging tha t t h i s claim was previous ly r a i s e in his 
i n i t i a l p e t i t i o n e r for pos t -convic t ion r e l i e f and in the appeal from the denial 
of h i s p e t i t i o n , in h i s memorandum in opposi t ion to the S t a t e ' s motion to 
dismiss, he moved to withdraw t h i s claim on the bas i s t h a t , " [ i j n the wake of new 
developments, [Pe t i t ione r ] does not be l ieve tha t the P e t i t i o n i s the proper forum 
for t h i s claim in i t s current form." ( P e t ' r Mem, in Opp. a t 123). 
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conviction relief and, therefore, they are procedurally barred 
under the PCRA and no statutory exception exists that would 
permit the Court to consider the merits of these claims. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(b) and (d). See also Kell, 2008 UT 
62 at 113 (a post-conviction petitioner "is not eligible for 
relief on claims that were ^raised or addressed' on direct 
appeal,") . This is so even for claims that appellate counsel 
failed to raise in the most effective manner. See id. at Jfl7 
(after opportunity to be heard on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
"presume[s] that [it] gave full consideration to the claims, 
regardless of whether [petitioner's] counsel raised them in the 
most effective manner."). See also State v. Carter/ 776 P.2d 886f 
889 (Utah 1989) (Supreme Court has, "after fully considering the 
substance of particular claims raised on appeal, summarily (and 
often without written analysis) dismissed the same as meritless 
or of no effect. . . . Accordingly, after fully reviewing every 
claim raised in [a] case, we discuss at length only those issues 
critical to th[e] appeal.'7). 
However, in Hurst, the Utah Supreme Court stated that a 
"ground for relief from a conviction or sentence that has once 
been fully and fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a prior [post-
conviction] proceeding should not be readjudicated unless it can 
be shown that there are ^unusual circumstances.'" Hurst, 777 
P.2d at 1036 (emphasis added). Broadly speaking, the Supreme 
-65-
Court has defined "unusual circumstances" to mean circumstances 
"where an obvious in jus t ice or a substantial and prejudicial 
denial of a const i tut ional right has occurred." Id. at 1035. 
Nevertheless, although i t remains unclear what, precisely,, 
consti tutes the full range of "unusual circumstances," the 
Supreme Court provided several pos s ib i l i t i e s , "[f]or example, a 
prior adjudication i s not a bar to reexamination of a conviction 
if there has been a retroact ive change in the law, a subsequent 
discovery of suppressed evidence, or newly discovered evidence." 
Id. 
Petitioner makes several arguments for the proposition that 
unusual circumstances exis t that excuse the procedural bar as i t 
applies to the successive claims he raises that have already been 
raised and addressed in a prior proceeding.9 
In the sec t ion of h i s memorandum in opposit ion to the S t a t e ' s motion to 
dismiss where he presents h i s discussion tha t the claims t h a t were previously 
ra i sed are not procedural ly barred, Pe t i t i one r r a i s e s two i s sues t h a t , in the 
Court 's view, are not re levant to whether "unusual circumstances" ex is t tha t 
would excuse the procedural ba r . 
F i r s t , Pe t i t i one r informs the Court tha t the Utah Attorney General 's Office 
i s engaged in a two-pronged e f fo r t " to el iminate the Utah Supreme Court ' s common 
law exceptions to f a i l u r e s t o r a i s e claims in p r io r proceedings regardless of the 
r e su l t i ng unfa i rness . " ( P e t ' r Mem. in 0pp. at 45) . The f i r s t prong i s the 
Attorney General 's u n i l a t e r a l attempt to amend the PCRA to i t s advantage and to 
the disadvantage of pos t -convic t ion p e t i t i o n e r s . The second prong i s to amend 
the Utah Const i tut ion t o allow the l e g i s l a t u r e , r a t h e r than the Supreme Court, 
to define pos t -convic t ion procedures, r i g h t s , and remedies. Even i f what 
Pe t i t i one r a s se r t s i s t r u e , simply because the Attorney General may be seeking 
to amend the PCRA, with or without the input and a s s i s t ance of other in te res ted 
p a r t i e s , has no bearing whatsoever on whether "unusual circumstances" ex i s t tha t 
would excuse the procedural bar in t h i s case. Obviously, the Attorney General 's 
Office i s e n t i t l e d to p a r t i c i p a t e in the l e g i s l a t i v e process and seek to affect 
the laws of the s t a t e j u s t as any other organizat ion or governmental agency or 
individual i s e n t i t l e d to do. Moreover, P e t i t i o n e r ' s ba ld a s se r t i on tha t the 
Attorney General 's motive i s to "seek[] grea ter power to expedite executions 
regardless of the mer i t s of the c la ims ," id . a t 45, i s unhelpful and simply 
i r r e l e v a n t to any discuss ion concerning the exis tence of common law exceptions 
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Firs t , Pet i t ioner argues that , af ter having received 
adequate funds and performing a more thorough investigation of 
the case than was previously performed by pr ior post-conviction 
counsel, new facts not previously known were discovered which (1) 
establish the denial of a const i tut ional r igh t , (2) might have 
changed the outcome of the t r i a l , and (3) es tabl ish the existence 
of fundamental unfairness in Pe t i t ioner ' s conviction.10 (See 
Pet ' r Mem. in Opp. at 48). Pe t i t ioner ' s basic argument is tha t , 
on the basis of new evidence he discovered as a resul t of more 
funding and a more thorough investigation of his case, an 
to the procedural bar r u l e . 
Second, with respec t to several of h is success ive claims, including claims 
asser t ing i ssues t h a t were r a i sed and addressed in a p r i o r proceeding, Pe t i t i one r 
argues tha t " the PCRA has been craf ted by the S ta te t o i t s decided advantage . 
• . [because t ] h e S t a t e has made the o r ig ina l t r i a l court the f i r s t stop [for 
p e t i t i o n e r s seeking pos t -convic t ion r e l i e f ] . " Id, a t 73, According to 
Pe t i t ioner , t h i s model c rea tes a conf l ic t because i t i s v> commons ense tha t 
a t tacking a judge ' s dec is ions i s an ine f f ec t ive way of gaining an Impartial 
hearing from a c o u r t . " Id. As a r e s u l t , p r i o r pos t -conv ic t ion counsel was 
prevented from r a i s i n g claims, or was required t o "water down" claims, in order 
to avoid p o t e n t i a l l y r a i s i n g the i r e of the pos t -conv ic t ion judge who was the 
same judge who pres ided at P e t i t i o n e r ' s t r i a l . Contrary to P e t i t i o n e r ' s 
a s se r t ions , i t was not the Attorney General who was the d ra f t e r of the ru le tha t 
required the t r i a l court to pres ide over h is p r i o r p e t i t i o n for post -convic t ion 
r e l i e f . Rather, i t was mandated by a ru le of c i v i l procedure promulgated by the 
Utah Supreme Court. See Utah R. Civ, P. 65C(f) , Furthermore, i t i s not 
commonsense, but more a jaded view of Utah's j u d i c i a l system, t h a t challenging 
a judge 's decis ion precludes an impar t ia l hearing on whether the judge ' s p r io r 
rul ings or ac t ions were co r rec t . Judges are e t h i c a l l y required to be impar t i a l , 
regardless of the i s s u e s tha t are being considered. See Utah Code of J ud i c i a l 
Conduct, Canon 1 and Canon 3(B). Pe t i t i one r has presented no evidence whatsoever 
t ha t his pos t -conv ic t ion judge acted une th i ca l l y or was incapable of being 
impart ia l when presented with i ssues r e l a t i n g to how the judge conducted the 
t r i a l . Again, t h i s argument i s unhelpful and i r r e l e v a n t to any discussion 
concerning the ex is tence of common law exceptions t o the procedural bar r u l e . 
1 0 Pet i t ioner a l so argues t h a t the claims were "overlooked in good f a i t h 
with no in t en t to delay or abuse the w r i t . " Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029, 1031 
(Utah 1989). This p a r t i c u l a r common law exception c l e a r l y cannot apply t o the 
claims tha t were r a i s e d and addressed in a p r i o r proceeding. Obviously, i f the 
claims were p rev ious ly ra i sed , they were not overlooked. 
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exception to the procedural bar exists for all of the claims he 
has raised in his successive post-conviction petition that were 
raised and address in a prior proceeding. Therefore, he 
contends, the Court should reconsider these previously raised 
claims in light of the new evidence. 
As noted above, in 1989 when the Hurst case was decided, the 
Supreme Court indicated that newly discovered evidence 
constitutes "'unusual circumstances" under the common law that 
would justify reconsidering a previously adjudicated claim. 
However, in Gardner II, the Supreme Court explained that, with 
the .passage of the PCRA in 1996, the legislature effectively . 
codified the common law "newly discovered evidence'' exception to 
the procedural bar. See Gardner II, 2004 UT 42 at 114 
("Likewise, the [PCRA] also provides for relief on the basis of 
^newly discovered material evidence,' thereby incorporating the 
second Hurst factor."). See also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
104(1) (e) . In doing so, rather than identifying newly discovered 
evidence as an exception to the procedural bar rule, the 
legislature reformulated it as an independent statutory ground 
for post-conviction relief. As a result, technically there is no 
exception under the PCRA to the procedural bar rule on the basis 
of newly discovered evidence. 
Moreover, although the Supreme Court has held that "despite 
the statutory enactment of the majority of the Hurst factors, all 
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five common law exceptions retain their independent 
constitutional significance and may be examined by this court in 
our review of post-conviction petitions/' Gardner II, 2004 UT 42 
at 125, the Supreme Court also expressly stated that it will 
"defer to the legislature unless these fundamental safeguards are 
repealed or otherwise restricted." Id. Because the legislature 
has neither repealed nor otherwise restricted the PCRA's "newly 
discovered evidence'7 ground for relief since Gardner II was 
decided, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(1); Utah Code Ann. § 78-
35a-104(l) (1996), the requirements for relying upon newly 
discovered evidence under the PCRA and as a common law exception 
are co-extensive. It follows that because Petitioner has 
asserted an exception to the procedural bar rule on the basis "of 
new facts not previously known which show the denial of a 
constitutional right or might have changed the outcome of 
[Petitioner's] trial [, and] the existence of fundamental 
unfairness in [Petitioner's] conviction," (Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 
48} (emphasis added), he cannot overcome the procedural bar for 
the successive claims he raises that were raised and addressed in 
a prior proceeding unless he satisfies the requirements set forth 
in the PCRA for raising a ground for relief based upon newly 
discovered evidence. 
Under the PCRA, reliance upon newly discovered evidence 
requires a petitioner to establish that 
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(I) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's 
counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial or 
sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any 
previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction 
proceeding, and the evidence could not have been 
discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely 
cumulative of evidence that was known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely 
impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly 
discovered material evidence demonstrates that no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found the 
petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the 
sentence received. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(l) (e) (I)-(iv). Nowhere in his 
pleadings does Petitioner specifically address any of these 
requirements for relying upon newly discovered evidence. At 
best, and entirely by implication, he suggests that the new 
evidence is material, is not merely cumulative, and is not merely 
impeachment. Significantly, however, Petitioner does not discuss 
nor demonstrate that the new evidence he now possesses is 
evidence that could not have been discovered through the exercise 
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of reasonable diligence and included in a prior post-conviction 
petition. That is, he does not affirmatively establish that the 
State, or any other governmental agency, purposefully withheld 
material evidence or failed to provide material evidence when 
requested. Moreover, there is no indication that the affidavits 
and additional reports submitted by Petitioner in his current 
successive petition could not have been presented in support of 
the claims he raised in his prior post-conviction proceeding. 
Rather than argue that the new evidence he now possesses could 
not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, Petitioner instead contends that the evidence was not 
discovered as a result of inadequate funding for prior post-
conviction counsel. 
There appears to be little question that prior post-
conviction counsel was frustrated at the funding mechanism in 
place at the time Petitioner's initial petition for post-
conviction relief was filed and that post-conviction counsel 
believed the funding provided was inadequate and permitted him to 
perform only a perfunctory investigation into Petitioner's case. 
Petitioner alleges that prior post-conviction counsel requested 
payments in excess of the funding caps from the Division of 
Finance ("Finance") pursuant to the administrative rules 
governing the payment of counsel, but that these requests were 
denied despite the fact that the post-conviction court authorized 
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the requested funding. Two separate judges deemed the funding to 
be reasonable and necessary. Initially, the funding available to 
prior post-conviction counsel was $25,000 in attorney fees and 
$10,000 in litigation expenses. Prior post-conviction counsel 
indicated to the post-conviction court that the $10,000 limit was 
insufficient to perform an adequate investigation and, 
ultimately, the court authorized up to $40,258.59 in litigation 
expenses beyond the $10,000 limit. Upon request from prior post-
conviction counsel for payment, Finance denied the request. 
Subsequently, Finance modified its rules and raised the 
amount of attorney fees by $5,000, for a maximum of $30,000, and 
the amount for litigation expenses by $10,000, for a maximum of 
$20,000. However, based upon the information provided by 
Petitioner and the State in their pleadings, it appears that, 
although the post-conviction court authorized up to $40,258.59 in 
litigation expenses beyond the $10,000 maximum at the time, prior 
post-conviction counsel ultimately only requested actual 
litigation expenses in the amount of $11,555.16, leaving unused 
the amount of $8,444.84 by the court's math. Even if incorrect, 
the principle is sound. Even if prior post-conviction counsel 
could not do all he wanted, funding in some amount existed to do 
more. Despite the apparent funding problems Petitioner argues 
existed during his prior post-conviction proceedings, it is 
difficult for the Court to conclude that, with unused litigation 
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funds still available in some amount, the new evidence that 
Petitioner now possesses is evidence that could not have been 
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence as a 
result of insufficient funding. 
In any event, even if the Court were to conclude that the 
funding available hampered prior post-conviction counsel's 
ability to perform the type of investigation he believed was 
necessary in the case and, for that reason, the new evidence he 
now has not only was not discovered, but also could not have been 
discovered, Petitioner fails to discuss or demonstrate that, when 
viewed with all of the other evidence presented in the case, no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found him guilty of the 
offense to which he pleaded guilty or subject to the sentences of 
death he received following the penalty phase proceedings. 
Thus, because Petitioner has failed to satisfy all of the 
requirements set forth in 78-35a-104(e)(I)-(iv) for relying upon 
newly discovered evidence, either as an independent post-
conviction claim or as a common law exception to the procedural 
bar rule, the State is entitled to a dismissal of Petitioner's 
successive claims that were raised and addressed in a prior 
proceeding. 
Second, in addition to asserting an exception to the 
procedural bar on the basis of newly discovered evidence, 
Petitioner also specifically argues that ineffective assistance 
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of trial, appellate, and prior post-conviction counsel are coinmon 
law exceptions to the procedural bar rule. (See Pet'r Mem, in 
Supp. at 32-33). Ineffective assistance of counsel is not one of 
the common law exceptions enumerated in Hurst and, although the 
list in Hurst was not intended to be exhaustive, see Gardner III, 
2001 UT 3 at 118 ("We later clarified that this list of ^good 
cause' exceptions is not exhaustive*")/ it is also true that the 
Utah Supreme Court has never formally recognized ineffective 
assistance of counsel as a common law exception to the procedural 
bar rule. 
In any case, it is simply unclear to the Court how 
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel can possibly 
constitute a common law exception to the procedural bar of 
Petitioner's successive post-conviction claims that were already 
raised and addressed in a prior proceeding. For example, the 
fact that trial counsel may have ineffectively raised a claim 
that Petitioner now raises again in his successive petition is 
irrelevant to whether the claim was raised and addressed in a 
prior proceeding, although it would be relevant to an independent 
claim on direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective in 
raising the claim. Thus, while trial counsel's ineffectiveness 
in raising a claim may itself constitute a separate claim on 
direct appeal, it does not constitute an exception to the 
procedural bar rule for successive post-conviction claims that 
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were raised and addressed in a prior proceeding. 
The same is true for ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel. The fact that appellate counsel may have ineffectively 
raised a claim that Petitioner now raises again in his successive 
petition is irrelevant to whether the claim was raised and 
addressed in a prior proceeding, although it would be relevant to 
an independent claim in an initial post-conviction petition that 
appellate counsel was ineffective in raising the claim. Thus, 
while appellate counsel's ineffectiveness in raising a claim may 
itself constitute a separate claim in an initial post-conviction 
petition, it does not constitute an exception to the procedural 
bar rule for successive post-conviction claims that were raised 
and addressed in a prior proceeding. 
As for Petitioner's assertion that ineffective assistance of 
prior post-conviction counsel constitutes a common law exception 
to the procedural bar rulef this argument also fails. As the 
Court concluded above in Section III. A. 2. c , Petitioner did not 
demonstrate that a proper interpretation of the Utah Constitution 
includes a right to the effective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel. Therefore, Petitioner cannot assert a common law 
exception to the PCRA's procedural bar for claims that were 
raised and addressed in a prior proceeding based upon a state 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel because the Utah Constitution does not 
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guarantee him this right* 
Moreover, the Court also concluded above that the right to 
the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel is a 
legislatively created protection. As a statutory right, rather 
than a common law right, Petitioner cannot rely upon this right 
as the basis for asserting a common law exception to the 
procedural bar rule for successive post-conviction claims that 
were raised and addressed in a prior proceeding. 
Therefore, because Petitioner has not demonstrated that 
ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, or post-conviction 
counsel constitute common law exceptions to the procedural bar 
rule, the State is entitled to the dismissal of Petitioner's 
successive claims that were raised and addressed in a prior 
proceeding. 
Finally, in the same section of his memorandum in support of 
the successive petition where Petitioner discusses the law 
governing common law exceptions to the procedural bar rule and 
where he specifically asserts that ineffective assistance of 
counsel constitutes a common law exception, he also appears to at 
least imply that the "severe funding limitations [that] ma[de] 
proper and thorough investigation impossible," (Pet'r Mem. in 
Supp, at 33), constitutes a common law exception to the 
procedural bar rule. If this is Petitioner's contention, it is, 
again, unclear to the Court how this is so. Common law 
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exceptions enumerated by the Supreme Court deal with the 
discovery of new or suppressed evidence, new law, and fundamental 
or constitutional errors. Lack of adequate funding for post-
conviction counsel may provide an explanation in support of 
Petitioner's allegations that prior post-conviction counsel was 
ineffective or why counsel was unable to do a constitutionally 
adequate investigation or why counsel failed to discover 
important evidence in the case. Indeed, in addressing his claim 
related to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, 
Petitioner asserts that N%[b]ecause of the administrative rule 
which severely limit[ed] funding of both the defense and 
investigation of post-conviction cases, including the retention 
of the services of crucial and fundamental expert services, . . . 
[his prior post-conviction] counsel was unable to provide 
effective assistance of counsel." (Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 415). 
See also Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at 120 n.3 (in the context of 
commenting on "the funds needed to secure [the petitioner] a 
proper post-conviction proceeding," the Utah Supreme Court noted 
that xxit may be the case that the statutory [funding] scheme 
imposes a crippling burden on [the petitioner],"). Thus, it is 
conceivable that the lack of adequate funding may result in 
constitutional or statutory violations. However, inadequate 
funding, in and of itself, is neither a violation of Petitioner's 
constitutional rights nor, so long as the proper funding rules 
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are followed, is it a violation of Petitioner's statutory rights. 
In the Court's view, the lack of adequate funding is not 
relevant to whether the procedural bar should be excused with 
respect to claims raised by Petitioner in his successive post-
conviction petition that were already raised and addressed in a 
prior proceeding. 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, all of Petitioner's 
successive claims listed above (all but Claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 
19, 21, 24, 25 and 27) that were already raised and addressed in 
a prior proceeding are procedurally barred under the PCRA and 
under the common law and Petitioner has not shown that any 
statutory or common law exceptions apply that would permit the 
Court to consider the merits of these claims. 
Therefore, the State is entitled to a dismissal of these 
claims, again, all but Claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 21, 24, 25 
and 27. 
3, Claims that Could Have Been, But Were Not, Raised in 
Petitioner's Prior Post-Conviction Petition 
The PCRA specifically precludes Petitioner from obtaining 
"relief . . . upon any ground that . . . could have been, but was 
not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (1) (d). Such claims are also 
precluded by the common law. See Gardner I, 888 P. 2d at 613 
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("Issues that could and should have been raised on direct appeal, 
but were not, may not properly be raised in a habeas corpus 
proceeding absent unusual circumstances,"). With respect to the 
following claims, they are all claims that could have been, but 
were not, raised in Petitioner's prior post-conviction petition: 
Claim 5, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
and trial court error in connection with Petitioner's motion to 
change venue; 
Claim 9, alleging that Petitioner was prejudiced by the 
trial court's error in failing to properly strike venire-members 
for cause during the penalty phase voir dire; 
Claim 10, alleging that the trial court failed to ask 
numerous voir dire questions resulting in a flawed jury selection 
process; 
Claim 12, alleging that Petitioner's jury venire was 
prejudicially biased by the trial court's introduction of the 
concept of "blood atonement" into the voir dire; 
Claim 14, alleging that the exclusion from the jury of 
persons who were not members of the LDS Church deprived 
Petitioner of the right to trial by a jury drawn from a 
representative cross-section of the community; 
Claim 19, alleging that the jury was prejudiced by it's 
consideration of extrinsic evidence in violation of the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the United States 
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Constitution; 
Claim 21, alleging that Petitioner's constitutional rights 
were violated by the improper admission of evidence at the 
penalty phase of his trial, including (1) the videotape made by 
Deli of Petitioner in the Tiede's cabin before the homicides, (2) 
allowing the prosecution to elicit and perform irrelevant and 
prejudicial in-court "demonstrations," (3) opinion testimony from 
James Bell, (4) testimony from James Holland, (5) photographs of 
the Kaye Tiede and Beth Potts before their deaths, and (6) Linae 
Tiede's statement regarding Petitioner's purported devil worship; 
Claim 24, alleging that the State failed to disclose 
material exculpatory evidence; 
Claim 25, alleging that Petitioner's death sentence is 
disproportionate to his culpability and violates his 
constitutional rights; and 
Claim 27, alleging that Petitioner has been prejudiced in 
investigating and presenting post-conviction claims and in 
gathering additional evidence to prove his entitlement to relief 
as a result of an inadequate and unreliable appellate record-
Petitioner nowhere argues that the foregoing claims are ones 
that could not have been known and raised in a prior post-
conviction petition. As explained previously in Section 
III.A.2.a., unlike the procedural bar rule that applies to 
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initial post-conviction petitions, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-
106(1}( c), which includes a statutory exception based upon 
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2), no exception based upon the 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is expressly 
included in the PCRA. Thus, any successive claim that was raised 
or that could have been raised, but was not, in a prior post-
conviction petition, is procedurally barred and no exception 
exists under the PCRA to excuse this failure. 
However, although no statutory exception applies to excuse 
the failure to raise these types of claims in a prior post-
conviction petition, because the common law exceptions have 
"independent constitutional significance," Gardner II, 2004 UT 42 
at $15, the common law exceptions may be relied upon in order to 
overcome the procedural bar. Petitioner asserts that four common 
law exceptions apply that excuse his procedural default, 
including the three that were previously discussed in Section 
II.B.: (1) the discovery of new evidence as a result of more 
funding and a more thorough investigation of the case, (2) 
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, (3) that 
severe funding limitations existed at the time Petitioner filed 
his prior post-conviction petition which made a proper and 
thorough investigation of his case impossible, and (4) all of the 
claims that were not previously raised were overlooked in good 
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faith with no 'intent to delay or abuse the post-conviction 
process. 
As an initial matter,- the Utah Supreme Court has explained 
that before the post-conviction court is required to consider 
whether any of the common law exceptions apply to excuse the 
procedural bar, a determination must be made that the claims that 
could have been raised in a prior post-conviction petition, but 
were not, are not frivolous and were not withheld for tactical 
reasons. See Gardner III, 2001 UT 3 at 126 (because " [f]rivolous 
claims, . . . and claims that are withheld for tactical reasons 
should be summarily denied[,] . . . a separate and distinct 
procedural determination for successive post-conviction claims 
[must be] made before [the trial court] reach[es] an analysis 
under the *good cause' common law exceptions.''). 
Other than merely asserting that his claims were overlooked 
in good faith, Petitioner nowhere demonstrates that they were not 
withheld for tactical reasons. It may well be that all of the 
claims he now raises which could have been raised in a prior 
post-conviction petition are non-frivolous in nature, but the 
Court must presume that post-conviction counsel had a legitimate 
tactical reason for not raising them in the prior petition. See 
Gentry, 540 U.S. at 5 ("When counsel focuses on some issues to 
the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he 
did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect."). 
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As explained above, in order to overcome this presumption, 
Petitioner must show that "there was no ^conceivable tactical 
basis for counsel's actions.'" Clark, 2004 UT 25 at 16 (quoting 
Bryant, 965 P.2d at 542). Not only has Petitioner not even 
attempted to specifically meet his burden, it is unlikely that he 
could do so. 
All of the claims raised in Petitioner's successive petition 
that were not previously raised are claims for which a 
reasonable basis can be articulated as to why they were not 
raised in a prior proceeding. For example, given all of the 
circumstances of the case and the limitations in terms of timef 
funding, and resources, it is certainly plausible that these 
claims were not raised in the initial post-conviction petition 
because they were weaker or less persuasive than the other claims 
that were raised. Raising weaker claims would have distracted the 
post-conviction court from fuller consideration of the stronger 
claims. Raising weaker claims could well have been futile and 
resulted in a determination the claims were frivolous on their 
face. This could have been seen as reducing the effectiveness of 
the arguments as to the stronger claims. Any of these reasons 
constitute a conceivable tactical basis why post-conviction 
counsel would not have raised them in Petitioner's prior post-
conviction petition. 
Furthermore, in Petitioner's memorandum in support of his 
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successive petition, for every claim that could have been, but 
was not, raised in a prior post-conviction petition, Petitioner 
states that he fairly presented the issues associated with these 
successive claims N>in state court pleadings, briefs and 
associated filings, hearing, and argument." (Pet'r Mem. in Supp. 
at 174, 235, 252, 259, 277, 331, 338, 379, 385, and 394), If 
that is true, then even though the issues related to his current 
claims may not have been specifically and discretely raised as an 
independent claim in his prior post-conviction petition, they are 
issues that must have been known to prior post-conviction 
counsel. They are not, therefore, claims that were overlooked in 
good faith because the issues involved were present in various 
state court pleadings submitted or argued by Petitioner's prior 
trial, appellate, or post-conviction counsel. 
Because Petitioner has not satisfied his burden of 
demonstrating that the claims he now raises that could have been, 
but were not, raised in his prior post-conviction petition were 
not withheld for tactical reasons, the Court cannot consider 
whether any of the common law exceptions to the procedural bar 
rule apply to his successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
On this basis alone, the State is entitled to the dismissal of 
these claims. 
Nevertheless, even had Petitioner satisfied his burden of 
demonstrating that his claims were not withheld for tactical 
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reasons, he has not shown that any common law exceptions apply 
that would overcome the procedural bar. 
First, Petitioner asserts an exception based upon the 
discovery of new evidence that resulted from a more recent, and 
more thorough, investigation of the case because of increased 
funding available. As previously explained in Section II.B., 
however, because the statutory and common law exceptions for 
newly discovered evidence are co-extensive, in order to rely upon 
this common law exception, Petitioner must satisfy the strict 
requirements set forth in Section 78-35a-104 (e) (I)-(iv). 
Petitioner has not met this strict requirement. At best, and 
entirely by implication, his pleadings suggests that the new 
evidence he has discovered is material, is not merely cumulative, 
and is not merely impeachment. However, he does not discuss nor 
demonstrate that the new evidence he now possesses is evidence 
that could not have been discovered through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence and included in a prior post-conviction 
petition. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104 (1) (f) (I) (%\ . . 
neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the 
evidence . . . in time to include the evidence in any previously 
filed . . . post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could 
not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence."). He argues that the lack of funding available for 
prior post-conviction counsel prevented counsel from performing a 
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constitutionally adequate investigation of Petitioner's case. 
This argument, however, is at least somewhat contradicted by the 
fact that unused litigation funds were still available at the 
conclusion of his prior post-conviction proceedings. 
Further, most of the claims do not involve "investigation" 
but relate to matters in the record-the change of venue issues, 
voir dire, the admission of certain evidence, the jury 
composition, and others. 
Moreover, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that, when 
viewed with all of the other evidence presented in the case, no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found him guilty of the 
offense to which he pleaded guilty or subject to the sentences of 
death he received following the penalty phase proceedings. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104 (1) (f) (iv), formerly 78-35a-104 (e) p. 
. . viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered 
material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact 
could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject 
to the sentence received."). Because Petitioner has failed to 
satisfy all of the requirements set forth in the PCRA, he cannot 
rely upon newly discovered evidence as a common law exception to 
the procedural bar rule. 
Second, Petitioner asserts an exception based upon the 
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel. As the 
Court concluded above in Section III.A.2.c, Petitioner cannot 
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assert a common law exception to the PCRA's procedural bar for 
claims that could have been, but were not, raised in his prior 
post-conviction petition based upon a state constitutional right 
to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel because 
the Utah Constitution does not guarantee him such a right, 
Moreover, although Petitioner has a statutory right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, because this is 
a legislatively created right, rather than a common law right, 
Petitioner cannot rely upon this statutory right as the basis for 
asserting a common law exception to the procedural bar rule. 
Third, Petitioner argues that a common law exception exists 
based upon the severe funding limitations that existed at the 
time Petitioner filed his prior post-conviction petition, which 
made a proper and thorough investigation of his case impossible. 
As noted above, the lack of adequate funding for post-conviction 
counsel may provide an explanation in support of Petitioner's 
allegations that prior post-conviction counsel was ineffective or 
why counsel was unable to do a constitutionally adequate 
investigation or why counsel failed to discover allegedly 
important evidence in the case. However, inadequate funding, in 
and of itself, is neither a violation of Petitioner's 
constitutional rights nor, so long as the proper funding rules 
are followed, is it a violation of Petitioner's statutory rights. 
Thus, the lack of adequate funding is not a common law exception 
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to the procedural bar rule that excuses claims that could have 
been, but were not, raised, in a prior petition for post-
conviction relief. 
Moreover, as to this argument, it is an argument in this 
context that relates to the "infinite continuum of litigation" 
concept, only in this context it is and could be run amok. If 
$40,000 is provided for post-conviction proceedings, it can 
always be claimed that $60,000 was needed; if that is provided, 
$80,000 could be claimed as necessary, and there could never be 
an end to such a claim. There is never enough time or money. 
However, the argument is not directly made by Petitioner, but 
based on this notion, this cannot be a basis for a common law 
exception to the procedural bar rule. 
Finally, Petitioner argues that all of the claims he now 
raises that could have been, but were not, raised in his prior 
post-conviction petitioner are claims that were overlooked in 
good faith with no intent to delay the post-conviction process. 
Without question, this is a legitimate common law exception to 
the procedural bar rule that has been expressly recognized by the 
Utah Supreme Court. See Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1031 ("A showing of 
good cause that justifies the filing of a successive claim may be 
established by showing . . . a claim overlooked in good faith 
with no intent to delay or abuse the writ."). However, the 
explanations Petitioner provides in his pleadings lead the Court 
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to believe that the claims were notf in fact, overlooked in good 
faith. As noted above, in Petitioner's memorandum in support of 
this successive petition, for each claim that could have been, 
but was not, raised in a prior post-conviction petition, he 
states that he fairly presented the issues associated with these 
claims "in state court pleadings, briefs and associated filings, 
hearing, and argument." (Pet'r Mem, in Supp. at 174, 235, 252, 
259, 277, 331, 338, 379, 385, and 394). Thus, the issues on the 
basis of which he now raises claims that were not raised in his 
prior post-conviction petition were apparently known, or should 
have been known, to prior post-conviction counsel. They are not, 
therefore, claims that the Court can conclude were overlooked in 
good faith. Again, many of the claims in this category are based 
on facts in the trial record, not facts that require an 
independent investigation beyond examination of the written 
record. 
Furthermore, even if the Court's inferences from the 
language Petitioner uses in his pleadings are not warranted, 
other than making the bald assertion that the claims were 
overlooked in good faith, Petitioner fails to provide a detailed 
argument explaining how the exception applies to his case or the 
reasons in support of this exception. As the State points out, 
Petitioner nowhere provides legal support for the proposition 
that the "overlooked in good faith" exception applies "merely 
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because the evidence [does] not establish that [Petitioner] held 
back his claim[s] for tactical purposes." (State's Mem. in Reply 
at 89-90), Indeed, in light of the Utah Supreme Court's view 
that exceptions to the procedural bar rule should only apply "in 
those rare and unusual cases in which Aan obvious injustice or a 
substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right has 
occurred,' making it unconscionable not to reexamine the issue," 
Medel, 2008 UT 32 at 120 (emphasis added), if a procedural bar 
can be overcome merely by stating that a claim that could have 
been, but was not, raised in a prior post-conviction petition was 
overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay, the exception 
would effectively eviscerate the rule. 
Nevertheless, although Petitioner does not set forth a 
compelling basis for this argument, presumably the reasons he has 
in support of the "overlooked in good faith" exception are based 
upon his contention that new evidence exists that went 
undiscovered until recently because prior post-conviction counsel 
was either ineffective or insufficient funding was available to 
perform a constitutionally adequate investigation. 
Even these reasons, however, are insufficient for the Court 
to conclude that the "overlooked in good faith" exception applies 
in Petitioner's case. In the most recent decision from the Utah 
Supreme Court where the "overlooked in good faith" exception was 
addressed in the context of the discovery of new evidence, see 
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Tillman, 2005 UT 56. The Utah Supreme Court carefully set forth 
the grounds in support of the "overlooked in good faith" 
exception. There the Supreme Court held that the petitioner's 
post-conviction claim that the State had failed to disclose 
material exculpatory evidence NVas overlooked in good faith with 
no intent to delay or abuse the post-conviction process," id, at 
125f because (1) the petitioner "had no reason to believe that 
there [was] undisclosed [evidence] until the State revealed [its] 
existence some nineteen years later," and (2) the State had made 
"affirmative representations . . , that no such [evidence] 
existed." In Petitioner's case, he does not argue that he had 
no reason to believe that the new evidence he now possesses did 
not exist. Nor does he establish that the State, or any other 
governmental agency, affirmatively represented to his prior post-
conviction counsel that this new evidence did not exist. 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, all of Petitioner's 
claims that could have been, but were not, raised in his prior 
post-conviction petition are procedurally barred under the PCRA 
and under the common law and Petitioner has not shown that any 
statutory or common law exceptions apply that would permit the 
Court to consider the merits of these claims. 
Therefore, the State is entitled to a dismissal of these 
claims, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27. 
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4. Claim Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Prior Post-
Conviction Counsel 
In claim 29 of his successive petition, Petitioner argues 
that because the funding mechanism in place during his prior 
post-conviction proceedings "severely limit[ed the] funding of 
both the defense and investigation of post-conviction cases, 
including the retention of the services of crucial and 
fundamental expert services, and repeated necessity to litigate 
funding, [Petitioner's prior post-conviction] counsel was unable 
to provide effective assistance of counsel." (Pet'r Mem. in 
Supp. at 415). This claim is not procedurally barred insofar as 
it is not a claim that was raised and addressed in a prior 
proceeding. Moreover, it is also not a claim that could have 
been, but was not, raised as a substantive claim in Petitioner's 
prior post-conviction petition. 
On the other hand, it is a claim that, at least in theory, 
could have been raised in a prior proceeding. That is, a claim 
of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel could have 
been raised in a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment, 
see, e.g., Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at 12 ("Following the dismissal of 
[the petitioner's] case, [post-conviction counsel] withdrew and 
new counsel was appointed. [The petitioner] then moved to set 
aside the district court's dismissal of his petition for post-
conviction relief pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
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Civil Procedure."), or on appeal following the post-conviction 
court's dismissal of Petitioner's post-conviction petition. 
Practically speaking, however, this was not possible because 
prior post-conviction counsel continued his representation of 
Petitioner through the appeal of the dismissal of the post-
conviction petition. See Pascual v. Carver, 876 P. 2d 364, 366 
(Utah 1994) ("Counsel on appeal is not expected to allege his own 
ineffectiveness as counsel for the defendant at trial.''); 
Parsons, 871 P.2d at 521 ("[T]rial counsel cannot reasonably be 
expected to raise the issue of his or her own incompetence on 
appeal."). However, given the circumstances this issue may have 
been properly raised on appeal, not as a per se claim that prior 
post-conviction counsel was ineffective, but as a claim that he 
was rendered ineffective by the inadequate funding. This court 
does not believe that such a claim would be precluded by the 
above authorities. 
Nevertheless, a claim of ineffective assistance of prior 
post-conviction counsel is not a valid basis for relief under the 
PCRA or the common law and, therefore, the State is entitled to a 
dismissal of this claim. 
As the State points out, when Petitioner filed his 
successive post-conviction petition, the PCRA provided "a 
substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a 
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense." Utah Code Ann. § 
-93-
u 
78-35a-102(1) (emphasis added). However, whether prior post-
conviction counsel was ineffective is immaterial to whether 
Petitioner's guilty pleas and the imposition of his death 
sentences complied with constitutional and statutory 
requirements. Because Petitioner's claim of ineffective 
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel is not a claim that 
challenges his conviction or sentence, it is not a cognizable 
ground for relief under the PCRA and, therefore, not a claim for 
which the PCRA can provide a legal remedy. 
Moreover, although the PCRA allows a petitioner to seek 
relief on the basis that he "had ineffective assistance of 
counsel in violation of the United States Constitution or the 
Utah Constitution," Utah Code Ann- § 78-35a-104 (1) (d), a claim of 
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel does not 
fall within the ambit of this ground for relief because 
Petitioner is not entitled to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel under either the federal or state 
constitutions. The United States Supreme Court has expressly 
held that, under the federal constitution, M[t]here is no 
constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 
proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such 
proceedings/' Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 122, 752 (1991). 
See also Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at 184 ("We do, however, note that 
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the United States Supreme Court has previously declined to 
recognize a federal constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings."). 
In addition, as the Court previously discussed in Section 
III.A.2.C, Petitioner does not have a right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel under the Utah 
Constitution. Therefore, because Petitioner does not have a 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel under either the federal and state 
constitutions, he cannot seek post-conviction relief by asserting 
that he "had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of 
the United States Constitution or the Utah Constitution." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-104 (1) (d). 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, Petitioner's claim of 
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel is not a 
recognized ground for relief under the PCRA and, therefore, the 
State is entitled to a dismissal of this claim, claim 29. 
IV. Conclusion 
Almost nineteen years ago, Petitioner was charged with, 
pleaded guilty to, and was sentenced to death for the murders of 
Kay Tiede and Beth Potts. On direct appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court, Petitioner's guilty pleas and sentence of death for both 
murders were upheld. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition 
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for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty pleas and death 
sentence. After several years of litigation, the post-conviction 
trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment and 
denied post-conviction relief on all of Petitioner's claims. On 
appeal, the post-conviction court's grant of summary judgment was 
affirmed. Petitioner then sought relief in federal court. 
Although Petitioner's federal case was, and is, still pending, 
Petitioner filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief 
in state district court raising thirty separate claims. The 
State responded with a motion to dismiss. 
The parties' arguments for and against dismissal of the 
successive petition has required the Court to resolve numerous 
legal issues, including: (1) that the 2008 amendments to the 
PCRA, which removed the interests of justice exception to the 
time-bar, does not apply retroactively to Petitioner's case and, 
therefore, that Petitioner is entitled to rely on the interests 
of justice exception to argue that, if the filing of his 
successive post-conviction petition was untimely, it should be 
excused in the interests of justice; (2) that Petitioner has not 
shown that he has either a federal or state constitutional right 
to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel and, 
therefore, that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel 
is not a common law exception to the procedural bar rule; (3) 
that the 2008 amendments to the PCRA expressly stating that post-
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conviction petitioners do not have a statutory right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, does not apply 
retroactively to Petitioner's case and, therefore, in light of 
the Menzies decision, Petitioner had the statutory right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel during his 
initial post-conviction proceedings; and (4) that because the 
statutory right to post-conviction counsel is a legislatively 
created protection, it is constitutionally permissible, and 
within the Utah Legislature's power, to exclude from the PCRA an 
exception to the procedural bar rule based upon ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel and, therefore, that 
Petitioner cannot rely on his statutory right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel to overcome the procedural 
bar for successive claims that could have been, but were not, 
raised in his prior post-conviction petition. 
Although the parties disagree on whether the untimeliness of 
Petitioner's successive post-conviction petition should be 
excused, in order to avoid performing a merits review of each 
claim to determine whether the interests of justice exception 
applies, which has the potential of being both unnecessary and 
counter-productive, the Court has proceeded on the assumption 
that Petitioner's successive petition is not time-barred. 
Relying on the foregoing legal conclusions, and after carefully 
considering all of Petitioner's claims, the Court concludes that 
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all of his claims, with the exception of his claim alleging 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, are 
procedurally barred either because they were raised and addressed 
in a prior proceeding or because they are claims that could have 
been, but were not, raised in his prior petition for post-
conviction relief. 
As for the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel 
claim, the Court concludes that it is not a cognizable claim 
under the PCRA because it is not a challenge to Petitioner's 
conviction or sentence. Therefore, it is not a claim for which 
the PCRA can provide a legal remedy. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the 
State's motion to dismiss Petitioner's successive post-conviction 
petition. 
Order 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's Motion to Dismiss 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Relief 
Under the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act is dismissed. 
This Ruling and Order constitute the final order of the 
Court. No further order is necessary to effectuate the Court's 
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decision. 
DATED this ll day of 2009, 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
Third Judicial District Cour 
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Addendum C 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
43 EAST 400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE (801) 363-9500 
FAX (801) 364-3232 
September 13, 2002 
Mr. Lynn Vellinga 
Assistant Director 
Utah Division of Finance 
2110 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
RE: Von Lester Taylor v. Hank Galetka, Case No. 990902315. Disbursement of funds for 
litigation expenses. 
Dear Mr. Vellinga: 
I have enclosed a bill for Dr. Linda Gummow for services completed as part of litigation 
expenses in the above matter. This request is made pursuant to Utah Rule of Administarive 
Procedure 25-14-5. 
Please pay Dr. Gummow directly. If you have any questions, please contact me. Thank 
you for your attention to this matter. 
Sincerely, 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
FROM : CONGB* GUMMOU 
JUL. 9.2002 8:58PM P 
P r NO. : 4853702 
Conger & Gummow 
247 E. 2100 S. 
Salt Lak* City, UT8411S 
(801)485*8802 
7/9/02 
TO: R. Mauro, Esq. 
FROM: Linda J. Gummow, Ph.D. 
RE: Neuropsychological Evaluation of Von Taylor 
The fees for the neuropsychological evaluation of Mr. Taylor including record review and 
provision of a written summary are itemized in the table below. 
Date Service Time Charge 
4/10/02 Record Review 10.0 $1T000.00 
4/11/02 Administer Tests 5.0 $ 500.00 
4/12/02 Administer Tests 5.0 $ 500.00 
4/15/02 Administer Teste 5,0 $ 500.00 
4/23/02 Administer Tests 5.0 $ 500.00 
4/27/02 Score Tests and Prepare Summary 5.0 $ 500.00 
5/1 /02 Review test results interview family 5.0 $ 500.00 
Total $4,000,00 
Please remit payment to the address above. Thank you far your courtesy. 
.y^2^<«-^^-^^ 
Linda J. Gummow, Ph.D. 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
43 EAST 400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE (801) 363-9500 
FAX (801) 364-3232 
March 24, 2003 
Mr. Lynn Vellinga 
Assistant Director 
Utah Division of Finance 
2110 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
RE: Von Lester Taylor v. Hank Galetka, Case No. 990902315. Disbursement of funds for 
litigation expenses for investigation. 
Dear Mr. Vellinga: 
I have enclosed a bill for investigator Ted Cilwick for services completed as part of 
litigation expenses in the above matter. This request is made pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Administarive Procedure 25-14-5. 
Please pay Mr. Cilwick directly. If you have any questions, please contact me. Thank you 
for your attention to this matter. 
Sincerely, 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
TED CILWICK 
Certified Licensed 
Paralegal Investigator 
UcMlOQISS 
13820 North 3100 West Days 801-242-2209 
Collinston,Utah 84306 Home 43^458^3141 
March 20,2003 
Dear Rich Mauro: 
Here is a bill for work I've done on the Von Taylor death-penalty appeal case. 
Please send it in to the state at your next convenient moment thank you. 
6/4/02 0.4 hrs, meet w/Rich Mauro re further investigation 
6/5/02 0.8 hrs, go to Matheson Courthouse, pull Manley prior cases, start 
looking for him 
6/6/02 0.8 hrs, re Manley: talk w/court clerk in Des Moines and write records-
request; talk w/warden at prison; do Internet search for him 
6/7/02 1.4 hrs, read Mauro petition; in Weber and Davis courthouses, check 
files re S. Manley; more on Internet 
6/14/02 0.1 hrs, talk w/Iowa state police re Manley crim. record request 
6/24/02 0.4 hrs, deal w/Iowa state police identification bureau, write them letter 
re Manley 
7/1/02 0.6 hrs, go to Manley address 13* South, talk w/complex mgr.; write 
memo to Mauro 
2/4/03 1.6 hrs, go to L. Gummow's office, meet w/her and Mauro re further 
invest., inc. family 
2/12/03 1.4 hrs, meet w/Rich Mauro; talk w/Taylor's fether, talk w/Mary G.; 
talk w/Kaye C. 
2/14/03 LI hrs, read materials from Mauro in prep, family interviews 
2/15/03 0.1 hrs, talk w/Kaye C. re large meeting 
2/27/03 0.1 hrs, talk w/Kaye's husband 
3/1/03 4.6 hrs, 36 miles, go to Brigham City, interview client's family and 
5 siblings 
3/2/03 3.1 hrs, write 9.5-page report yesterday meeting; draft John's release 
and write him letter, phone conf w/Mauro re further invest. 
3/3/03 2.4 hrs, 46 miles, go to Ogden, find and interview Steve Taylor, write 4-
page report; talk on phone w/R- Taylor 
3/4/03 1.5 hrs, go to Ogden, look for and find Chris T.'s job, go there 2x; talk 
on phone w/T. Taylor about Von-Steve's accident; draft top of 
affidavit for Mauro 
3/6/03 1.9 hrs, in SLC, go to Robert T's home, interview him, write 2.5-page 
report; talk on phone w/Chris TVs girlfriend; w/Kathy 0. 
3/10/03 2.5 hrs, go to Ogden, interview Kathy 0., write 2.5-page report; in 
SLC, meet w/Mauro re my affidavit, further invest. 
3/18/03 4.1 hrs, 116 miles, roundtrip Brigham-SLC, meet w/Mauro and family 
member of victims' 
28,9 Hours: 198 Miles 
28.9 Hours @$50 $1,445.00 
198 Miles @$0 365 72.27 
Fee for Iowa crim. record . . 13.00 
$1,530.27 TOTAL 
ThankY/i 
TED piLWICK 
RICHARD R MAURO 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
43 EAST 400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE (801) 363-9500 
FAX (801)36^3232 
March 25, 2003 
Mr. Lynn Vellinga 
Assistant Director 
Utah Division of Finance 
2110 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
RE: Von Lester Taylor v. Hank Galetka, Case No. 990902315. Disbursement of funds for 
litigation expenses. 
Dear Mr. Vellinga: 
I have enclosed an additional bill for Dr. Linda Gummow for services completed as part of 
litigation expenses in the above matter. I have also enclosed a copy of the court order authorizing 
payment. This request is made pursuant to Utah Rule of Administarive Procedure 25-14-5. 
Please pay Dr. Gummow directly. If you have any questions, please contact me. Thank 
you for your attention to this matter. 
Sincerely, 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
cc. Dr. Linda Gummow 
Conger & Gummow 
247 E 2100 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
(801)485-8802 
3/21/03 
TO: R. Mauro, Esq. 
FROM: Linda J. Gummow, Ph.D. 
RE: Von Taylor 
As per your request, I provided three hours of consultation and affidavit preparation in 
this matter. The charge for this service is $300.00. Please send the bill in for payment. 
Payment can be sent to the above address. 
Thank you for your courtesy. 
Linda J. Gummow, Ph.D. 
Cc: David Munk 
i 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
43 EAST 400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE (801) 363-9500 
FAX (801)364-3232 
October 13,2003 
Mr. Lynn Vellinga 
Assistant Director 
Utah Division of Finance 
2110 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
RE: Von Lester Taylor v. Hank Galetka, Case No. 990902315. Disbursement of funds for 
litigation expenses for investigation. 
Dear Mr. Vellinga: 
I have enclosed a bill for investigator Ted Cilwick for services completed as part of 
litigation expenses in the above matter. This request is made pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Administarive Procedure 25-14-5. 
Please pay Mr. Cilwick directly. If you have any questions, please contact me. Thank 
you for your attention to this matter. 
Sincerely, 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
TED CILWICK 
Certified 
Paralegal 
13820 North 3100 West 
Collinston, Utah 84306 
Licensed 
Investigator 
Uc.#100268 
Days 801-242-2209 
Home 435-458-3141 
Oct. 2, 2003 
Dear Rich Mauro: 
Here is a bill for work on VON LESTER TAYLOR'S case. Please send it in to the state, 
thank vou. 
8/23/03 8.8 hrs, 405 miles, roundtrip travel Collinston-Gunnison state prison, 
interview co-def. E. Deli 
8/24/03 1.1 hrs, write 4/2-page report of yesterday Deli interview 
9.9 Hours; 405 Miles 
9.9 Hours @$50 $495.00 
405 Miles @$0.36 145.80 
Meal 9.21 
$650.01 TOTAL 
Thank You, 
TED CILWICK 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that, on the 30th day of April, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed by first-class mail to: 
Thomas B. Brunker 
Erin Riley 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
Criminal Appeals 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Counsel for Respondent 
( 0, (JMJkAnu%j)J 
Stephanie Verhamme 
